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Chapter 1 
 
Background of the Study 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Malaysia, a moderate yet progressive Muslim country, practices separate laws for Muslims and 
non-Muslims which has resulted in differences in women’s rights (Anwar, 2001). According to 
Embong (2001), Malaysia is a stable multicultural society consisting of Malay, Chinese and Indian 
descendants, but it is not without its crisis, especially when it involves religions. Malaysian Muslim 
women have often been subjected to gender inequalities concerning religious issues (Anwar, 2001). 
A group called Sisters in Islam (henceforth SIS) has tried to respond to this problem by initiating an 
Islamic feminist ideology in Malaysia. 
The aim of this thesis is to show a change taking place in Malaysian Muslim society 
instigated through the medium of newspaper debate. This chapter is divided into six sections: the 
first section provides the background of Malaysia which includes brief information on religions, 
languages, politics, media, legal system, and Global Gender Gap index; the second section explores 
Islamic fundamentalist discourse, the agenda of global feminism and its influence and relation to the 
birth of Islamic feminism in Malaysia; the third section looks at the purpose of the study and the 
research questions; the fourth section explores the significance of this study; the fifth section covers 
the limitations of this study and the final section gives the outline of this dissertation. 
 
1.2 Politics, Islam, judiciary system and media in Malaysia 
 
Malaysia is a democratic country with Islam as the official religion. Its long history has resulted in 
the construction of a multiethnic society there. According to Department of Statistics (2010), about 
sixty seven percent of Malaysian population consists of the ethnic groups Bumiputera (sons of the 
soil in English). The largest group among the Bumiputera is from the Malay ethnic group with about 
fifty four percent of the population. At about twenty-six percent, the Chinese ethnic group is the 
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second largest population in Malaysia. There are about seven percent people from the Indian ethnic 
group and the rest of thirteen percent is from other various ethnic groups (Department of Statistics, 
2010). 
As a result of different ethnic groups existing together in Malaysia, many religions are 
practised there. Malaysians normally refer to themselves as Muslims or non-Muslims based on either 
those who embrace Islam as their religion or those from other religions. Religions, however, cannot 
be based on certain ethnic groups as everyone except for the Malay ethnic group, can choose to 
embrace any religion. According to the Malaysian constitution, all Malays are Muslims but Chinese, 
Indians and others can either be Muslims or non-Muslims. There are around sixty-one percent 
Muslims, nineteen percent Buddhists, nine percent Christians, six percent Hindus and five percent 
other religions (Department of Statistics, 2010). It is the same case with languages. The official 
language is Bahasa Malaysia, also known as Malay in English. English is the second language for a 
large number of people, and is aspired to be the second language to everyone. A variety of Chinese 
and Indian dialects can also be found all over the country.  The next sections provide the scenarios of 
politics, Islam, judiciary system and media in Malaysia 
 
1.2.1 Malaysian politics 
 
Given the fact that there are diverse ethnic groups and religions, it is important for Malaysia to 
maintain peace and stability among the people. The federal head of state is The King and the head of 
government is Prime Minister. There are thirty ministers in the cabinet and 222 members of the 
parliament, from various pro-government and opposition parties. The ruling party called Barisan 
Nasional (BN) is based on a coalition of political parties from different ethnic groups. The major 
ones representing the Malay, Chinese and Indian ethnic groups respectively in BN are the United 
Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the 
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). This coalition is based on the right wing political position.  
After World War II, from 1955 to 1957, Malaysia was trying to gain independence from the 
British. The British made a condition for the leaders not to have one race dominating the government 
but to form a multi-racial government so that independence could take place (Hwang, 2003: 51). It 
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was for the sake of independence that the three distinct communal parties, UMNO, MCA and MIC 
formed the Alliance coalition to show multi-racial co-operation (Hwang, 2003: 51). Since Malaysia 
gained independence in 1957, the coalition of UMNO, MCA and MIC has always been the ruling 
force which formed the government. For the 1974 general election, the name Alliance was changed 
to Barisan Nasional (BN). BN once again won in the 13th General Election in Malaysia in 2013 and 
the present prime minister is Najib Razak, who took over the office in 2009 after Abdullah Badawi 
stepped down. 
There have been six prime ministers in Malaysia, all of whom are from UMNO. The longest 
serving prime minister is the fourth prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad, who was in the office for 22 
years, from 1981 to 2003. He was responsible for modernisation and high-tech development in 
Malaysia. His efforts were also seen in building economic prosperity, modernity and UMNO 
hegemony (Hilley, 2001: 105). However, there was a dispute between him and his deputy prime 
minister, Anwar Ibrahim, following an economic crisis in 1998. Anwar’s knowledge of internal 
corruption and nepotism, along with policy differences with Mahathir concerning crisis management 
resulted in the sacking of Anwar from both the office and UMNO by Mahathir (Hilley, 2001: 76). 
Anwar was accused to be involved with sexual impropriety thus he was charged with five counts of 
sodomy and five counts of corruption (Hwang, 2003: 277). He was sentenced to six years’ 
imprisonment and received another nine years for another sodomy charge. However, because of his 
good behaviour, he only served four years for his first sentence and his second sentence was upheld. 
Anwar Ibrahim’s sacking from the government triggered a movement called Reformasi (it 
means reformation in English) started by him against UMNO. Many Malaysians showed their 
support towards him and resisted BN’s ruling. Reformasi had a significant impact on Malaysian 
political history as an opposition political coalition was formed by four largest opposition political 
parties in 1999. Anwar Ibrahim’s wife, Wan Azizah formed Parti Keadilan Nasional (National 
Justice Party) or KeADILan in 1999. KeADILan made a coalition with the Democratic Action Party 
(DAP), Parti Islam SeMalaysia (Islamic Party of Malaysia or PAS) and the Malaysian People’s Party 
(PRM) in 1999. It was called Barisan Alternative (BA or Alternative Front in English). BN has 
always won two thirds majority in elections but since the election in 1999, after Anwar’s sacking, 
BA has managed to weaken the majority as BA won some seats (Funston, 2001: 190). In 2003, 
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KeADILan changed its name to Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR, People’s Justice Party in English) after 
merging with PRM. Anwar Ibrahim returned to the political arena in 2008 after the ban on him 
getting involved in politics was lifted. After Malaysia’s 12th General Election in 2008, the name BA 
was changed to Pakatan Rakyat (PR, People’s Pact or Alliance in English) and it consists of PKR, 
DAP and PAS. 
Hilley (2001: 232) argued that the left politics in Malaysia can be somewhere between the 
“left social-democratic” and the “liberal reformist” variants. Hilley also asserted that in Malaysian 
political context, the left political force has always been marginalised. PKR’s focus is on social 
justice and anti-corruption while DAP leans towards a more democratic socialist economic policy. 
PAS is devoted to form an Islamic state in Malaysia (Thaib, 2012: 53). Through collaborations with 
other parties, PAS secured control of a state government in a state called Kelantan since 1990 and 
received exceptional performances in general elections of 1974, 1990 and 1999 (Thaib, 2012: 54). 
During the Reformasi period, PAS gained control of another state government, Terengganu in 1999 
general election (Thaib, 2012: 54). 
 
1.2.2 Islamization in Malaysia 
 
In the 1980s, under Mahathir’s ruling when he was the Prime Minister, the government developed an 
Islamization policies in Malaysia (Loh, 2002: 31). This project was initiated following the Islamic 
revivalism in Malaysia from the opposition Islamic party, PAS and other Islamic resurgence 
movements. In 1982, Mahathir tried to Islamise the Malaysian society and state laws to prove the 
“Islamic credentials” of UMNO as a political party by embarking on several policies (Othman, 2006: 
344). Among others, the policy involved “instituting procedures and government agencies aimed at 
bureaucratizing the potential role of Islam in the economy” (Othman, 2006: 344). Other measures 
include standardizing the interpretation and implementation of Islamic laws by setting International 
Islamic University, Islamic banking and insurance scheme, Quran reading competition and an 
Islamic center within the Prime Minister’s office which aimed to link Malaysian Islam with 
non-Muslim world’s modern knowledge, skills and procedures (Ong, 1999: 366, Loh, 2002: 31). 
Mahathir also made the functions and authority of Muslim scholars or ulamas centralized at the 
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federal level under the Department for Islamic Development in the Prime Minister’s Office (known 
as JAKIM) (Othman, 2006: 344). The government’s aim was not to create an Islamic State but to 
“direct the Islamic resurgence away from dogmatism and conservatism towards modernity and 
progression” (Foley, 2004: 57). 
 UMNO and PAS parties work on different grounds and beliefs, making it difficult at times for 
some issues concerning Islam to be resolved. Islamization policies by UMNO was a part of 
representing a more liberal interpretation of Islam so that the party and the government appealed 
more to non-Muslims especially with PAS’s attempt to implement Islamic criminal law (hudud) and 
form an Islamic state (Loh, 2002: 31).  
 
1.2.3 Malaysian legal system 
 
Malaysian law is based on the common law which is influenced by the British. Two types of law, criminal 
and civil law are applicable to all Malaysians. The court system consists of Superior Courts (High Court, 
Court of Appeal and Federal Court) and Subordinate Courts (Sessions, Magistrate and Native Courts) 
(Funston, 2001: 183). Malaysia also practices dual judiciary systems of criminal and civil laws, and 
Islamic law. Muslims fall under the jurisdiction of Islamic law, which is also known syariah law in 
family law, inheritance law, transactional law and penal law. For Muslims these matters are handled 
in Syariah Courts; however, personal laws for non-Muslims are handled in civil courts (Lee, 2004).  
Syariah Courts are governed by state laws while civil courts in Malaysia are a federalized 
court system. The establishment of Islamic or syariah law may have different implementation of 
laws depending on the states as there are 13 states and 1 Federal Territories which have their own 
Syariah Courts. Therefore, there are 14 different syariah systems due to “variations in the legal code 
between the states” (Foley, 2004: 64). Islamic Family Law which is based on the Quran, covers 
Muslims’ way of life and looks into marriage and divorce, and related matters such as maintenance, 
matrimonial property, custody and the relationship between children and parents (Abdullah, 2007: 
514). Religious judges known as kadi run Syariah Courts and they are the ones who interpret and 
implement Islamic laws (Ong, 1999: 356). There are also religious counsels or mufti in Syariah 
Courts who can issue religious rulings or edicts (known as fatwa) concerning Muslim behaviour and 
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religious scholars or ulama who also have a say in religious matters (Ong, 1999: 356). The control of 
the Islamic discourse goes to ulama who are considered as capable of interpreting Islam and those 
who do not follow their Islamic version may be condemned as kafir (unbelievers) or murtaad 
(apostate) (Foley, 2004: 61 - 62). There are no specific sentences yet for Muslims who became 
apostates as the crime of apostasy is not mentioned in syariah law enactment syariah law (Hasan & 
Mohd Ali, 2007: 5). Instead, some states in Malaysia look into the crime of converting from Islam, 
for example, in Malacca, Muslims who wish to convert from Islam may be detained by the religious 
department which will guide them to repent (Hasan & Mohd Ali, 2007: 5). In another state, Perlis, 
Muslims who try to change their religion may be asked to undergo rehabilitation for not more than a 
year (Hasan & Mohd Ali, 2007: 5). 
There is a conflict between federal and state religious authorities when it comes to law 
reforms and uniformity of Islamic laws (Anwar, 2001: 245). The federal government believes in a 
progressive vision of Islam and in the need to reinterpret the Quran in order to keep up with the 
challenges of contemporary society (Anwar, 2001: 245). However, most people in religious 
authority at the state level are “fundamentally opposed to this progressive vision” (Anwar, 2001: 
245). Islamic laws are drafted at the federal level but whenever there is a legal reform, the state level 
officials’ mind-set to implement the laws remains unchanged (Anwar, 2001: 244-245). 
 
1.2.4 Media condition in Malaysia 
 
There is a diverse and distinct choice of media language in Malaysia. Since the population is made of 
various ethnic groups, the newspapers are available in Malay, English, Chinese and Tamil languages, 
and publication is separated according to West Malaysia (also known as Peninsular Malaysia) and 
East Malaysia (consisting of Sabah and Sarawak).  
The following newspapers published in Malaysia are referred from Audit Bureau of 
Circulations (Audit Bureau of Circulations, 2012). Malay and English newspapers are published 
daily and have weekly or Sunday editions. National newspapers published in Malay for West 
Malaysia and Sarawak are Harian Metro, Metro Ahad, Kosmo, Kosmo Ahad, Utusan Malaysia, 
Mingguan Malaysia, Berita Harian and Berita Minggu. Except for Kosmo, other Malay newspapers 
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can be found in Sabah. Sinar Harian is a Malay newspaper with different editions for various states 
in West Malaysia. There are local newspapers in East Malaysia such Utusan Borneo in Sarawak and 
Utusan Borneo Sabah in Sabah.  
National newspapers which use English in East and West Malaysia are The Star, Sunday 
Star, New Straits Times and New Sunday Times. The Edge can only be found in East Malaysia. Local 
newspapers in English are Malay Mail and Sunday Mail in East Malaysia, The Borneo Post and The 
Sunday Post in Sarawak, and Borneo Post Sabah and New Sabah Times in Sabah. Newspapers 
published in Chinese for both East and West Malaysia are Sin Chew and China Press. Guang Ming 
is published in West Malaysia and Sabah, while Oriental Daily is only for West Malaysia circulation. 
Except for Oriental Daily which is published daily, other Chinese newspapers have day and night 
editions for West Malaysia and only day edition for East Malaysia. Chinese newspapers published in 
East Malaysia are See Hua Daily News and United Daily News. Other Chinese newspapers in Sabah 
are Asia Times, Morning Post, Harian and Tawau Express. Newspapers published in Indian or 
Tamil language are Tamil Nesan, Malaysia Nanban and Makkal Osai. 
These are circulation figures of major newspapers in Malay, English and Chinese in 
Malaysia from January to June 2012 produced by Audit Bureau of Circulations (ABC, 2012). The 
circulation for East Malaysia is given in brackets. The highest circulation for Malay newspapers is 
Harian Metro with 394,026 (Sarawak: 13,058, Sabah: 13,717), followed by 224,518 for Kosmo 
(Sarawak: 1,661), 181,356 for Utusan Malaysia (Sarawak: 3,602, Sabah: 1,274) and 144,955 for 
Berita Harian (Sarawak: 3,324, Sabah: 3,633). A daily newspaper published in English with the 
highest circulation is The Star with 290,566 (Sarawak: 5,993, Sabah: 2,217) and the circulation 
figures for New Straits Times is 100,382 (Sarawak: 1,392, Sabah: 1,001) and 21,979 for The Edge. 
The circulation figures for Chinese newspapers combine both day and night editions, Sin Chew has 
the highest circulation of 407,349 (Sarawak: 59,112, Sabah: 487), followed by 240,547 for China 
Press (Sarawak: 7, Sabah: 27), 113,354 for Guang Ming (Sabah: 86) and 105,667 for Oriental Daily. 
The Malaysian government controls the media industry through legal controls and media 
ownership (Anuar, 2005: 29). Ruling parties of the Malaysian government own or have close 
connection to mainstream newspapers or other media companies, which gives them control over the 
press. The involvement of the dominant partners in the ruling coalition started after the introduction 
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of Malaysia’s New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971 which aimed to improve national economy and 
achieve harmony among the many ethnic groups (Nain, 2002: 127). With the investment in the 
major newspapers, eventually the ruling coalition takes control and has influence over the 
newspapers (Loh & Mustafa, 1996, cited in Nain, 2002: 127). 
Data for this study are collected from newspaper columns from The Star and the New Straits 
Times. These two newspapers have the highest and second highest circulation figures for English 
newspapers in Malaysia, and they are two pro-government newspapers owned by MCA and UMNO 
respectively. UMNO and MCA are parts of the ruling parties of Malaysian government from Barisan 
Nasional coalition, which makes the two newspapers in favour of the government as the media 
owners. The largest English newspaper in Malaysia, The Star, is owned by MCA (Hashim, 2006: 
230). It is managed by a company called Huaren Management Sdn Bhd which is an investment arm 
of MCA that owns other media companies besides The Star such as Sunday Star, Nanyang Siang 
Pau, China Press and a radio station, Star Rfm (Anuar, 2005: 31). The New Straits Times is a part of 
a larger company called the New Straits Times Press group (NSTP) owned by Media Prima (Anuar, 
2005: 30). Besides The New Straits Times, NSTP publishes other English newspapers such as New 
Sunday Times, Malay Mail and Sunday Mail. It also publishes Malay newspapers such as Berita 
Harian, Berita Minggu and Harian Metro. Media Prima also owns television stations consisting of 
TV3, 8TV, Channel 9 and ntv7. Media Prima has many shareholders who are closely associated 
with UMNO (Anuar, 2005: 31, Hashim, 2006: 230). Two Tamil newspapers, Tamil Nesan and 
Malaysia Nanban are closely allied with the MIC, the Indian party from BN coalition (Anuar, 2005: 
31, Hashim, 2006: 230). Politicians in East Malaysia own newspapers in East Malaysia such as the 
New Sabah Times and the Borneo Post (Anuar, 2005: 31). 
Law is another way of controlling the press industry which is exercised by using the Printing 
Presses and Publications Act (PPPA) (Anuar, 2005: 29). This act states that newspapers should 
possess a publishing permit from the Ministry of Home Affairs and must renew their printing 
licenses annually (Nain, 2002: 128). A licence or permit can be revoked or suspended if the press is 
found to be “prejudicial to public order or security” (Nain, 2002: 129). The Sedition Act is another 
law which curbs the freedom of expression and limits the press freedom (Anuar, 2005: 30). This act 
is meant to control the press from criticizing government policies.  
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According to the 2013 Press Freedom Index, Malaysia was placed at number 145 out of 179 
countries (Reporters without Borders, 2013). It was a big drop for Malaysia from 122nd place in 
2011-2012 Press Freedom Index to 145th place in 2013 because “access to information is becoming 
more and more limited” (Reporters without Borders, 2013).   
All these imply that there is no actual ‘freedom of expression’ in the mainstream media since 
everything that is accessible to the public is still very much scanned, edited and controlled by the 
government, which makes the opposition parties, including the Islamist party (PAS) having 
constraints and limited press freedom. The Islamic feminist group in Malaysia, Sisters in Islam (SIS) 
also has constraints on what they can write especially concerning Islam. All media practitioners are 
bound by the law and the constitution in Malaysia as they cannot write anything against Islam or 
other religions, cultures or against the government.  
 
1.3 Feminism and Islam 
 
This section looks at gender inequality issue in certain areas of Islamic law (also known as syariah 
law) in Muslim countries including Malaysia. The discussion of gender inequality provides a vital 
background to this research as it is an important agenda of Islamic feminist movements. This study 
incorporates feminist studies as it investigates the discourse of Islamic feminism in Malaysia. I also 
discuss some crucial aspects of gender and inequality concerning Muslim women in Malaysia.  
The World Economic forum conducts a study to assess gender gap in countries from all over 
the world. The index is measured based on four criteria: economic participation and opportunity, 
educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment. The aim is to “provide a 
global synopsis of the patterns of gender inequality which may help to eliminate the gender gap 
across the globe” (Hausmann, Tyson, & Zahidi, 2011). 
From the World Economic Forum’s report on the 2011 Global Gender Gap Index, Malaysia 
was ranked at number 97 out of 135 countries (Hausmann, Tyson, & Zahidi, 2011). This low ranking 
for Malaysia reflects the social inequality between men and women in many aspects such as the lack 
of female involvement in politics. Currently women make up only about ten percent of the members 
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of the parliament in Malaysia. According to the Department of Statistics (2011), less than forty-eight 
percent of women participate in the labor force in Malaysia.  
 
1.3.1 Islamic fundamentalist or Islamist discourse 
 
According to Moghissi (1999), a fundamentalist agenda proposes to reform the society by adopting 
models of an idealized past. Islamic fundamentalist movements suggest that Islamic societies’ 
subjugation is caused by their deviation from “true” and “authentic” Islam, and they seek to save and 
“purify” Islamic societies. The fundamentalists also oppose the separation of religion and politics. 
The term Islamist is used to describe Muslims who want to go back to the Quran, follow a 
conservative interpretation of the religious texts, and they often want to create an Islamic State (Foley, 
2004: 54). Islamists are sometimes called fundamentalist although the term “Islamic fundamentalist” 
is generally thought of as pejorative; therefore some Muslims prefer to be known as “Islamists” 
(Foley, 2004: 54). 
There are various political agendas of Islamist groups in the Middle East, but most of them 
agree on the “women question”, in which they oppose the influence of Western values in the Middle 
East, and challenge the agendas of secular women’s groups’ (Graham-Brown, 2001: 31-32). 
According to Graham-Brown, most Islamist groups divide gender roles into men as having the 
utmost power and women as wives and mothers, and also perceive the importance of men’s control 
over women’s sexual purity. Another area that shows men’s control over women is women’s modest 
dress and dress codes which leaves women’s identity to be defined by men (Graham-Brown, 2001: 
32). Since the twenty-first century, from Algerian Islamist groups’ point of view, women are 
forbidden from working or be involved in politics because they are seen as subordinates 
(Graham-Brown, 2001: 23-24). Saudi Arabians women receive tough restrictions on daily lives for 
example, they are not allowed to drive or use taxicabs without male guardian or another woman’s 
presence, and there was an opinion preventing women from working outside the home (Doumato, 
2001: 166). Some Saudi shaikhs believe that working women are considered dangerous since they 
work with men and it may lead to “adultery, split society and wreck society” thus men are seen as 
“the protectors and maintainers of women” to keep them safe (Doumato, 2001, 170). Women’s 
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religious groups in Kuwait stressed the return to “traditional female virtues and morality” and “a 
body of discourse” was seen generated to place women’s domestic role as important (Al-Mughni, 
2001: 179). A women’s group, the Federation of Kuwaiti Women’s Association (FKWA) which 
supported “Arab and Islamic traditions”, put the blame on women for various social problems 
(Al-Mughni, 2001: 181).  
According to Foley (2004: 56), the type of Islam in Malaysia is considered ‘softer’, and the 
practice of Islam is mostly tolerant and moderate. This is because the religion is practiced alongside 
Malay customs and traditions known as adat since the introduction of Islam to the Malay peninsular 
in the fourteenth century. Adat is a “fairly egalitarian system based on bilateral descent and 
inheritance” (Foley, 2004: 56). Malay Sultans or kings took control of Islam and it became the 
official religion of Malaysia during the time of independence in 1957 (Foley, 2004: 56). Up until late 
1970s, there was expectation of veiling or mixing in public space for Muslim women in Malay 
culture, and there was no tradition of segregation between Muslim men and women (Anwar, 2001: 
232-233). However, the rights and benefits Muslim women in Malaysia enjoyed began to change 
during Islamic revivalism in 1980s (Anwar, 2001: 234). 
In the mid-1980s, many events began influencing the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia (Anwar, 
2001: 241). The first event came from hundreds of Malay students who returned from England, but 
influenced and radicalized by the followers of conservative Jamaat-i-Islam of Pakistan and the 
Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt living in Britain (Anwar, 2001: 241). Those who became lecturers or 
teachers started to nurture “a more militant generation of Islamists”, “declared the government 
infidel and demanded the creation of an Islamic state” (Anwar, 2001: 241). The second event 
involved “the leadership crisis in PAS”, the Islamist political party, which saw the graduates in 
theology and jurisprudence from Middle Eastern universities took over the party and also demanded 
the creation of an Islamic state (Anwar, 2001: 241). PAS made the constitution to be based on the 
Quran and Sunnah, applied syariah law, and recognized the leadership of religious scholars (the 
ulama) (Anwar, 2001: 241). 
Feminists in Malaysia have claimed that the Islamic fundamentalist discourse leads to gender 
inequality for Malaysian Muslim women. There has been “a steady erosion of freedom and rights in 
the areas of law and access to syariah legal system, as well as in rights of dress, family, public 
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participation, and socialization between the sexes (Anwar, 2001: 234). One of the founders of SIS, 
Othman wrote about the Malaysian experience of patriarchal discourse and ideology through the 
movement of Islamic fundamentalism/extremism or political Islamist (Othman, 2006: 341). These 
movements of “Islamisation agenda seek to organize (or re-organize) the practices of social life” of 
what they deem as “truly Islamic” or “authentic Islamic values” (Othman, 2006: 341). Islamic 
fundamentalists seek to establish a “pristine Islamic society and state” and take control of women, 
their social roles, movements and sexuality (Othman, 2006: 341). Male jurists and scholars 
dominated the interpretation and codification of Islamic law which led to an orthodox mainstream 
that men and women are not equal (Anwar, 2001: 230). 
The targets of most Islamic movements are covering or veiling of women, and promoting a 
policy of gender segregation (Othman, 2006: 341). Muslim women’s covering is often used to 
measure “authentic” Islamic identity and piety. When PAS first ruled Kelantan in 1990, they 
introduced a dress code for Muslim women and practices of gender segregation such as in seating 
arrangements and payment counters (Anwar, 2001: 234; Othman, 2006: 342). Muslim women were 
also discouraged to work at night shifts. 
Malaysian Islamists’ rationale behind the restrictions on Muslim women is because they 
need to protect women. The typical Islamists set a mind-set which put “uncovered and uncontrolled 
women” and how women dress as the cause of social problems and blame for rape. This mind-set 
creates a popular discourse of the “main role responsibility of women as obedient wives and dutiful 
mothers and daughters” (Othman, 2006: 342). Getting permission from her husband before a wife 
engages with activities outside the house is another discourse by traditional Malaysian Muslim 
scholars. This brings the assumption that “in Islam a woman is considered secondary and inferior or 
subordinate to men and therefore men are charged with the religious responsibility of protecting and 
taking care of her in any way – her basic needs, her life, morality and chastity” (Othman, 2006: 342).  
Gender-biased discourses and discriminatory view of gender relations are also disseminated 
through various media discourse and education programs and public talks in Malaysia. The practice 
of Islamic fundamentalist ideology is “coterminous with the delegitimation of Malay or local culture 
and tradition” (Othman, 2006: 343). Malay customs and cultural identity are replaced with the 
“preferred Arabised Islamic identity” promoted by Islamists movement as “truly Islamic”. Muslim 
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women in Malaysia have been struggling with freedom and rights in the areas of law and access to 
the syariah legal system, the rights of dress, family, public participation and socialization between 
sexes (Anwar, 2001: 234).  
 
1.3.2 Islamic family law (IFL) 
 
The practice of Islamic Family Law (IFL) became a systematic jurisprudence in the ninth century, by 
using four sources of Islamic law: the Quran (Islamic divine revelation texts of God), the collection 
of the Prophet’s model behavior (the Sunnah) in narrative reports or traditions (hadith), analogical 
reasoning upon the texts, and consensus of the whole community and religious scholars (Esposito, 
2001: 9). 
According to Joseph & Slyomovics (2001: 2), patriarchy shapes the gender system in most 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa, and some have argued that patriarchy affects social 
order and hinders equality and democracy. The institutions of patriarchy provide privileges to males 
and elders, and enhance their powers over women. For most Arab-Muslim countries, matters related 
to family laws such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and child custody are bound by religious 
institutions (Joseph & Slyomovics, 2001: 5). Thus, feminists have argued that family law in the 
Middle East and North Africa entails gender bias since male clerics hold patriarchal control in laws 
concerning women and family, thus putting gender issues as secondary (Joseph & Slyomovics, 
2001: 5). 
According to Charrad (2001: 61), family law in the Islamic world defines women’s rights as 
representing political issue, since it involves the authority of governments and affects politics from 
both right and left wing parties. In Maghrib countries (Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria), Islamic law 
awards the control of women’s lives to male members of the kin group, and favours males and kin 
on the male side in matters of marriage, divorce and inheritance (Charrad, 2001: 63). Women’s rights 
advocates in the Maghrib countries have played pivotal roles in improving family law and women’s 
rights. Through the struggle of restructuring legal systems of the Maghrib countries after the 
independence of Morocco and Tunisia in 1956 and Algeria in 1962, significant changes have taken 
place especially in Tunisia. In matters of marriage, Tunisian women now must give verbal consent 
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and attend their wedding while guardian’s consent is still required in Morocco, women must also 
sign their marriage contract to get married (Charrad, 2001: 65 & 70). Polygamy was abolished in 
Tunisia but continued to be legal in Morocco and Algeria (Charrad, 2001: 65). Divorce proceedings 
in Morocco only saw a dismal change, while in Algeria and Tunisia, divorce must take place in court, 
although only in Tunisia men and women are given the rights to file for divorce (Charrad, 2001: 65). 
Guardianship law went through a significant change in Tunisia, as mothers who are given custody 
rights can also challenge the rights of guardianship (Charrad, 2001: 70).  
 
1.3.3 Problems of Islamic family law in Malaysia 
 
The call for reformation of the Islamic Family Law (IFL) in Malaysia in 1984 was due to the 
awareness towards gender justice and human rights as well as a modernization of Islamic law (Noor, 
2007: 123). Among those trying to reform are academician-reformists, the lobbyist by Islamic 
movements and women organizations. According to Othman (2006: 339), the sole interpretation of 
syariah law is grounded in a traditionalist (non-historicised) interpretation from men’s point of view, 
which frequently discriminates against women. This dominant interpretation of syariah law serves as 
a platform of continued discussion and debate in Malaysia concerning gender inequality for Muslim 
women. With the influence of Islamic resurgence, women’s rights were also limited as appropriate 
ways of dressing and behaving were also imposed on them (Foley, 2004: 64).  
Under syariah law, Muslim women face problems with regards to “difficulties in accessing 
their rights, the strength of male rights compared to female rights and the bias of male judges” (Foley, 
2004: 64). According to Othman (2006: 344), it is somewhat easy for Muslim men in Malaysia to 
practice polygamy, divorce a wife or wives irresponsibly, neglect maintenance for children or 
abandon wives and children. Polygamy is illegal for non-Muslims in Malaysia but it is accepted for 
Muslims. However, conditions that a Muslim man should fulfil before marrying more than one wife 
are usually overlooked. Normally the court only considers the man’s financial ability but neglects 
other conditions: a just and necessary reason, the ability to treat his wives equally, and that the 
proposed marriage not causing physical, mental, or spiritual harm to the existing wife/wives (Anwar, 
2001: 244).  
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“Weak and discriminating implementation” of syariah law is sometimes successfully 
claimed by women in divorce matters (Anwar, 2001: 244). Non-Muslims can file for divorce via 
mutual consent or petition by either spouse. Muslim men are able to pronounce a divorce unilaterally 
and register the case in a single hearing; however, divorce cases filed by women, due to gender-bias 
being normalised in Muslim courts, often result in long battles, taking years to settle (Anwar, 2001: 
244). Many divorced, abandoned, abused or neglected Muslim women cases do not get prompt 
action from Muslim courts or the legal action is not available to women, which in the end often result 
in injustice and oppression to women (Othman, 2006: 344).  
While non-Muslims enjoy equal rights to guardianship and equal rights to inheritance, IFL 
states otherwise: the father is the sole primary guardian of his children and the wife does not inherit 
the whole matrimonial property (Mahathir, 2006). The existence of two separate judiciary systems 
has resulted in different conditions for Malaysian Muslims and non-Muslims pertaining to personal 
matters, which is seen as unequal by some and as causing many women to question its efficiency and 
fairness in a multicultural society. Gender discrimination is also seen in the implementation of 
Islamic law, for example in a 1997 case regarding modesty, Muslim women who took part in a 
beauty pageant were arrested but no actions were taken on males who exposed their bodies in a 
body-building contest (Othman, 2006: 345). 
In 2005, the Malaysian Parliament passed the amendments of Islamic Family Law known as 
the 2005 Amendments. In their website, Sisters in Islam (SIS) has listed the provisions in the 2005 
Amendments that they claim “detrimental to women’s rights and interests” (Sisters In Islam, 2013). 
The first provision is on polygamy. The previous conditions in 1984 Act before contracting a 
polygamous marriage “just and necessary” have changed to “just or necessary”. These conditions 
ignore the principle of justice as mentioned in the Quran as men can give the condition “necessary” 
to take another wife. The second provision is division of matrimonial assets upon husband’s 
polygamous marriage. The gender neutral language in the amendment allows “any party” to claim 
matrimonial assets before a polygamous marriage is contracted. The third provision is the right of 
fasakh or dissolution of a marriage. Previously in 1984 Act only the wife was given the right to apply for 
fasakh but now on top of the right to talaq or divorce, men are also given the right to apply for fasakh. The 
next provision is on prohibitory order against wife’s property. The new amendment uses gender neutral 
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language and allows the court to grant injunction which prevents the disposition of property by a wife or 
former wife. This is claimed as contradicting the traditional Islamic law which says that the husband has no 
rights over the property belonged to his wife. The final provision is on penalties. There are still no penalties 
for husbands who contract polygamous marriage without the permission of the court and for husbands who 
pronounce talaq or divorce outside the court as recommended in 1984 Act. In addition to the 1984 Act of the 
penalty for “disobedience of wife”, the 2005 Amendment added other penalties such as the penalty for 
“ill-treatment of wife” was extended to be gender neutral as “ill treatment of spouse”. Hence, wives may face 
double penalty unlike husbands who are only liable to ill-treatment penalty. Another penalty is for apostasy in 
order to annul marriage. Even though gender neutral language is used for this, SIS has claimed that this 
penalty may be used on wives as husbands can apply for divorce so there is no use of the attempt to be 
apostate to annul marriage.  
 
1.3.4 Islamic feminist discourse 
 
The Muslim world has seen the rise of Islamic feminism at the end of the twentieth century, 
especially in Iran and Egypt (to name a few examples) (Badran, 2005:12). The emerging movement 
of Islamic feminism is based on expert scholars in Islamic studies who interpreted the Islamic texts 
(Halim & Meyers, 2010: 87). According to Badran (2005: 6), Islamic feminism is “built upon a 
single paramount Quran-centered discourse”. In defining feminist discourse, Badran (2005: 7-8) 
pointed out how some Muslim feminist-leaning women have tended to draw on the discourse of 
religious reform, consisting of Islamic modernist discourse that is intertwined with the new 
nationalist discourse. Islamic feminism is based on new readings of the Quran which assert equality 
for both women and men across the public or private sphere (Badran, 2005:14). The practice of 
social justice is important to Islamic feminist movement as social justice cannot be attained if full 
gender equality is not achieved (Badran, 2005:12). Ulama or Muslim scholars believe that the doors 
of ijtihad (independent reasoning) were closed long ago, thus anyone not educated in religion has no 
right to speak on or question the religion (Anwar, 2001:231; Othman, 2006: 346). However, Islamic 
feminists are critical on the understanding on independent reasoning and believe that any “believer” 
can claim the right to independent reasoning (Moll, 2009: 46). 
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A notable Islamic feminist, Mir-Hosseini, focused on three major issues: promotion of new 
discourses on gender among Muslim scholars, confrontation of Islamic family laws by common 
women, and the appearance of reform-minded Islamic feminists (Moghadam, 2002: 145). A 
discourse of Islamic feminism interprets Islam as quite different from the patriarchal Islamists 
(Badran, 2001). This new interpretation is distinct from the interpretation of secular feminists since 
Islamic feminists are demanding women’s place and rights within an Islamic framework (Treacher, 
2003). Both Islamic and Western feminisms have the common objective to empower women and 
create social change, however, Islamic feminism would only endorse the rights for women based on 
Islamic rulings as prescribed in the Quran and the hadith (Halim & Meyers, 2010: 87). Moghadam 
(2002) asserts that some Muslim women have reinterpreted Islamic law in order to eliminate 
discrimination against women and improve women’s legal status.  
Based on the global understanding of feminism and its influence to the world, Kassim (2009) 
states that any Muslim man or woman will be labeled as a feminist if one speak, write or delve into 
issues about women. She argues that the term “feminism” cannot be Islamicised because Islam does 
not have any concepts of feminism as according to the Quran and the hadiths, women are already 
given equal rights and the rightful position alongside men. However, due to the spread of the global 
feminist agenda into the Muslim world, many Muslims have revisited the rights of Muslim women 
and have explored research about women’s rights and status in the Quran and the hadiths (Kasim, 
2009: 205).  
According to Kasim (2009: 233), most Western feminists reject the connection of any form 
of divine texts and religion in their feminist agenda, which clashes with Muslim’s beliefs. Many also 
fear that Muslim societies will be influenced by the negative results of Western feminist agenda. 
However, Kassim (2009) claims it is undeniable that feminism has somehow influenced Muslim 
women in various Muslim countries in their struggle of getting equal women’s rights. The 
emergence of Islamism is one of the reasons of the awareness for women’s rights. Islamism 
promotes the discourse of ‘women are blameworthy to social ills’ and leave out men who are also 
involved in social deviance (Kassim, 2009). Kassim asserts that many Muslim feminists reject the 
same Western feminists’ deconstruction of familial institution, but she fears that some Muslim 
feminists may adopt postmodernist ideas in their writings and change the Muslim society like the 
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West. However, she assures that there are still many highly educated Muslims who work within the 
Islamic framework to improve the position of Muslim women. 
In the Middle East, Muslim women’s plight concerning men’s control over females’ personal 
lives is central to Islamic feminist movement. Nawal El-Saadawi, an Egyptian doctor and writer, 
objects men’s sexual repression and oppression to women, which she believes is the outcome of 
conservative interpretations of Islam (Graham-Brown, 2001: 31). Another scholar from Morocco, 
Fatima Mernissi, also opposes the double standards in sexual behavior as she challenges the 
patriarchal power instilled by Islam which has subordinated women and perceived female sexuality 
as capable of contributing to social ills or disorder (Graham-Brown, 2001: 31). Zine (2006) argues 
that Muslim women have to face challenges on dual oppressions: neo-Orientalism and Islamophobia, 
and fundamentalism and religious extremism. 
Within the framework of Islamic belief, many Muslim women around the world have 
attempted to reform syariah law to revisit women’s rights. Among many women who have been 
reinterpreting the religious texts are Afsaneh Najmabadeh, Ziba Mir-Hosseini (Iranian), Nazira Zain 
al-Din (Lebanese) and Amina Wadud (African American), along with other pioneer Islamic feminists 
like Zainab Al-Ghazali, ‘Aisha ‘Abd al-Rahman (Egyptian), Fatima Mernissi (Moroccan), and many 
others have produced numerous papers on gender equality and justice (Badran, 2001 & 2005). Zine 
(2006: 17) has suggested an approach called a “critical faith-centered” for Islamic feminists to 
understand the connection of sites of religious oppression to various forms of marginality based on 
race, ethnicity, class, gender, sexuality, religion, and imperialism.  
In addition to individual Islamic feminists, international women’s organizations have also 
been involved in Islamic re-interpretations to increase Muslim women’s rights and reform legal 
systems. From early twentieth century in Turkey, Iran and Egypt, women’s organizations started to 
form and they demanded education, work opportunities and reform of personal status and family law 
(Graham-Brown, 2001: 24). In 1924, a feminist group called the Egyptian Feminist Union was 
formed with little achievement but managed to make a public debate of women’s demands 
(Graham-Brown, 2001: 25). During those times, feminist and women’s movements did not extend to 
women from all social classes, marginalizing those not from big cities. There was a link between the 
ruling political party and women’s organizations in “secular nationalist” states such as Egypt, Syria, 
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Iraq and Algeria (Graham-Brown, 2001: 26). In the early 1950s, an Egyptian group Bint al-Nil 
(Daughters of the Nile) managed to push for enfranchisement as Egyptian women started to vote and 
stand for election (Graham-Brown, 2001: 27).    
To provide women more access to work, various feminist organizations in the Arab world 
are created, for example, university departments in Lebanon, Egypt, and Algeria, women’s research 
networks in North Africa, and an Arab Women’s Training and Research Center in Tunisia (Hijab, 
2001: 51). In Kuwait, there are several women’s organizations today but a feminist group called 
Arab Women’s Development Society (AWDS) was disbanded in 1978, following Kuwaiti’s 
patriarchal society’s disapproval of the group’s adopting secular ideologies which focused on gender 
equality and women’s citizenship rights (al-Mughni, 2001: 178). Other women’s groups, such as 
Women’s Cultural and Social Society (WCSS) and the Girls Club, support suffrage for women but 
do not support secular feminism entirely, while there are other women’s groups that clearly oppose 
feminist movement (al-Mughni, 2001: 179). 
Founded in 1984, “Women Living Under Muslim Laws” (WLUML) is an organization that 
supports women from around the world who have links to laws and customs originating from Islam 
(WLUML, 2013). The goal of WLUML is to “strengthen women’s individual and collective 
struggles for equality and their rights, especially in Muslim contexts” (WLUML, 2013). Also formed 
in 1984, the “Sisterhood is Global Institute” (SIGI) is an international NGO that supports women’s 
movements globally but also focuses on Muslim women’s welfare (The Sisterhood is Global 
Institute, 2013). A new global movement is Musawah, which was launched in 2009. The word 
“musawah” itself means “equality” in Arabic. NGOs, activists, scholars, legal practitioners, policy 
makers and grassroots women and men from around the world work together in this group which 
aims for equality and justice in the Muslim family, which advances human rights for women in 
Muslim contexts, in both their public and private lives (Musawah, 2013). 
 
1.3.5 Feminist movements in Malaysia 
 
According to Ariffin (1999: 417), many Malaysian women do not identify as feminists due to the 
view of feminism as “a concept and practice imported from the West” which is deemed different 
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from the local context. Feminist struggles in Malaysia is rephrased as “women’s struggles for 
reforms” in matters on economic and social inequalities, and all forms of violence against women 
(Ariffin, 1999: 417). Historically, the struggles of women in Malaysia were different from the West 
because Malaysia women received the right to vote when Malaysia was declared independent from 
Britain in 1957. The practice of Islam in Malaysia also made a distinction between feminism in 
Malaysia and the West. Issues such as “women sexuality and women’s control over their bodies” are 
usually avoided by women activists who do not want to challenge the socio-cultural framework or 
upset the religious hierarchy and establishment (Ariffin, 1999: 417). Among gender issues in 
Malaysia are violence against women; advocacy for equal rights under the law; reduction of the 
negative and stereotyped images of women in the media; a more sympathetic treatment for single 
parents especially unwed mothers and abandoned babies; the problems of youth loafing and young 
girls hanging out at “hotspots” to pick up older, wealthy men; the problems of runaway children, 
especially young girls; a higher representation of women in decision making, particularly in politics; 
and the rights of women in Islam (and under syariah laws) (Ariffin, 1999: 419-420). 
In contemporary Malaysia, Ng, Mohamad and Tan (2006: 34) have divided feminism into 
four phases of varieties: nationalist feminism, social feminism, political feminism and market-driven 
feminism. These four phases of feminism correlate with four political moments which took place 
historically in Malaysia. The following descriptions of feminist evolution in Malaysia are credited to 
Ng, Mohamad and Tan (2006).  
The first variety is called nationalist feminism, which emerged throughout the phase of 
nationalist politicization in the 50s before Malaysia gained independence (Ng, Mohamad and Tan, 
2006: 17, 34, 39). During the anti-colonialism period and Malaysians’ struggles to create a nation 
state, women’s rights were not centered around human rights or against patriarchal system. Rather, in 
order to create national autonomy, nationalist feminism of justice for women took shape by 
providing education to women and improving the legal system as well as getting women to 
contribute to the political, social and economic sectors. However, Malaysian women at that time 
could be seen leaning more towards their own ethnic-based political parties representing Malay, 
Chinese and Indian, with deep sense of loyalty and belonging towards their homeland for Chinese 
and Indian immigrants. Thus, political parties which focused on equal opportunities in pay for all and 
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emancipation for women were not successful. Ways to improve the position of women of their own 
race fell under the responsibility of the women’s wing of the major political parties (Ariffin, 1999: 
417). 
Social feminism is the second variety of feminism which took place after the Malaysian 
independence in 1957 during the post-independence ‘consociational’ politics phase (Ng, Mohamad 
and Tan, 2006: 19, 34, 39). This variety of feminism is pragmatically inspired and emerged alongside 
the aspiration to develop unity among multiracial women in Malaysia since there are three major 
political parties for each ethnic group: UMNO for Malays, MCA for Chinese and MIC for Indians. A 
group called National Council for Women’s Organisations (NCWO) was formed and its agenda 
included looking after women’s welfare and making sure women were involved in the society and 
workplace, and helped with the development of the state and modern institutions. The NCWO 
worked closely with women from the three ethnic-based parties. Women from the political parties 
and the cabinet became leaders in the NCWO. They worked towards getting equal pay, equal access 
to public service jobs and marital rights, and supported women’s participation in politics, even 
though the achievement was dismal. The NCWO’s approach in women’s rights was not aggressive 
and this group also did not pursue controversial issues such as demanding for change in syariah 
laws.   
The next variety, political feminism, started from the 70s until the 90s during the phase 
called developmentalism and identity politics (Ng, Mohamad and Tan, 2006: 21, 35, 39). A crisis 
among multi-ethnic groups in Malaysia led to ethnic riots which occurred on May 13th, 1969. Due to 
the crisis, the issue of identity surfaced, together with the ideology of developmentalism. A New 
Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced to improve inequality in the economy based on ethnicities. 
The development of Malaysia as one of the newly industrializing countries resulted in great 
economic growth but with that, identity politics came into place. This resulted in ethnic 
differentiation which contributed to women’s rights issues being looked after by respective ethnic 
political groups. As a result of the global Islamic revival in 1970s in Malaysia, Muslim women were 
seen adopting modest dress codes and wearing the veil. In the 1980s, various women’s groups 
sprouted, such as the Women’s Aid Organisation (WAO), Women’s Crisis Centre (WCC, changed to 
Women’s Centre for Change), Women’s Development Collective (WDC) and the All Women’s 
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Action Society (AWAM). During this time, feminism in Malaysia became the most politically 
engaged as it moved to promote women’s issues as human’s rights. A notable struggle for Malaysian 
feminists at this time was a campaign called Violence Against Women (VAM). Feminists became 
more proactive at the state level including improving on certain laws concerning domestic violence, 
rape and others. A global feminist network called Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML), 
which is mentioned in the previous section, held activities in Malaysia exploring feminism and its 
relevance to Islam. This triggered Muslim women to take the approach of incorporating Islam into 
feminist movement. Sisters in Islam (SIS) was formed in 1993 with the aim to liberate Muslim 
women from male-biased Islamic movements. However, there were also other organizations such as 
Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM or Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia) and Jemaah Islah 
Malaysia (JIM or Islamic Reform Congregation) which rejected feminism and only related with 
Islamic movement. Justice and democracy also became political feminist’s agenda during Reformasi 
period (the call for reforms after the sacking of Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister in 1998). Seven 
women’s groups, along with SIS, launched a women’s charter called “Women’s Agenda for Change” 
(WAC) which was the height of political feminism although it was only short-lived.   
The fourth and final variety called market-driven feminism, occurred during the phase of 
post-Reformasi realignment since 1999 until around 2004, and possibly until present (Ng, Mohamad 
and Tan, 2006: 30, 38, 39). Malaysian right and left wing political parties, UMNO and PAS 
respectively, targeted at Muslims, took different approaches in addressing gender issues. Women’s 
groups started to provide advice and help for women who had problems, especially with the laws. 
Feminists from all stages, multi-ethic groups or religions; individuals, privileged women, and various 
organizations and companies contributed to women’s empowerment to achieve equal rights for 
women in a plural Malaysian state.  
According to Ng, Mohamad and Tan (2006: 87), based on different agenda of 
Malay-Muslim political parties and organizations, Malay-Muslim women’s movements in Malaysia 
can be grouped into pragmatists, communitarians and Islamic feminists. Pragmatists refer to “those 
who are expedient players and answerable to their political constituents” (Ng, Mohamad and Tan, 
2006: 87). Political parties in Malaysia such as UMNO and PKR have their own women’s wings 
which support their respective parties’ agendas in line with the larger goals of the organization. 
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Communitarians refer to those who aspire “towards a specific goal of building an alternative moral, 
social and political order”, which in the Islamic case, “there is an explicit rejection of outward 
manifestations of ‘Western decadence’, including the freedom of women to partake prominent public 
roles” (Ng, Mohamad and Tan, 2006: 87-88). Among others, the women’s wing of a political party, 
PAS, is an Islamic communitarian women’s organization. Islamic feminists refer to “those who 
accept from the outset that Islam is a system of belief that is democratic and just to women”, and 
they also “uphold and promote the principle of ijtihad (reasoning) and ijma’ (decision by consensus) 
to reclaim Islam for women” (Ng, Mohamad and Tan, 2006: 88). A Malay-Muslim NGO that is an 
Islamic feminist group is Sisters in Islam.  
 
1.3.6 “Sisters in Islam” 
 
Sisters in Islam (henceforth SIS) is a Malaysian Muslim women’s organization. It is a part of a coalition 
with various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Malaysian under the Joint Action Group for 
Gender Equality (JAG) (Joint Action Group, 2013). JAG is a coalition of NGOs that work towards gender 
equality. SIS is the only group under JAG with the focus on Muslim women, while other NGOs under this 
coalition focus on women in general. The other NGOs are All Women’s Action Society (AWAM), Perak 
Women for Women (PWW), Persatuan Kesedaran Komuniti Selangor (Empower), Persatuan Sahabat 
Wanita Selangor (PSWS), Sabah Women’s Action-Resource Group (SAWO), Women’s Aid Organisation 
(WAO), Women’s Centre for Change (WCC) and Tenaganita. JAG focuses on violations of women’s rights 
and gender equality, law reform, movement building, and public education campaigns. 
It is stated in SIS’s website that the founding members of SIS started questioning, “If God is just as 
Islam is just ‘why do laws and policies made in the name of Islam create injustice?’” which marked the 
beginning of searching for ways to solve issues concerning discrimination against Muslim women (Sisters In 
Islam, 2013). One of its founders, Zainah Anwar, who is also a writer selected for this study, cited syariah 
law’s implementation as the cause for suffering and injustice for Muslim women, therefore that prompted the 
formation of SIS (Anwar, 2001: 228). This has prompted SIS to take the lead to try to improve Muslim 
women’s rights in Malaysia. SIS is a non-governmental, Islamic feminist group active since the ‘80s which 
aims to fight for Muslim women’s equality and to eradicate discrimination against women (Anwar, 2001). 
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Since Islamic teachings have traditionally been interpreted by men, SIS members seek to find the 
interpretation of Islamic texts from women’s point of view in order to understand the underlying values and 
principles in areas such as Islamic laws, polygamy, modesty, etc. (Anwar, 2001).  
In 1987, a group of lawyers, academics, journalists, analysts, and activists, and many women 
got together to “study problems associated with the implementation of new Islamic Family Laws that 
was legislated in 1984, and enforced in 1987” (Sisters In Islam, 2013). These women started 
organizing meetings and workshops to address Muslim women’s rights. In 1988, they engaged in a 
workshop involving the National Council of Women’s Organizations, the federal government’s 
Women’s Affairs Division, and the Islamic Center in the Prime Minister to address problems women 
faced with the implementation of the law (Anwar, 2001: 228). However, the problem with the law 
was not solved as Muslim women still complained about injustice which they faced or heard. Anwar 
related the feeling of powerlessness they felt when some said that “Islam demands wives be obedient 
to their husbands, or Islam grants men the right to beat their wives or to take second wives” (Anwar, 
2001: 228). These women also felt powerless hearing from radio, television, religious department 
and Syariah Courts that “men are superior to women, that a woman must obey their husband, that 
the evidence of two women equals to that of one man, that a wife has no right to say no to sex with 
her husband, that hell is full of women because they leave their heads uncovered and are disobedient 
to their husbands” (Anwar, 2001: 228).     
To understand about oppression and ill-treatment of women, SIS started to re-read the Quran 
to counter the argument that the Text “supported the oppression and ill-treatment of women” (Sisters 
In Islam, 2013). In 1989, the core of SIS was formed by a group of women as listed in their website: 
 Amina Wadud, a teacher of Qur'anic Studies at the International Islamic University who would go 
on to publish her pioneering work, Qur'an and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman's 
Perspective 
 Askiah Adam, an analyst at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia 
 Norani Othman, a sociologist at the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (the National University of 
Malaysia) 
 Rashidah Abdullah, a senior programme officer in the gender and development programmed at the 
Asian and Pacific Development Centre (APDC) 
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 Rose Ismail, a journalist at the New Straits Times 
 Salbiah Ahmad, a law lecturer in at the International Islamic University 
 Sharifah Zuriah Aljeffri, cultural affairs adviser at the US Embassy, and artist 
 Zainah Anwar, a senior analyst at ISIS Malaysia 
This group continued to do an intense study of the Quran to look at sections of the Text used 
to “justify domestic violence, polygamy, women's unquestioning obedience to men, the inferior 
position of women as witnesses, and gender inequality in general” (Sisters In Islam, 2013). SIS 
discovered that Islam does not oppress women “but male-centered interpretations of the Qur'an 
influenced by cultural practices and values of patriarchal realities” (Sisters In Islam, 2013). 
According to Anwar (2001: 229), the voices, and experiences of women have been largely silent and 
silenced in the reading and interpretation of the text. Based on their interpretation of the Quran, SIS 
believes that in all areas, women should be treated equally with men, and gender equality should 
then flows into the legal system (Foley, 2004: 62). 
In 1993, the group was registered as an NGO under the name SIS Forum (Malaysia) Bhd 
(Ng, Mohamad and Tan, 2006: 170). The practice of Islam is subject to different interpretations that 
have created discrimination for Muslim women especially in the wake of Islamic resurgence in the 
1970s and Islamization agenda in Malaysia in the 1980s. SIS was formed because of “Islamic 
intolerance and closed-mindedness of Islam’s spokesperson (Ng, Mohamad and Tan, 2006: 98). 
Promoting the rights of Muslim women within the framework of Islam becomes the focus of this 
group (Anwar, 2001: 229). SIS adopts a “precarious middle ground” which involves reinterpretation 
of Islamic texts as a basis for their Islamic feminism (Anwar, 2001: 231). This group adheres to the 
Quranic teaching which promotes equality, justice and freedom principles. 
SIS has proposed the reforms in syariah law and has been involved in campaigns against the 
implementation of the Hudud law (Islamic criminal laws) (Ng, Mohamad and Tan, 2006: 170). 
According to Anwar (2001), SIS and other women’s groups are at the forefront in challenging the 
efforts made by conservative Islamist groups to establish a ‘pristine’ and ‘authentic’ Islamic state by 
using a traditional Arabic model of Islam. Anwar (2001) claims these efforts reverse Malaysian 
Muslim women’s rights they used to have, and deny Muslim women the same legal rights and 
protection for non-Muslim women. SIS also contributed to the agenda of promoting a ‘democratic’ 
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Islam especially when it involves women’s injustice in the laws (Ng, Mohamad and Tan, 2006: 99) 
One of SIS founders Othman (2006), claimed that Islamic fundamentalists try to control 
women’s rights and status in the family and society, as well as women’s bodies. Because of that, 
Islamic feminism is gaining popularity among Muslim women’s “new”/radical movements in 
Malaysia. SIS also strives to educate the larger public on the importance of understanding the full 
context about Islamic teachings, and not only depend on the authority of religious scholars and 
Islamist groups (Othman, 2006). SIS works to negotiate rights for Muslim women in legal, political, 
economic and social structures through research, advocacy, public education, publications, and local 
and global networking (Othman, 2006).  
From a previous study on SIS by Ong (1999), she substantiates the increase of Islamic 
feminist discourse in Malaysia is synonymous with the agenda of SIS. According to Ong (1999: 360), 
equality demanded by Muslim feminists is not a civil rights movement, but rather, these feminists 
seek to justify equality based on alternative readings of the Quran and hadith’s (the Prophet’s) 
sayings. She asserted that SIS had to show they are “worthy participants” to engage in Islamic 
tradition and combat the ulamas’ (Muslim scholars) power by relying on women’s intellectual role to 
interpret Islam for themselves and promoting higher education for girls (Ong, 1999: 360). To gain 
credibility as “respected interpreters in Islam”, Ong saw that SIS conducted themselves as 
“reasoning sisters” employing Malay customs of acknowledging elder sister’s authority over other 
siblings. She pointed that SIS cultivated images as authoritative figures, patient and careful reasoners 
through the “sisterly persona”. SIS also viewed themselves as “builders of a Muslim civil society” as 
they organize public debates over Islamic truths using Quranic verses (Ong, 1999: 361).  
Another way for SIS to battle Muslim scholars is by rejecting the ‘fallacious’ view about 
“women’s inherent inferiority and men’s inherent superiority” as they argue the Quran and the 
hadith endorse gender equality (Ong, 1999: 362). With regards to hijab or veiling for women, Ong 
found that SIS argued on the basis of no compulsion suggested by the Quran verses and suggest 
freedom of choice “based on their faith in Allah”. SIS also represented women as “modern public 
figures alongside men” following their advocacy on “female emancipation and independent 
decision-making” and invented public speech for Muslim women to defy the patriarchal Muslim 
scholars (Ong, 1999: 363). Regarding polygamy, Ong (1999: 363) pointed that SIS also referred to 
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the Quran which according to them, “does not give men a ‘blanket right’ to practice polygamy” 
except in certain circumstances. Instead of making women accept polygamy, SIS offered a solution 
based on the Quran for men to change from being “promiscuous to self-discipline and respect for the 
opposite sex”.  
Even though SIS has portrayed women as having more self-discipline than men, being 
deserving, rational and moral subjects so that they can prove their “moral worthiness as equal Islamic 
citizens” and have merits to defend gender rights than Muslim scholars, Ong argued that SIS has not 
articulated women’s basic rights over their own bodies (Ong, 1999: 365). Ong also pointed out that 
SIS has not done any public debates or publications about women’s sexual experiences, desires or 
passions. 
In relation to gender conflicts in the public sphere, feminist movements represented by SIS 
are modern because of two reasons (Ong, 1999: 365-366). First, Malaysia is different from other 
Muslim countries because Muslim feminists in SIS have been aspiring to combine secular and 
Islamic elements and to introduce Islamic modernity in its multicultural nation. Secondly, feminist 
movements also shape the civil society through engagement with various other groups to “combat 
different disciplinary regimes such as Islamic courts and clerics”. The strength of Muslim feminists 
in Malaysia is attributed to Malaysia’s aggressive development than other Muslim countries. Besides 
being the center for high-tech industries, Malaysia is also the center for “Islamic capitalism” in line 
with Islamization agenda to implement Islamic laws in the multicultural contexts (Ong, 1999: 366). 
According to Ong (1999: 366), “the regime of corporatist Islam is reflected in bureaucratic 
discourses on the material and spiritual riches of the ‘new Islam’, and by mounting criticisms of 
Islamic authorities”. Corporatist Islam is based on the Islamization policy in Malaysia which is cast 
as “fundamentally friendly to and at home with global capitalism, and at ease with the multicultural 
contexts and modern forms and skills of the modern era” (Ong, 1999: 366). Ong (1999: 356) argued 
that Muslim feminists require the sheltering wing of a technocratic, secular state that seeks to 
integrate Islamic regulation at the level of the government. It is under this corporate ideology that SIS 
is seen as having the support of the state of “women’s voice in Islamic interpretation”. By supporting 
SIS, the state not only provides a space for “the expression of a new public Islamic culture” but it 
also gives the state “the opportunity to gain greater control of Islam” as “the corporate ideology that 
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constitutes a modern Malay professional culture and the growth of state power” (Ong, 1999: 368). 
Foley (2004: 61) asserted that SIS demanded equal rights for women and men without any 
patriarchal bargain, which were based on modern reinterpretation of the Quran. However, SIS 
methodology is not widely accepted in Malaysia because most of SIS members are not trained 
theologian and have no credentials to engage with the Quran, and SIS is regarded as “a rather 
westernized group” (Foley, 2004: 62). In legal reform, SIS focuses on equality and their 
reinterpretation of Islamic law based on a “reinterpretation of the Quran” and they view the existing 
Islamic law as “anachronistic and highly patriarchal” (Foley, 2004: 69). SIS also believes that 
Islamic law is not divine, instead it was made by humans therefore reinterpretation can take place at 
any age or place (Foley, 2004: 69). 
According to Moll (2009: 40), the growth of Islamic feminism is indebted to a “moderate 
Muslim” voice which embraces equality, pluralism and human rights values of secular-liberal 
understandings. Moll found that reformists are found to locate Islamic feminist projects within a 
“multiple modernities” paradigm. Moll (2009: 41) made SIS as her case study to investigate “not 
only such feminists reason within an Islamic paradigm (the substantive content), but furthermore 
how they reason, towards what ends, under what conditions, and with what implications”. Islamic 
feminists seek to redefine “Islamic tradition” and reject traditional commentaries of authoritative 
male interpreters, which are believed to not adhere to an Islamic horizon (Moll, 2009: 42).  
Moll positioned SIS as embodying the discourse of “self-identified Islamic feminist civil 
society” groups as she examined the group’s public reasoning and reasons for arguing (Moll, 2009: 
48). SIS members engage themselves with not only Malaysian human rights activists but also 
“Muslim academics based in the West, American and British-Muslim journalists, and representatives 
from Western non-governmental organizations concerned with women’s rights and democratization” 
in local workshops and as invited speakers in the United States and Europe. The central topic of 
discussion is patriarchal interpretation in Islamic family law. SIS has produced booklets on “correct” 
feminist interpretation and incorrect (patriarchal) interpretation of selected Qur’anic verses on gender 
relations and women’s status such as on polygamy, divorce, inheritance and the veil (Moll, 2009: 49). 
Moll established that SIS works based on the feminist axiom representing the framework of 
“personal is the political”. From articles by SIS writers, Moll found that they exemplify the 
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modernist move of proposing state laws/fatwas affecting “fundamental liberties” to be controlled by 
the Parliament and constitution, and begging for citizens “the rights to speak on Islam” (Moll, 2009: 
50). She asserted that the overlap of the politics of knowledge production with the politics of 
citizenship, rights and public space constitutes the Islamic tradition of Islamic feminists, which 
moulds the reasoning of SIS. Islamic tradition here refers to methodologies of Islamic texts’ 
interpretation in which Islamic feminists reject traditional commentaries, claimed as not adhering to 
the correct way to reason, and “do not adopt a critical literary and historical approach to the text” 
(Moll, 2009: 42). As Moll (2009: 52) highlighted, in the “new Islamic public sphere”, Islamic voices 
does not have to be only progressive or feminist. The “new Muslim public sphere” allows for “a 
multiplicity of voices on Islam, not all of which are progressive or feminist”, thus Moll noted that 
even though SIS is able to reason Islamic law in a modern state and regard religions as a question of 
rights, others may still disagree with them (Moll, 2009: 53).  
 
1.4 Purpose of the study  
 
The issue of Muslim women in Malaysian being discriminated against and having unequal rights, 
and problems in Islamic law has been a central focus among Islamic feminists in Malaysia. This 
paper focuses on issues concerning the challenge to the disempowerment of Malaysian Muslim 
women in the context of a society that has different, more liberal laws for non-Muslims. I use 
discourse analytic approaches to demonstrate how two Malaysian Muslim feminist writers contest 
dominant religious and gendered discourses which have historically long been considered 
‘commonsensical’ in Malaysian society. The two writers are Marina Mahathir and Zainah Anwar, 
whom I refer to as MM and ZA in this thesis. Both of them are members of Sisters in Islam and they 
are columnists for Malaysian English newspapers, The Star and the New Straits Times. 
This study shows how these writers construct alternative discourses to challenge oppressive 
and discriminating discourses in order to present and empower Muslim women in a more favorable 
position. The purpose of using discourse analysis methodology in examining media texts is to 
illuminate how social change is presently occurring, as it occurs. On a personal level, as a Muslim 
woman myself aspiring to a professional career in academia in Malaysia, I am invested in 
30 
 
researching, understanding and contributing to positive changes and overcoming resistance to 
change in Muslim women’s identities and status.   
This research aims to explore: “How do the two feminist writers utilize newspaper columns 
to demand gender equality, negotiate their identities and promote the discourse of Islamic feminism 
in Malaysia?” and “how do they offer solutions and present changes concerning the condition of 
Malaysian Muslim society, if any?” To facilitate answering the questions, based on the recurring 
topics from the two writers’ columns, I narrow it theme down into three big themes: deconstructing 
gender and Islamic fundamentalist or Islamist discourses in Malaysia, challenging Islamic law and 
pursuing a feminist agenda within a Malaysian Islamic context. For analysis of the data, this paper 
seeks to answer the following three research questions: 
 
Research question 1: 
What discursive actions and linguistic features are two female feminist Muslim writers using in their 
columns? 
 
Research question 2:  
How do the two writers position themselves and others (including other Muslim women, Muslim 
men, and non-Muslims in Malaysia) in their columns? 
 
Research question 3: 
What major gender and religious discourses appear in the two writers’ columns?  
 
1.5 Significance of the study 
 
This study examines the language use of two SIS writers, and analyses the discourses from their 
newspaper columns. This study reveals how discourse analysis methodology of media texts provides 
a sound theoretical approach to understanding social change as it is presently happening, as it occurs. 
The research contributes to positive social changes and a means for Muslim women’s identities and 
status to progress by overcoming resistance to change in a traditional society, which is promoted by 
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certain people.  
Written texts bring a great impact because they “can be read and re-read by the consumer, 
shared by friends and colleagues, photocopied or faxed, and once they are archived, acquire 
permanency and public accessibility” (Krishnamurthy, 1996: 129).  Talbot, Atkinson and Atkinson 
(2003: 11) also assert that “media texts may be produced, distributed and consumed as commodities”. 
They also state that “everyday language is transient, but media language is forever”. Besides 
reporting news, the news media are easily accessible by anyone, which can be used by newsmakers 
to promote certain ideologies. I chose newspapers as my source of data as I believe they are effective 
in influencing the public regarding any particular issue.  
For my study, I unpack the ideologies of the two writers concerning their various discourses 
found in their writing. As mentioned earlier, Malaysia has various political parties which carry 
various ethnicities and promote different religious views, and naturally each party has its own 
supporters. It is the same case when it comes to the society’s views on Islam: some adopt the 
fundamentalist view, some support the feminist view and there are some who just take a moderate 
approach. 
As the mass media may shape people’s attitudes and perceptions through their powerful use 
of language, or even subject to debates, I am invested to study the two SIS’s members’ language in 
which they write for the mainstream media, to see what constitutes their attitudes in disseminating 
their ideas concerning gender inequality in Islam. It is interesting to observe how people who support 
the discourse of Islamic feminism claim their objection to the Islamic fundamentalist discourse. 
For this study, I look at how Malaysian Muslim women are represented in the media texts 
through the use of the two writers’ language. I look at how both writers construct and contest the 
identities of Muslim women in Malaysia, as well as the relationship between Muslim women and 
others. I also look at how the traditional gender and religious discourses are challenged by the writers 
and how they draw on and create new discourses as the alternative. Lastly, I study the ways that the 
writers position not just themselves, but also other social actors in the media texts, mainly Muslim 
men, non-Muslims and others. 
This study suggests how the media may contribute to the construction and impact of the 
Islamic feminist discourse in Malaysia. The use of discourse analysis on language in the media on 
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Muslim gender issues can help to uncover how identities, relationships and positions are constructed 
and contested. This study highlights the significant role of the media in drawing attention to the 
empowerment of Malaysian Muslim women through their representation in the media. By looking at 
Muslim gender issues, this study illustrates the social change that is taking place in Malaysian 
Muslim society. 
 
1.6 Scope of this study 
 
I gathered the findings of this research specifically about Muslim women in Malaysia, not about 
Malaysian women from other faiths. Even though there were occasional references to non-Muslim 
women or non-Muslim men, most collected data was mostly about Muslim women in relation to 
gender and Islamic issues. This is because I wanted to look at how MM and ZA constructed and 
contested Muslim women’s struggle and identities in Malaysia.  
I specified the topics of selected media texts to only about gender and Islamic issues 
concerning Muslim women in The Star and the New Straits Times, and not any other issues to 
provide consistency to this study. Other topics discussed in their columns are deemed not directly 
relevant to the study. For reliability purposes, I looked at articles from 2005 to 2011 so that I could 
have a fair amount of data as well as a source of observing consistencies, similarities and changes 
concerning the issues voiced by the chosen writers. I chose articles from 2005 onwards because the 
two writers were found writing about the 2005 Amendments to IFL, following the passing of the law 
in that year.  
There is also a specific choice of the newspaper’s language. Even though there are other 
newspapers published in Malay, Chinese or Indian languages in Malaysia, I only used Malaysian 
English newspapers for this study. The reason is because SIS’s two feminist writers, MM and ZA 
contribute their columns only to English newspapers in Malaysia. There are no members who write 
columns in any other language. The Islamic feminist group, SIS uses English mostly as their main 
language to communicate with people. Their website (http://www.sistersinislam.org.my/) is also 
written in English but some accompanying articles in Malay on the website are found. The core 
members of SIS are mostly from urban and middle class group who are common to use English on 
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daily basis. 
 
1.7 Outline of this dissertation 
 
This dissertation is divided into six chapters: background of the study; previous studies, theoretical 
and methodological framework; data analysis; discussion and conclusion.   
Chapter One has given the essential background of this research on Malaysia and Islamic 
feminism. It also has presented three research questions. The first research question looks at 
discursive actions and linguistic features which two female feminist Muslim writers use in their 
columns. The second research question explores how the two writers position themselves and others 
in their columns. The final question looks at major gender and religious discourses which appear in 
their columns.  
Chapter Two explores literatures and previous studies that this research draws on. The 
reviews include previous research on media discourse, language and discourse analysis. This chapter 
provides the research method for this study, which involves the method of data collection and data 
analysis. This chapter also looks into the frameworks of critical discourse analysis (CDA) 
(Fairclough, 2003) and feminist poststructuralist discourse analysis (FPDA) (Baxter, 2003) in order 
to explore the language use in media texts and to identify constructed and contested discourses, and 
Malaysian Muslim women’s and others’ positionings. 
Chapter Three looks at how the two writers, MM and ZA, deconstruct gender and Islamic 
fundamentalist or Islamist discourses in Malaysia. The analysis attempts to answer the research 
questions by examining: 1) MM’s and ZA’s linguistic features and discursive actions, 2) MM’s and 
ZA’s positionings of themselves and others, and 3) gender and religious discourses found in MM’s 
and ZA’s columns. Gender and religious issues concerning Muslim women, deemed as 
discriminatory to women, are also unpacked in this chapter. This chapter also focuses on a Muslim 
women’s group in Malaysia, Sisters in Islam (SIS) and how MM and ZA contests criticisms against 
SIS. 
Chapter Four examines how MM and ZA challenge the system of Islamic laws in Malaysia. 
This chapter analyses MM’s and ZA’s columns to answer the same research questions as in Chapter 
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Four. The theme of Islamic laws is found recurring as both the writers claim some aspects of the law 
may be discriminatory to women.  
Chapter Five analyses how MM and ZA pursue their feminist agenda within a Malaysian 
context. Both of them are not just any feminist writers, but Islamic feminists, thus their writings serve 
as rich data to contribute to “a discourse of Islamic feminism”. The analysis in this chapter attempts 
to answer the three research questions as in both Chapter Four and Five. This chapter looks at how 
MM and ZA negotiate Muslim women’s identities in a contemporary Malaysian society.  
Chapter Six summarizes this study by looking back at the research questions and the 
methodological framework. This chapter gives a rundown of gender and religious discourses found 
in the data. Possible future research is also listed.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Methodology and previous studies 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an insight into various literatures and previous studies that provide the 
analytical and methodological framework for this research. The focussed methodologies are: 1) 
media discourse, 2) language and discourse analysis, 3) data analysis and 4) data collection. 
In the first part, I explore previous literatures concerning communication in the mass media 
and newspaper genres. The focus is on the analysis of media language, especially written media such 
as newspapers. 
In the second part, I explain the key concepts in discourse analysis, in particular relation to 
analysing media language and gender. I base my research on two approaches: critical discourse 
analysis (CDA) and feminist poststructuralist discourse analysis (FPDA). Hence I provide the 
reasons these two approaches are the best chosen theories for this study. 
The third and fourth parts explain the research method employed for this study. The research 
method consists of the analysis and the collection of the data. I use a combination of Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) (Fairclough, 2003) and Feminist Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis 
(FPDA) (Baxter, 2003) to examine the language use in media texts, constructed and contested 
discourses in selected texts, and various positionings of Malaysian Muslim women and others by the 
writers. I also provide how I organize and analyze the data based on CDA and FPDA as my 
methodological framework. I have selected various newspaper columns by two female writers as the 
data for my research, so I explain the process and the reasons for selecting the data. 
 
2.2 Media discourse 
 
2.2.1 Communication in the mass media 
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The mass media are a part of today’s culture in most societies nowadays. Print and electronic media 
are two distinct media channels of communication. Newspapers and magazines are examples of print 
media or the press which uses written language and printing production technologies while radio and 
television are the dominating electronic broadcasting media types using spoken language (Fairclough, 
1995: 38). Of late, with the advancement of technology, the Internet and other forms of social media 
are gaining their popularity. According to Johnson & Ensslin (2007: 11), besides the common 
classical channels of media, such as newspapers/magazines, radio, cinema, television, and the new 
electronic media, the term “media” refers to any tools and techniques to perform precise signifying 
practices, which can be explicit or implicit. Spoken and written discourses are also different. 
According to Chouliaraki & Fairclough (1999: 43), writing is a spatialisation of spoken discourse, 
and written discourse can be kept as a permanent record immediately. Special skills for writing are 
needed, therefore writing is a mediated discourse as it increases time-space distantiation.  
Mass media’s communicative event is also different from face-to-face communication, as the 
time and place of media texts’ production is not the same as the time and place of consumption by 
audience (Fairclough, 1995: 36). Since media communicative events involves mass audiences, there 
is no simultaneous feedback from audiences which gives rise to the questions of media producers’ 
manipulation, cultural domination, imperialism and ideology (Fairclough, 1995: 40).  
According to Thornborrow (2002: 50), the media have different purposes as the means to 
gain information, to provide entertainment and to offer education. Therefore, the mass media have a 
powerful force through their various accesses to societies as they are capable of producing and 
circulating social meanings which can be selected or controlled by the media (Thornborrow, 2002: 
51). The media have various functions which include “public agencies of observation, interpretation, 
performance, representation and dissemination”, thus, a mix of conative, emotive and conceptual 
meanings are used by media producers to reach to the target audience (Johnson & Ensslin, 2007: 13). 
 
2.2.2 Genres in newspapers 
 
According to Bell (1991: 13), two common genres in all the media of mass communication are news 
and advertising. In newspapers, there are two categories of press advertising consisting of small-print 
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columns of classifieds, and display advertising occupying the whole news page (Bell, 1991: 13). 
Everything else in a newspaper besides advertising is called “editorial” (Bell, 1991: 13). Bell 
lists three categories of editorial copy as service information, news and opinion. Service information 
covers lists of information such as sports results, television programmes, share prices and weather 
forecasts. Press news is divided into hard news, feature articles and special-topic news (Bell, 1991: 
14). Hard news covers unscheduled events such as reports of accidents, conflicts, crimes, 
announcements, discoveries and other immediate events. Feature articles are “soft” news which is 
not subjected to immediacy of time, and can be written by journalists or non-journalists (Bell, 1991: 
14). Features are longer articles which cover background, writer’s personal opinions or “editorialize”, 
and writer’s name or “byline” (Bell, 1991: 14). Special-topic news refers to topics on specific subject 
matters such as sports or financial issues and is written by separate groups of specialist journalists 
with their own editor (Bell, 1991: 15). 
Opinion copy is also known as “editorials” or “leaders” which consist of a statement from 
the point of view of the newspaper, while other opinion copy includes regular contributed columns, 
letters to the editor and reviews (Bell, 1991: 13). They usually appear together in feature pages. 
According to Weiner (1996: 131), columns are a series of features or articles appearing regularly in a 
newspaper or magazine, and a columnist is a bylined writer of a regular feature or a column. 
Personal columns does not hide the “I” of the reporter and the voice of the writer carries original 
tones such as “witty, controversial, quirky, bitchy, no-nonsense, hard-hitting, culturally eclectic, 
conversational, whimsical, ironic, confessional, authoritative, subversive, irritating” (Keeble, 1994: 
293). There is a kind of relationship between the writer and readers who can either love or hate the 
columnists (Keeble, 1994: 293). Styles, language and tones of personal columns are influenced by 
the newspaper “personality” (Keeble, 1994: 293). Personal columns vary according to the interests 
of the writer, which can be straight opinion or responses to the dominant news agenda (Keeble, 
1994: 294). The data collected for this study are contributed columns from the opinion genre, which 
are written by two columnists from Malaysian English newspapers.   
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2.2.3 Language and the media  
 
These are the reasons why I choose to study media language. According to Bell (1991:1) media 
language is a huge production which can reach mass audiences, and because of that, “media are 
dominating presenters of language” in today’s lives. Bell (1991: 3) also provides a list of reasons to 
study media language. The first reason is due to various language uses in the media, and another 
reason is because of the ability of media generating language to be heard by many people. The next 
reason is because language is a tool which provides content to media language. Media language also 
has a unique feature of communicating with mass audiences compared to face-to-face 
communication. Other reasons include availability of media language which makes it easier to 
collect, and quality of radio or television recordings being similar to their original production. 
According to Talbot, Atkinson and Atkinson (2003: 9-10), media language is distinct because 
addressers and addressees are not physically present so their relationship is different, and may entail 
a one-sided communication. 
Thornborrow (2002: 52-56) claims that the media can use the language to represent 
particular social and political group through linguistic representation, and has the power to select 
how people and event appear in news using various linguistic structures. Johnson & Ensslin (2007: 
6) links the study of language in the media with the concept of metalanguage, which refers to the 
language that is used to talk about language. Metalanguage intersects with language ideology and 
language representation in the media. One of the ways language ideologies in the media can be 
traced is by looking at linguistic or discursive practice which refers to what people actually do with 
language (Johnson & Ensslin, 2007: 10).  
According to Fairclough (1995: 4), media producers employ various stylistic choices such as 
media genre, semiotic modes, participants, foregrounding and backgrounding, and textual discourse. 
Fairclough also asserts that media language is diverse, available and accessible everywhere, therefore, 
the language of media is significant to analyze as there is signifying power held by the media in 
which the media are able to represent things in certain ways (Fairclough, 1989; 1995). He also notes 
that knowledge, beliefs, values, social relations, and social identities are represented in the media’s 
discursive construction, and contestation. Besides, Fairclough adds that language choice in the media 
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is ‘ideologically significant’. Media discourse also, according to him, provides an ideal audience, 
subject positions, in which a negotiation is possible to take place in the relationship between the 
audience and the positions offered.  
Richardson (2006: 6) explores the use of critical discourse analysis in analyzing newspapers 
as well as the role played by newspaper discourse in indexing and (re)producing class inequality. He 
comes up with five fundamental assumptions of language: language is social, language use enacts 
identity, language use is always active, language use has power and language use is political 
(Richardson, 2006: 10-13). The next section looks at various discourse analytical researches 
involving representations of Muslims and issues with Islam in the media, followed by some studies 
on Muslim gender issues as represented in the media. These studies provide the background to some 
gender and religious issues found in Malaysian English media texts. 
 
2.3 Language and discourse analysis 
 
2.3.1 Discourse 
 
The term “discourse” has various meanings in different contexts. One meaning of discourse refers to 
spoken or written language use, including other semiotic activity such as visual images and 
non-verbal communication (Fairclough, 1995: 54). Another meaning refers to the use of language 
from a certain point of view to represent social practice (Fairclough, 1995: 56). Social practices are 
ways people use to interact socially (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999: 38). Fairclough refines the 
term discourse into two senses of abstract nouns and count nouns. Discourse as an abstract noun 
refers to language and other types of semiosis as elements of social life while discourse as count 
nouns looks at particular ways of representing part of the world (Fairclough, 2003: 26). The primary 
use of the term discourse in this study is discourse in a concrete form as representing the world or as 
social or ideological practice.  
According to Kress (1985: 6-7) discourses are sets of statements organized systematically 
which give expression to the meanings and values of an institution. Discourses are a form of social or 
ideological practice which governs the ways in which people think, speak, interact, write and behave 
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(Gee, 1999). Phillips & Jorgensen (2002: 1) define discourses as a particular manner to talk about 
and understand the world. Based on Foucault’s notions of the link between discourse and power, 
discourses are forms of knowledge or powerful sets of assumptions, expectations and explanations. 
By inscribing power relations within texts, discourses are also systematic ways to make sense of the 
world (Baxter, 2003: 7). Discourses have existed long before we existed, as Sunderland (2004) also 
refers to discourses as “ways of seeing the world” in which discourses can be recognized as well as 
drawn on and produced. Litosseliti (2006: 48-49) lists characteristics that discourses encompass as: 
‘discourses are recognizable and meaningful, discourses can be supporting, competing or conflicting, 
discourses represent and constitute ways of thinking and doing, discourses are ideological and social 
power is acted out through them, and discourses exist in relation to other discourses.’ 
 
2.3.2 Discourse analysis 
 
Approaches of discourse analysis stemmed from the linguistic philosophy of structuralism and 
poststructuralism which state that language provides the access to representations and construction of 
reality (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002: 8). From Ferdinand de Saussure’s theory, structuralist linguistics 
arises in relation to language as a system. Saussure proposed that individual sign’s meaning depends 
on how the sign is related to other signs. He is concerned with the study of langue, which is the 
structure of language, rather than parole, speaking or signs people use in particular situations. 
Langue’s fixed and underlying structures became the focus in structuralism. However, the 
inconsistencies of the structures posed a problem to the Saussurian tradition and made it difficult for 
people to understand change (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002: 11). Using structuralism as a base, 
poststructuralists claim that internal relations within the network of signs provide the meaning to 
signs, not to how signs are related to reality. The meaning of signs still depends on how they are 
different to other signs, but they can change depending on how they are used. Thus, in 
poststructuralism, people draw on concrete language use to create, reproduce and change any 
structure and introduce alternative ideas to challenge the structure (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002: 
11-12).   
Michel Foucault contributed to the development of discourse analytical approaches. He 
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pointed that knowledge is not just a reflection of “reality”, and “truth” is a discursive construction. 
He explored the notions of power as being bound to knowledge, and power as able to create social 
world through language and discourses. The conception of truth is also embedded by power 
relationships and created within discourse and representation (Foucault, 1972).  
Post-structuralism has various schools of thought and theoretical positions, but the focus is 
on how language is used to construct and contest social meanings. The work of another 
poststructuralist, Jacques Derrida’s notion of deconstructionism played an important role in discourse 
analysis as deconstructing or pulling apart the “commonsense” structures can reveal plurality, 
multivocality and non-fixity of all meaning (Baxter, 2003: 6, Kamada, 2010: 21). Self-reflexivity is 
also important in post-structuralist discourse analysis, which looks at the constitutive powers of 
analysis (Baxter, 2003: 6).   
According to Jaworski and Coupland (1999: 1-3), discourse analysis fall into three main 
categories: (1) anything beyond the sentence, (2) language use, and (3) a broader range of social 
practice that includes non-linguistic and nonspecific instances of language.The focus of discourse 
analysis is not only on the linguistic analysis of text even though text analysis is important; rather, the 
focus of discourse analysis oscillates on specific texts and the “order of discourse” to look at 
representation of the world through discourses (Fairclough, 2003: 3). An order of discourses involves 
a group of discourses that operate in the same social terrain and can be in conflict or in concordance 
with each other (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002: 57). Fairclough (2003: 24) describes an order of 
discourse as a network of social practices with elements of linguistic structures as well as discourses, 
genres and styles.  
According to Phillips & Jorgensen (2002: 1), discourse analysis is the analysis of various 
patterns of language in different domains of social life, but they claim that there is no consensus on 
how to analyze discourses as there are many versions of discourse analysis. In doing discourse 
analysis, Phillips & Jorgensen (2002: 4) verify that using multi-perspectival work to create one’s 
own package by combining elements from different discourse analytical perspectives is positively 
valued. This is because multi-perspectival work can provide a broader understanding and knowledge 
by using various perspectives.  
For this paper, I combine interdisciplinary frameworks of gender, media language and 
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discourse analysis to analyze language use and discourses in Malaysian media. I adopt the 
methodology from Kamada’s package of the multi-perspective social constructionist discourse 
analytical approaches in her research on gender studies on spoken discourse by “half-Japanese” girls 
in Japan (Kamada, 2010: 19). She draws on poststructuralist discourse analysis (PDA), feminist 
poststructuralist discourse analysis (FPDA), discursive psychology (DP) and critical discourse 
analysis (CDA) to look at how “half-Japanese” girls identify and celebrate their ethnicity, and how 
they position themselves based on their gendered and ethnic embodiment (Kamada, 2010: 11-13).  
For this research on written language in the Malaysian media, there are two approaches of 
doing discourse analysis that I use: critical discourse analysis (CDA) (Fairclough, 2003) and feminist 
poststructuralist discourse analysis (FPDA) (Baxter, 2003). These are appropriate methodological 
and theoretical approaches to explore how discourses, women’s positioning and gender issues are 
constructed and challenged in media texts. Besides being ideal to apply CDA and FPDA in analyzing 
media language, their theoretical and analytical frameworks also overlap with feminist linguistic 
which is practical in the analysis of discourse and gender. Unlike Kamada’s framework, I use a 
combination of approaches of CDA and FPDA. Kamada’s framework is more suitable for spoken 
data while CDA and FPDA is the best for this study’s written data. CDA and FPDA provide the 
background frameworks for this study’s analysis of data. For data analysis in this study, I specifically 
search for columns which touched on gender issues in relation to Islam in Malaysia.  
 
2.3.3 Dominant and alternative discourses 
 
There are two prominent discourse types which are opposing each other ideologically: dominant and 
dominated or alternative discourses. I identify and examine these discourse types in the selected 
Malaysian newspaper columns in this study. Dominant discourses occur in any social domain when 
certain ideological assumptions are established or maintained as commonsensical (Fairclough, 1989: 
90). Thornborrow (2002: 57) defines dominant discourses as prevailing choices in representation of 
people, situation or events which is established in a particular culture. The ‘normal’ representations 
happen as a result of accepting identical linguistic choices in a certain way as commonsense in 
talking or writing about certain groups of people or events, which hardens the process of finding an 
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alternative solution to talk ‘around’ or ‘outside’ any representation (Thornborrow, 2002: 57). The 
conflicting or competing discourses, or the more marginalized notions about the world, are referred 
to as alternative discourses. A relationship of opposition arises between dominant and alternative 
discourses; therefore, as a result of social struggle, new representations provide alternatives to the 
dominant discourse types (Fairclough, 1989: 91). 
By employing a macro analysis approach in this study, we can understand that discourses 
reflect the broad, macro aspect of society and refer to the commonsensical notions or ideas that 
people or particular societies have about the world which are depicted in the media. These are the 
dominant discourses that exist in the world which we are born into, which can be challenged or 
changed. Thus it is the aim of this study to examine the function and power of the media in looking 
at how dominant discourses are contested or challenged and how alternative discourses are created.   
There are common dominant discourses used universally in the media. In Izadi & 
Saghaye-Biria (2007) study, they employ CDA in their research to examine coverage of Iran’s 
nuclear program in American newspapers’ editorials from The New York Times, The Washington Post, 
and The Wall Street Journal. Their CDA approach is based on van Dijk’s ideological squares which 
present the good properties/actions of “us” and the bad properties/actions of “them”, and mitigate the 
bad properties/actions of the in-group and the good properties/actions of the out-group. This study 
also draws on Orientalist concept development by Edward Said, referring to Western dominant 
discourse of perceiving the Islamic world to be of distinct social and cultural reality. This research 
does not include gender issues as the focus is only the representation of Islam in the media. The 
results show that the dominant discourse of Islam as a source of threat is linked to Orientalist 
depictions of Muslim countries. Two newspapers, The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post 
are seen using more Orientalist concept but based on CDA, all three newspapers highlight Iran’s 
nuclear program, promote Iran as a threat and must not be trusted. 
The next study by Hakam (2009) employs a corpus of news from English-language Arab 
newspapers to examine a specific incident involving the negative portrayal of Muslims’ Prophet 
Muhammad in cartoons, known as “Prophet Muhammad cartoons controversy”. The cartoons of 
Prophet Muhammad associated with the dominant discourse of terrorism and suicide bombings 
appeared in a Danish newspaper. CDA is used to analyze the news reports, editorial/opinion pieces 
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or news analyses on the cartoon controversy which is based on computer-assisted quantitative 
frequency and concordance analysis of the corpus. Arab news are different even when they use news 
copy from international news agencies and it is found that significant changes are made by Arab 
journalists to show their affiliation. This study showed clear evidence of changes made by Arab 
editors or writers who resisted or challenged the dominant ideology underlying the Anglo-American/ 
European-generated discourse. There was a significant greater frequency of Arab-generated texts 
which employed negative evaluative comment or modality in collocation with the mention of the 
Prophet caricatures which showed that the dominant discourse is resisted and challenged. 
In a discourse analysis study by Halim & Meyers (2010), three English language newspapers 
from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait are examined. Representation of violence against Muslim 
women in news coverage from the newspapers are analyzed to determine whether it has the 
perspective of Islamic feminism or traditional Islamic. There are four categories of violence found in 
the coverage: honor crimes, domestic violence, sexual violence, and sexual harassment. The findings 
show that the newspapers adopt a dominant discourse of traditional Islamic perspective in reporting 
the news which marginalized female victims and put victims to be blamed. The newspapers are also 
found to minimize the violence and women’s voice but sympathize with guilty males in honor 
crimes. Muslim women are portrayed in similar positions as Western women in news coverage of 
violence against women. Muslim women involved in violence are not portrayed as victims, but 
viewed as the ones to be blamed, based on a dominant discourse of blaming the women. On the 
contrary, the analysis finds that the coverage of female segregation in Saudi Arabia is viewed from 
the Islamic feminist perspective. 
A study by Malik & Iqbal (2011) examines the image of Taliban in Pakistanis media 
discourses. This study undertakes a discourse analysis approach to examine the construction of 
Taliban in editorials of two English newspapers in Pakistan, The News and Dawn. The results reveal 
that both newspapers construct the dominant discourse of the image of Talibans in negative ways. 
However, The News is found to be more radical and politically active and it was stated that this 
newspaper raised the voice of those who condemned the Taliban activities. Dawn, on the other hand, 
has to maintain a neutral position while covering sensitive issues. Both newspapers are also found to 
use similar media frames of a negative Taliban image for their editorials even though the context and 
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construction for both newspapers was at extreme poles. This study concluded that “a media 
discourse does not only communicate the world what it does, but it also helps people construct an 
image of what media discuss”. 
Another study is on representations of Muslim women and men in The New York Times 
(Mishra, 2007). The data are taken from news articles appearing between September 11, 2001 and 
from September 11, 2003 in The New York Times. The content of the data is different as stories about 
Muslim women in non-Western world are mostly on political violence while stories about Muslim 
men are about Islamic resurgence, terrorism and illegal immigration. The textual analysis of how 
Muslim women and men are portrayed in The New York Times draws on Edward Said’s critique of 
Orientalism and feminist criticism. According to Said (1994: 3) Orientalist discourse is a “Western 
style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient”. The study has found that 
The New York Times represented the dominant discourse of Muslim women as victims of violence 
and oppression as a result of Islamic practices. Muslim men’s portrayal as dangerous and violent is 
another dominant discourse, thus the newspaper presents Muslims as in need of Western liberation.  
Ehrkamp (2010) also employs a textual analysis in a study of newspaper articles from 
Germany daily and weekly newspapers, and news magazines. An electronic database serves as the 
source of data collection of newspaper articles for ten years from 1998 to 2008. The focus of the 
analysis is on gendered portrayals of Muslim migrant women’s sexuality in the media, in relation to 
political Islam, citizenship and integration of immigrants into Germany. The analysis looks at 
specific search terms of “honor killing” and “forced marriage” in German language. This results 
show that Muslim immigrants are distinguished by their religious, racial or cultural differences, 
which is still a dominant discourse. Muslim women are portrayed as victims of “honor killing” and 
“forced marriage” and labels like “Turkish”, “Muslim” or “fundamentalist” are associated with the 
alleged perpetrators of crime. The issue of dress code for Muslim women is another subject of 
debates in the media. The media portray unveiling of Muslim women’s bodies and sexual liberation 
as essential for emancipation and active citizenship for migrant Muslim women. The newspapers are 
found to highlight and celebrate acts of oppressed yet heroic Muslim women individuals who 
claimed their independence by defying Islam. These women are represented as model immigrants, 
democrats and citizens, but are not accepted as a part of the Muslim community.  
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Studies on identities and representations of Muslim women and men in the media are also 
pervasive in Canada, USA, German and Pakistan. A study by Bullock & Jafri (2000) looks at 
representations of Muslim women in the mainstream Canadian media of both print and broadcast 
media. This study is an elaborate sponsored project with an objective to improve Muslim women’s 
media literacy and advocacy skills. This project includes group discussion on the representation of 
Muslim women in the media, and annotated bibliography compilation on the representation of 
Muslim women and other minorities. The results show that Orientalist stereotypes of Muslim 
women as passive, veiled, and impersonal in Canadian print media are dominant discourses. Muslim 
women are presented as outsiders who promote values such as indiscriminate violence and gender 
oppression, which are opposite to Canadian values. Muslim women in Canada who wear hijab or 
headscarf are represented as veiled and oppressed victims and viewed as un-Canadian. Muslim 
women are found to be unhappy of inaccurate Canadian media portrayals of Islam and Muslim 
women. However, there have been some improvements in the coverage as some Muslim women 
have been motivated to initiate change in the representation of Muslim women, for example, through 
letter-writing campaigns, liaising with the media, increasing the number of journalists who are 
Muslims, and so on. As long as Muslim cultures and Islamic beliefs are misunderstood, Muslim 
women will not be identified as a part of women in the Canadian nation.   
 
2.4 Data analysis 
 
I adopt a qualitative research in this study to examine the representation of Malaysian Muslim 
women in the newspapers through discourse analysis of media texts. According to Silverman (2000: 
1), the choice of research methods depend on what one wants to find out. Compared to quantitative 
data, qualitative research methods can offer “a deeper understanding of social phenomena” 
(Silverman, 2000: 8). Therefore, qualitative method is more suitable for the design of my study 
because I want to examine the writers’ attitudes, discursive practices, and ideologies, instead of 
numbers.   
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2.4.1 Critical discourse analysis  
 
The language of media is ideologically significant in revealing how people use power to represent 
things in certain ways (Fairclough, 1995). Critical discourse analysis (henceforth CDA) is an 
appropriate methodological and theoretical approach to identify and look at gender and religious 
discourses constructed in newspapers as CDA examines the role of discourse in the construction of 
the social world (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002: 7). CDA is also concerned with continuity, change and 
what happens in texts as investigation of change is essential in CDA (Fairclough, 2003: 3). 
Fairclough focuses upon contemporary social change, also known as “globalization” or post- or 
late-“modernity”, but he uses the term “new capitalism”. The use of language in new capitalism 
looks at how the transformation impact on politics, education and many other areas of social life 
(Fairclough, 2003: 4). 
CDA is an approach where the researcher analyses texts and talk in social and political 
contexts and looks at how social power, dominance, and inequality are represented in people’s 
speech (Van Dijk, 2001: 352). The aim of CDA is to explore the links between language use and 
social practice (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002: 69). CDA is necessary for describing, interpreting, 
analyzing, and critiquing social life reflected in text (Luke 1997).  
Michael Halliday’s Systemic Functional Linguistic (SFL) provides a background to the 
perspectives of critical social research which contributed to the development of critical discourse 
analytical approach. SFL is known for its focus on functional grammar which looks at language and 
other social life elements and aspects (Halliday, 2004). Fairclough’s approach of CDA combines 
textual analysis (derived from Michael Halliday’s functional grammar), macro-sociological analysis 
of social practice (based on Michel Foucalt’s theory) and ethnomethodology. His analysis of 
discourse involves complementary focuses of continuity and change on communicative events such 
as newspaper columns, and the order of discourse (Fairclough, 1995: 56). CDA also places the 
importance of the analyst not to decide which statements about the world is right or wrong, but to 
explore what has been said or written in order to identify the reality behind the representations of 
discourses (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002: 21). 
Faiclough introduced CDA’s analytical framework in 1989 and expanded upon it in 1995. 
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CDA’s analytical framework of a communicative event to analyze media discourse consists of the 
analysis of relationship between three dimensions: text, discourse practice and sociocultural practice 
(Fairclough, 1995: 57). The summary of CDA analytical framework can be seen in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: A framework for critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 1989: 22; 1995: 59) 
 
The figure explains the relationship between the text, discourse practice and sociocultural practice. 
‘Text’ refers to any written or spoken texts from audio to visual forms. ‘Discourse practice’ involves 
the processes of text production and text consumption. ‘Socio-cultural practice’ deals with what is 
taking place in any communicative events, socially and culturally. Discourse practice is the link 
between text and sociocultural practice, which indirectly means texts are shaped by sociocultural 
practice. This is achieved through discourse practice, shaped by texts features in both processes of 
text production and text consumption.   
Fairclough (1989: 22) proposes “discourse as a social practice” because language is a part of 
society, language is a social process and language is a socially conditioned process. In line with this 
analytical framework of looking at discourse as social practice, he has distinguished three stages of 
CDA referred to as description, interpretation and explanation (Fairclough, 1989: 26). According to 
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Fairclough (1989), language is part of the society, which means discourse involves social conditions 
of production and interpretation. To analyze language as a discourse and as social practice, all these 
things have to be looked at: analyzing texts, analyzing processes of production and interpretation and 
analyzing the relationship between texts, processes, and their social conditions.  
The first stage, description, refers to the formal properties of the text. The analysis of texts 
involves traditional linguistic analysis such as vocabulary and semantics, grammar, phonology and 
writing system. Apart from that, it also involves analysis of textual organization, cohesion and the 
overall structure. Both meanings and forms are equally important in the analysis of texts.  
The second stage, interpretation, looks at the relationship between text and interaction. 
Discourse practice is the mediator between the textual and the socio-cultural practice. This involves 
the intertextual analysis of texts in which it looks at texts from discourse practice’s point of view. The 
goal of this is to explain and describe the many genres and discourses available in the texts. 
Intertextual analysis is backed up by linguistic analysis, and is interpretive in nature. It also depends 
on the understanding of social and cultural practice.   
This brings to the socio-cultural practice, the final dimension in CDA. The relationship 
between interaction and social context is the explanation stage. This looks at the bigger picture of the 
socio-cultural contexts so that the communicative event will be better understood. There is a 
distinction between economic, political and cultural aspects as economic and political aspects 
involve power and ideology issues whereas cultural aspect deals with the question of value and 
identity. Chapter One of this study functions as the explanation stage of the analytical framework. 
Based on Fairclough’s method of analysis in 1989 and 1995, the following is the extended 
version of method of CDA’s framework (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999: 59, Fairclough, 2003: 
209): 
1. A problem (activity, reflexivity). 
2. Obstacles to its being tackled. 
3. Function of the problem in the practice. 
4. Possible ways past the obstacles. 
5. Reflection of the analysis. 
 
50 
 
Fairclough (2003: 209-210) provides the following description of the method. The first stage 
focuses upon a social problem, which can be activities of a social practice, or the reflexive 
construction of a social practice. The second stage identifies obstacles to it through the analysis of: a) 
the network of practices within which it is located; b) the relation of discourse to other moments; c) 
the discourse itself through structural analysis (the order of discourse) and textual/interactional 
analysis (interdiscursive and linguistic analysis). The third stage explores whether those who benefit 
most from the way social life is now organized have an interest in the problem not being resolve. The 
fourth stage identifies possible ways past the obstacles to look for unrealized possibilities for change 
in the way social life is currently organized. The final stage requires the analyst to reflect of where 
s/he is coming from and how s/he herself/himself is socially positioned. 
 
2.4.2 Feminist poststructuralist discourse analysis 
 
Writing, texts and discourses are constructive phenomena which can shape identities of human 
subjects, and one of the outlets is through writing in the media. Writing, texts and discourses are what 
poststructuralist discourse theory examines to see how construction can contribute to identities and 
practices of human subjects (Luke 1997). Kassim (2009: 205) unpacks feminism as the performance 
by women and men who act, speak and write about women’s issues and rights, including those who 
examine gender discrimination and form personal views on any unjust issues. There are various 
other approaches to language and discourse studies by feminist scholars with different specialization 
and focus area such as feminist CDA (Lazar, 2007), feminist conversation analysis (Kitzinger, 2000) 
and feminist pragmatics (Christie, 2000). However, the feminist approach chosen for this study is 
feminist poststructuralist discourse analysis (henceforth FPDA). 
Feminist poststructuralist theory stems from third-wave feminism which challenges the 
sex-gender distinction with post-structuralism as a foundation to feminist practice (Gavey, 1989). 
FPDA is based on various concepts like social constructionist feminism, poststructuralist feminism 
and CDA. Feminist post-structuralism seeks to locate female subjectivity as simultaneously powerful 
and powerless. Deconstruction of female subjectivity and the construction of women as subjects 
within discourses, practices and power is another concern of feminist poststructuralist theory (Baxter, 
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2003: 32-33). Baxter argues that the view of feminist poststructuralist can validate feminism and can 
support social transformation, and thus proposes for poststructuralist inquiry to support feminist 
projects.  
FPDA looks at various discourses and examines how people “negotiate their identities, 
relationships and positions in their world based on the ways they are located by discourses.” (Baxter 
2003). According to Baxter (2003: 8), FPDA sees plural and competing discourses existing in any 
context resulting in dominant discourses and resistant or oppositional discourses. FPDA explores 
how people negotiate and position themselves or positioned by others, however, people can assume a 
powerful or powerless positioning depending on discourses they are in (Baxter, 2003: 9). Therefore, 
using FPDA in this study is applicable to analyze the columns by female writers in Malaysia to 
examine discourses and look at how the writers position themselves and others. 
Baxter (2003: 58-66) proposes several principles of FPDA such as being self-reflexive, 
taking a deconstructionist approach, and selecting a specific feminist focus. Self-reflexivity centers 
on the value of being critical of assumptions. To be self-reflexive, one must be clear of any 
theoretical positions and understand well the ‘epistemological assumptions’ of discourse analysis. 
According to Baxter (2003: 59), in doing discourse analysis, the principle of self-reflexivity is 
essential to declare, monitor and evaluate the quest of FPDA. Baxter asserts that it is the quest of 
FPDA practitioners to make the transformation of representing women’s experience and giving 
voices to marginalised women who are affected by dominant discourses. The researcher must also be 
self-reflexive about vocabulary lineup especially on specialist technical vocabulary or ‘foundational 
rhetoric’ which may exclude or marginalise others who are not familiar with the terms. When it 
comes to fictionality and textuality of the research process, Baxter asserted that practitioners of 
FPDA must be explicitly self-aware and take the authorial role in doing analysis. It is important for 
researchers to reflect upon their entire research process, including the reasons for their choices and 
strategies.  
The next principle proposed by Baxter (2003), taking a deconstructionist approach allows 
people to look at or produce new perspectives when any constructions and structures are 
deconstructed. It also borrows the “oppressed”/ “oppressor” term from CDA to explore and 
challenge two sides of subject positions or discourses. Deconstructionist approach also applies a 
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‘metaphorisation strategy’ which distinct the ‘positively valued term’ by contrasting it with 
‘negatively values term’. These valued terms also ‘inhabit, co-exist and co-evolve with the other’. 
Taking a deconstructionist approach includes questioning things and deconstructing the constructions 
and structures so that new ideas can be reconstructed for alternative transformations.  
The final principle of FPDA, selecting a specific feminist focus, stresses on the importance 
of leaving old subject matters such as women oppression or even gender effects on some groups’ 
speech style. The feminist focus must be looking at specific contexts of the negotiation of gender 
discourse and focus on the significant discourses. Finally, this also looks at how women from a 
particular community negotiate gender discourses and how the discourses position female speakers, 
either as powerful, powerless or both.  
Baxter (2003: 181) emphasizes that FPDA has significant contribution to the field of 
discourse analysis as FPDA explores how people position themselves as powerful or powerless, 
influential and effective than others. She also asserts that FPDA can explain the differences within 
and between girls/women, provide multiple and competing voices and support feminist projects 
within a post-structuralist tradition (Baxter, 2003: 181-182). 
FPDA undergoes two levels of analysis: denotation and connotation (Baxter, 2003: 75). 
Denotative analysis is similar to CDA’s text analysis in the description stage as the analysis looks at 
description of what is going on within a text. As CDA’s second dimension of discourse practice in 
the interpretation stage, FPDA’s connotative analysis also explores the interpretative social 
discourses. The analysis in connotative level also examines how people negotiate for positions of 
power or resisting positions of powerlessness. 
 
2.4.3 A multi-perspective approach 
 
I draw on a multi-perspective approach of CDA and FPDA frameworks for this paper’s data analysis 
on Malaysian English newspaper columns by female Muslim writers. According to Kamada (2010: 
18), “a poststructuralist framework allows for multiple perspectives to be heard alongside one 
another” and that such multi-perspectives could include the combination of the compatible 
approaches of CDA and FPDA. FPDA’s approach promotes multiple versions and different 
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perspectives therefore it is versatile and can function alongside with other discourse analysis 
approaches (Baxter (2003). CDA views itself not as a methodological theory, but as a “critical” 
perspective” which can be combined with other approaches as well (Baxter, 2010: 2010). Therefore, 
CDA and FPDA are supplementary to each other to work as a multi-perspective approach. CDA and 
FPDA also employ both micro analysis and macro analysis of data, which analyze what people 
discursively do in their talk, actions and interactions (Kamada, 2010: 19; Baxter, 2010: 131). 
In CDA, the analyst has a role to distance oneself from the context under analysis and must 
tackle the problem reflexively (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002: 21). This is similar to FPDA’s principle 
of being reflexive therefore both theories put importance on researcher’s self-reflexivity (Baxter, 
2010). CDA draws on the principle of intertextuality which is a reference drawn upon other texts, 
genres and discourses in producing communicative events (Fairclough 1995: 61). Similarly, 
intertextuality is an important feature in FPDA as traces of other texts or discourses are explored 
within a particular context or dominant discourses (Baxter, 2003: 78). CDA examines subject 
positions which look at identities and power in discourse. Positioning of people by placing a range of 
subject positions in various discourse types and variable produces social subjects (Fairclough, 1989: 
102-103). FPDA also examines how social actors are positioned (or position themselves) and that 
people can be both powerless and potentially powerful according to various contexts (Baxter, 2003). 
Both CDA and FPDA also focus on how social relations, identity, knowledge and power are 
constructed through written and spoken texts (Luke 1997). Similarly, CDA and FPDA draw on social 
constructionist tradition which view language as social practice and examine the relation between 
language and power (Baxter, 2010: 131).  
 
2.4.4 Key concepts of analysing discourse 
 
This section covers the key concepts of CDA and FPDA which are used for this study involving 
micro analysis and macro analysis. These two analytical approaches are related to look at the 
construction of meaning through linguistic features which contribute to analysis of discourses 
through language use. Fairclough has come up with his version of analyzing texts using critical 
discourse analysis, which are used in this study. Fairclough (2003: 135) considers text as 
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representation which focused on representational meaning in the clause. There are three elements of 
clauses from a representational perspective: Processes, Participants, and Circumstances (Fairclough, 
2003). These are representations of Processes as verbs, Participants as Subjects, Objects or Indirect 
Objects of verbs and Circumstances as various types of adverbial elements and there are various 
grammatical and lexical realizations for each (Fairclough, 2003). Representations of social events in 
texts can be analyzed through inclusion, exclusion or prominence of particular elements in particular 
social events. In the representation of social events as recontextualization, these features are also 
known as absent or present, and prominent or backgrounded. Degree of generalization can also be 
compared in social events to see whether social events are represented concretely or abstractly.  
Representations of Participants are realized as social actors and there are many variables in 
the representations of social actors in social events. The first variable is inclusion or exclusion of 
social actors whereby exclusion of social actors can appear as suppression, which is not mentioned at 
all, or backgrounding, not explicit but can be inferred from the text. The use of pronouns or nouns 
and grammatical roles for the representation of social actors are also essential variables as they can 
entail Us versus Them representations of In-group and Out-group. One example is the first person 
plural pronoun, “we” which can be used “exclusively” to include a specific group of people, but can 
also be used “inclusively” to loosely referencing everyone and anyone. Social actors can also be in 
‘activated’ or ‘passivated’ forms as they can be the Actor in the processes or the Affected or 
Beneficiary. Active and passive forms look at the feature of agency, which may contribute to 
intended inclusion or exclusion of social actors. Other variables of socials actors are whether they are 
represented as personal or impersonal, and as named or classified person or groups. The final 
variable is based on classified social actors as they can be represented as specific or generic social 
actors.  
Circumstances types look at representations of time and place. Various linguistic features can 
represent time, such as the tense of verbs (past, present and future), the aspect of verbs, the 
distinction between progressive and non-progressive and between perfect and non-perfect, adverbials, 
and conjunctions and prepositions.  
Fairclough has distinguished primary speech functions as Statements and Questions which 
are associated with knowledge exchanges, Demands and Offers, associated with activity exchanges. 
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This can be elaborated and differentiated in many terms of “speech act” (Fairclough, 2003: 108). The 
use of speech acts is not exclusive to analysis of spoken data thus can be used for this study which 
includes data from written texts. Statements can also be distinguished as statements of facts, 
“irrealis” statements which are predictions and hypothetical statements and evaluative statements. 
Through grammatical mood, sentence types are divided into declarative, interrogative and imperative. 
From Speech functions, it is also possible to look at modality and evaluation which is related to what 
authors commit themselves to and how they identify themselves (Fairclough, 2003: 165). Modality 
explores what is true and what is necessary while evaluation looks at what is desirable or undesirable 
and whether something is good or bad. Modality is marked by modal verbs, adverbs and adjectives, 
and other verbs of appearance and adverbs. Evaluative statements are one kind of evaluation, along 
with affective evaluations and value assumptions. 
As mentioned earlier, intertextuality is another essential aspect in discourse analysis. 
According to Fairclough (2003: 40), intertextuality refers to the way elements of texts incorporated 
within a text and it covers a range of elements such as quotations, reported speech, writing or thought. 
It is possible to examine inclusion and exclusion of texts and voices in intertextuality. Intertextualiy 
is also a form of recontextualization as a context moves or transform to another. There is also a link 
between intertextuality and assumptions but assumptions have no attributes to specific texts 
(Fairclough, 2003: 41). Assumptions are also known as types of implicitness such as presuppositions, 
logical implications or entailments, and implicatures. There are three types of assumptions described 
by Fairclough (2003: 55). Existential assumptions are assumptions about what exists which are 
marked or triggered by markers of definite reference such as definite articles and demonstratives. 
Certain ‘factive’ verbs trigger factual assumptions which are assumptions about what is or can be or 
will be the case. The final assumptions are value assumptions triggered by certain verbs referring to 
what is good or desirable. 
Positioning looks at the construction of people’s identities, which can be de-constructed or 
re-constructed (Fairclough, 2003; Baxter, 2003). The process of positioning is also known as 
negotiation which allows people to take up position in various and competing discourses (Phillips & 
Jorgensen, 2002: 110). According to Weatherall (2002: 142), based on poststructuralism and 
positioning theory, identities of people can be attributed in different positions depending on the 
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situations. Sunderland (2004) addresses the notion of ‘construction’ in relation to gender. She notes 
that any individual can construct themselves through linguistic ways like using speech acts and 
genres. In both spoken and written texts, self-construction can be intentional or not, and it also 
suggests that construction of other people is also possible. Gendered discourses are linguistically 
constructed in interaction through the use of social category like ‘women’ by the speakers. Another 
way is to look at the reference of any drawn gendered discourses on male or female, individual or 
groups. The notion of generalization is equally important. Generalization is quite similar to 
stereotyping, which assigns the characteristics of a certain group of people to the whole group and 
this suggests particular ideology at work (Teo 2000). For ‘labeling’ practice, Sunderland (2004) looks 
at repeated lexical choice and how social actors are referred to.   
According to Foucault (1972) there are four basic ways for discourses to operate. The first 
way discourse operates proposed by Foucault is that discourse creates a world as people shape their 
perceptions, pull together chains of associations to produce understanding and organize how they 
behave. Next, Foucault proposed that discourse also generates knowledge embedded through 
language, and “truth” which is referring to people’s acceptance of discourses as true in certain 
context. The next way suggested by Foucault is discourse says something about the people who 
speak it. Besides the intended meaning of language, analyzing discourses used by people enable one 
to understand their gender, sexuality, ethnicity, class position, and their relationship to others. The 
final way mentioned by Foucault is that discourse is involved with socially embedded networks of 
power. Discourses are thought of as giving people some levels of power socially, culturally or 
politically.  
Fairclough (2003: 129) lists the following for analysts to identify discourses: 
1) identify the main parts of the world (including areas of social life) which are represented 
– the main ‘theme’ 
2) identify the particular perspective or angle or point of view from which they are 
represented. 
 
Fairclough (2003: 129) proposes that discourses can be identified by ways of representing 
and by their relationship to other elements. Several grammatical and linguistic features are used to 
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examine ways of representing the world. Major contributors are features of vocabulary such as 
looking at semantic relations such as hyponymy, synonymy and antonymy. Looking at patterns of 
co-occurrence or collocations of words in text is also common. Lexical cohesion relations can be 
expressed through the identity chain of co-reference, co-classification, and co-extension and such 
relations (Halliday & Hasan 1985: 52).  This refers to the same ideas which appear in different 
places in texts, as suggested by Hassan that the idea of continuity and connectedness can be mediated 
by lexical cohesion relations.   
Another way to identify discourses is through metaphor, consisting of lexical metaphor and 
grammatical metaphor (Fairclough, 2003: 131). Lexical metaphors are words representing one part 
of the world extended to the other, while grammatical metaphor refers to representations of entities 
through nominalization. Nominalization is a transformation of a clause into a nominal or noun-like 
entity and the agents of process are absent from texts.  
Sunderland (2004) argued that it is possible to identify and name a discourse after a bit of 
analytic word. However, she also pointed that from a constructionist viewpoint, reflexivity is 
important in documenting discourses are “arbitrary, unfixed and provisional or contingent”. Kamada 
(2010) employs Baxter’s 4-point framework to locate discourses in her analysis. The 4-point 
framework includes searching for i) words, terms or phrases repeatedly occurring; ii) commonly 
emerging themes, issues and preoccupations; iii) connections, links and associations; and iv) 
contradictions, oppositions or competing viewpoints (Baxter, 2003: 138). 
 
2.4.5 Methodological framework 
 
This study focuses on how Muslim feminists are trying to challenge various dominant discourses 
that exist in Malaysia, and to promote a channel for new voices to be heard that might assist women 
in claiming equality and justice within an Islamic framework. To assist in data analysis and 
answering research questions which look at deconstruction of gender and religious discourses, the 
challenge of Malaysian Islamic law and the pursuit of a feminist agenda in Malaysian media texts, I 
draw on CDA and FPDA frameworks and adopt two levels of analysis as the methodological 
framework; micro and macro analysis. 
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Micro analysis is adopted from CDA’s analysis of text and FPDA’s denotative analysis. This 
analysis looks at properties and descriptions of texts. For micro analysis, I examine linguistic features 
in texts, mainly focusing on lexical choice and grammar, which has been explained earlier in the 
previous section on “Key concepts of analyzing discourse”. The text analysis also includes the 
utilization of speech acts which is an examination of what people “do” with language and how 
people “do” various actions through their language. The analysis of fine grained evidence from 
linguistic features “pinpoints the exact moments in discourse” during the shifts between speaker’s 
powerfulness and powerlessness, and identifies discourses synchronically or diachronically (Baxter, 
2010: 132).  
The other level of analysis, macro analysis, comes from a combination of discourse practice 
in CDA’s interpretation stage, and FPDA’s connotative analysis. CDA’s explanation stage, which is 
the social analysis, is covered in Chapter One of the background of Malaysia, feminism and Islam. In 
doing macro analysis, I explore how people “position” themselves and others in ideological 
perspectives and use social discourses in which dominant and alternative discourses are drawn on. I 
use Baxter’s 4-point framework to locate discourses in which I search for “words, terms or phrases 
repeatedly occurring; commonly emerging themes, issues and preoccupations; connections, links 
and associations; and contradictions, oppositions or competing viewpoints” (Baxter, 2003: 138) in 
the texts to find the occurrence of discourses and to determine how people position themselves and 
others. Macro analysis helps to explain the power relations between speakers (Baxter, 2010: 132). 
From the selected media texts related to Islam and gender issues by two feminist writers, 
MM and ZA, I analyze the data using both micro and macro analysis as the methodological 
framework based on research questions mentioned in Chapter One. The first question looks at micro 
analysis of the media texts which explores discursive actions and linguistic features employed by 
two female Malaysian Muslim writers, MM and ZA. I look for how they “do” various actions such 
as denying, blaming, refuting, celebrating, constructing, re-constructing, and so on. I also look at 
“linguistic traces” by the two writers based on the identified discourses. The second and third 
questions look at macro analysis which explores positionings of the two writers on themselves and 
others in their columns. This involves looking at the construction and contestation of Muslim 
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women’s identities in Malaysia and to some extent, from other countries. I also examine recurring 
discourses which are challenged and formed by both writers in their columns. 
 
2.5 Data collection  
 
In this study, I critically analyze newspaper columns by two women writers from Malaysia, Marina 
Mahathir and Zainah Anwar. In the analysis, I refer to them respectively as MM and ZA. From their 
columns in two well-read pro-government Malaysian English newspapers: The Star and New Straits 
Times, I examine competing discourses as well as Malaysian Muslim women’s representations, 
negotiation of identities and positionings.  
 
2.5.1 Background of data 
 
I specifically selected MM and ZA because both of them are feminist writers and they are also 
prominent members of Sisters in Islam (SIS). They have different careers and journalistic 
backgrounds from each other, and their columns are published in mainstream newspapers in 
Malaysia, which could possibly influence readers, positively or negatively, to a certain extent. The 
biodata of MM and ZA below is from the SIS website (Sisters in Islam, 2013). 
Marina Mahathir (MM), born in 1957, is well known as the daughter and eldest child of 
Malaysian fourth Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad. She graduated from University of Sussex, 
United Kingdom. She was the president of the Malaysian AIDS Council (MAC) and the chairperson 
of the Malaysian AIDS Foundation (MAF). She left MAC in 2006 and was voted as one of SIS 
board members in 2009. Since 1989, she has been a columnist for a column, Musings, in The Star, 
writing fortnightly mostly about women’s rights, censorship, young people and HIV/AIDS. Her 
interest is in the area of Islam, Gender and HIV/AIDS.  
Zainah Anwar (ZA) is one of the founders and former Executive Director of SIS. She is also 
a former member of the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia. Currently she is the Director for 
Musawah, a global movement for equality and justice in the Muslim family. She studied journalism 
at the MARA Institute of Technology, Shah Alam, Malaysia in 1972, did her masters in Boston 
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University, USA in 1978, and read International Law and Diplomacy at the Fletcher School of Law 
and Diplomacy, Tufts University, USA until 1986. She was a columnist for the New Straits Times 
but she later changed to become a columnist for The Star, writing a monthly column called Sharing 
the Nation since March 2008 to present. She writes mostly on politics, religion and women’s rights. 
These two columnists are the objects for my research to examine their language use in 
printed media, discourses that they construct or contest and their positioning of Malaysians, 
particularly concerning Muslim women. Their topics vary from issues on women’s rights, gender 
differences, Islamic/civil laws, multi-ethnic relations, democracy, religion and politics, among others. 
While MM’s witty, yet meaningful writings tend to lean on personal anecdotes, ZA’s style is more 
formal and serious. I employed two writers for this study because it is interesting to see how two 
different women with different styles and identities embody the same discourse of promoting Islamic 
feminism in their writing. 
 
2.5.2 Source of data 
 
I used two Malaysian English newspapers for this study, The Star and New Straits Times, in which 
the selected columns by MM and ZA are published. These are two major English newspapers in 
Malaysia and I chose these so that they can provide relevant data for this study. I chose printed media 
texts for my study because printed media are still accessible to the mass public even after they are 
published. This means that people have the option to read the printed media texts more than once and 
they can make any reference to them any time they want. The writing also remains the same as no 
transcription work is necessary so there is no question of validity or missing words or sentences as 
everything is clear cut as printed. 
I collected columns from both MM and ZA, which were published from 2005 to 2011 in the 
two newspapers, The Star and the New Straits Times. These two newspapers are printed media but 
the news and articles can also be found online. The materials used for this study are mostly selected 
through electronic search from the newspapers’ online sites. The online version of The Star is 
http://thestar.com.my/ and for the New Straits Times, their website is http://www.nst.com.my/. I chose 
the columns starting from 2005 because in 2005, another round of amendments was made to Islamic 
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Family Law (IFL) in Malaysia, referred to as 2005 Amendment. SIS members and other women’s 
groups have claimed the amendments made are discriminatory against Muslim women, causing 
them to demand for changes in IFL.  
After I obtained all the texts that were written by MM and ZA, I separated them according to 
recurring themes concerning gender and religious issues concerning Muslim women in Malaysia 
before pursuing data analysis on the media texts. I have selected ninety articles altogether from MM 
and ZA’s data; fifty from MM’s and forty from ZA’s work from 2005 to 2011. These ninety articles 
are related to Muslim gender in Malaysia. However, for the purpose of analysis, based on the three 
research questions, I have narrowed down to eighteen articles from MM and sixteen articles from ZA 
(See Appendix 3 and 4 for the list of articles).  
I divide data analysis of MM’s and ZA’s newspaper columns into three chapters: 
deconstruction of gender and religious discourses in Malaysia, the challenge of Malaysian 
Islamic/syariah Law, and the pursuit of a feminist agenda in Malaysia. The first theme from the 
columns is on the deconstruction of gender and Islamic fundamentalist discourses in Malaysia in 
media texts by two feminist writers. The Gender Gap Index is used as a reference to measure gender 
gap in Malaysia. In the 2006 report, Malaysia stood at 72nd place but declined to 97th place in the 
2011 report (Hausmann, Tyson, & Zahidi, 2006, 2011). Besides the Gender Gap Index, MM and ZA 
also criticized the Islamic fundamentalist or Islamist discourse. Pertaining to Islamic practice, a 
discourse of “patriarchal Islam” is still visible and very dominant in many Muslim societies, 
including Malaysia. Patriarchal Islam refers to Muslim men who ascend to top positions and have 
the final say in almost everything. This discourse derives from the Islamic resurgence coming from a 
traditional Arab interpretation of Islam (Anwar, 2001: 234). 
Othman (2006: 342) challenged the popular discourse of Malaysian Muslims, which is 
similar to the global Islamic fundamentalist ideology that men and women’s gender roles should be 
clearly divided; men should be the head of the family and responsible for protecting women, and 
women should be obedient wives and dutiful mothers and daughters. This discourse can be linked to 
the ideology of Islamic fundamentalists in their attempt to recreate a Muslim society according to the 
“idealized past” which promotes anti-modernity measures.  
Conservative Muslim groups draw on the discourse of men and women as inherently 
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unequal in Islam, which leads to total segregation of men and women, and various restrictions on 
women (Anwar, 2001: 231). Islamists in Malaysia draw on the dominant discourse of “Muslim men 
as superior to Muslim women” in determining leaders or decision makers, either in governmental or 
political posts, or in organizations and companies. Fundamentalists believe that men have a higher 
status and credibility than women. 
The second theme gathered from the columns is how the two feminist writers challenge the 
system of (separate) Islamic laws (Syariah Law) in Malaysia. Islamic feminists in Malaysia have 
claimed Muslim women suffer discrimination under Islamic laws. The interpretation of religious 
texts and the codification of Islamic law have always been from the point of view of men, and as a 
result of this, women have often suffered “inequality and injustice”, such as in matters of divorce and 
inheritance. Othman (2006: 341) criticized the patriarchal conception of Muslim women that 
involves controlling women’s bodies, their social roles, status, and presence in society. Following the 
2005 Amendments in Islamic Family Law, MM and ZA made the most of their newspaper columns 
to challenge the law to change. 
The third theme is on how the two writers pursue their feminist agenda within an Islamic 
context in Malaysia in their columns. MM and ZA’s work is not without criticism in Malaysia. 
Islamic fundamentalist groups in Malaysia have shown great resistance in accepting Sisters in 
Islam’s (SIS) ideologies. This question explored how MM and ZA promoted the discourse of Islamic 
feminism and defended against criticisms towards their group, which is an Islamic feminist 
movement in Malaysia. MM’s and ZA’s newspaper columns serve as alternative voices for average 
and modern Muslims who may not always agree with the fundamentalists. Their columns offer some 
options and encouragement for others not just to think about, but to take real actions concerning 
gender inequality.  
      
2.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I presented the multi-perspective approach of CDA and FPDA as the theoretical 
framework for this study. I also provided the key concepts of micro and macro analysis. I presented 
the media as a communicative event and looked at how the study of gender and Islam in the media 
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can be analyzed. From the previous researches on Muslims in the media, there are various issues 
explored by researchers to analyze how the media present stories about Muslims in relation to gender 
and representations of Muslims in the media. This study however, focuses on written language from 
media texts by Muslim female writers as data is taken from Malaysian newspaper columns. The 
dynamic of their columns are somewhat different as the stories are written from the point of view of 
Muslim women. 
Finally, I presented the data analysis and the data collection methodology for this study as I 
lay out the principles of CDA and FPDA as the selected framework. I also presented the 
methodological framework which is used to analyze the written data. The next three chapters, Three 
Four, and Five, analyze data to answer the research questions. Chapters Three, Four and Five are 
based on three themes respectively: deconstructing Islamic fundamentalist or Islamist discourses in 
Malaysia, challenging Islamic law and pursuing a feminist agenda within a Malaysian Islamic 
context. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Deconstructing gender and Islamic fundamentalist or Islamist discourses in 
Malaysia 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I divide the analysis of MM’s and ZA’s columns in the form of extracts, not the whole 
article. Some are divided into “a” and “b” parts for easier analysis. (See Appendix 1: Data 
Conventions for explanation of conventions used in the extracts). To answer the research questions, I 
look at the use of linguistic features and examine MM’s and ZA’s discursive actions and/or strategies 
that are done and/or employed in the texts. I also explore the two writers’ positionings of themselves 
and others as seen in the media texts. Finally, I locate gender and religious discourses which are 
challenged or formed by the two writers in their columns. I use the methodological framework as 
explained in Chapter Two to guide me with the analysis. I try to start with micro analysis followed by 
macro analysis; however, these two analyses are not always in that order and can be overlapping.  
The theme in this chapter is on the deconstruction of gender and Islamic fundamentalist or 
Islamist discourses in Malaysia by MM and ZA. This chapter looks at various discriminatory issues 
concerning women’s rights, gender and religion faced by women in Malaysia, especially Muslim 
women; and the theme of Sisters in Islam (SIS), a Malaysian feminist’s group that adopts the 
ideologies of moderate Islamic practice. I seek to look at how both the feminist writers, MM and ZA, 
deconstruct the discourse of Islamic fundamentalism in Malaysia with regards to criticisms 
concerning themselves, SIS, and other Muslim women in Malaysia, which are made both implicitly 
and explicitly. This involves the issue of un-Islamic discourse, and Muslims who are not experts in 
theology and have no religious credentials are not allowed to speak. 
I selected a number of columns for analysis, which contain the theme of gender gap, gender 
inequality and the discourse of Islamic fundamentalism in Malaysia which MM and ZA frequently 
write about. The analysis below is divided according to gender and religious discourses found in 
media texts and how MM and ZA deconstruct the discourses. 
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3.2 Gender gap (ZA) 
 
In extracts 3-1a to 3-2b, ZA deconstructs gender discourses as she brings up the issue of gender gap 
in Malaysia, involving Malaysian women in general. In extract 3-1a below, ZA responds to the 2006 
global report on Gender Gap which was produced by the World Economic Forum. According to the 
report, out of 115 countries in the world, Malaysia was ranked at 72nd place. Even though there was 
progress for Malaysian women in the areas of education and health, no changes were seen in terms 
of economic participation and political empowerment.  
 
Extract 3-1a: “Move fast to close gender gap” (#29) 
(ZA, New Straits Times, 2007, May 11) 
 
25 The obvious question that comes to mind is what is happening to all those thousands  
26 of girls who are outperforming boys in schools and universities for the past several  
27 years? 
28 Very often, when feminists complain about gender discrimination, men point to  
29 women outnumbering men in the universities to dismiss our complaints — as if this  
30 one area where women do better translates into women’s dominance in society. 
31 That we have progressed far since independence is laudable. But the challenge now is  
32 to close the gender gap as this discrimination against women means lost talent,  
33 productivity, and individual and family wellbeing. 
In this extract, ZA does not refer to any specific people, rather, she uses generic nouns for 
Malaysians as social actors here, such as “girls” and “boys” (both in line 26). The noun “women” is 
repeated a few times in lines 29, 30 and 31, whereas the noun “men” is only mentioned twice in lines 
28 and 29.  
In deconstructing gender discourses in discrimination against women, ZA foregrounds her 
support of feminism as she employs the noun “feminists” (line 28) in this extract, referring to 
feminists in Malaysia. She positions herself as one of the “feminists” (line 28) but uses inclusive 
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pronouns “our” (line 29) and “we” (line 31) to engage with other feminists in Malaysia, possibly 
among the readers. ZA also foregrounds the gender gap issue from the mention of “gender 
discrimination” (line 28) and “gender gap” (line 32), which are repeatedly used in other extracts as 
well. The repetition of content word is known as “lexical cohesion”. This suggests that ZA 
challenges “a discourse of women as unequal to men”. 
ZA employs an interrogative sentence in lines 25-27 to question what happen to girls and 
women after they finish their education. She deconstructs gender discourses by drawing on “a 
discourse of women as educated” as she celebrates the fact that girls or women are “outperforming” 
(line 26) and “outnumbering” (line 29) boys or men in schools and universities. However, she 
criticizes the reply that men always give to feminists when the issue of gender discrimination comes 
up; that the percentage of women who continue to pursue higher education is higher than men (lines 
28-29). ZA challenges gender discrimination as she suggests that the number does not reflect 
“women’s dominance in society” (line 30). She may be referring to the small number of Malaysian 
female leaders or female politicians and thus argues that the “dominance” of women in universities 
does not mean gender discrimination is over. ZA appeals for closing of “gender gap” (line 32) to end 
discrimination against women in Malaysia, thus promotes “a discourse of women as equal to men”.  
Extract 3-1b below is from the same article where ZA continues to challenge “a discourse of 
women as unequal to men” in terms of low labour force participation and less political 
empowerment for women.  
 
Extract 3-1b: “Move fast to close gender gap” (#29) 
 (ZA, New Straits Times, 2007, May 11)  
56 A major reason why Malaysian women’s labour force participation and political 
57 empowerment remain so low compared to their level of health survival and  
58 educational attainment is because neither government nor society has dealt effectively  
59 or adequately with the changing roles of women today. 
60 When work and family conflict, more often than not, it is women who leave the  
61 labour pool as they feel more pressured to conform to the traditional gender role as  
62 the home-maker and principal care giver. This affects not just married women with  
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63 young children, but may also affect single women who are expected to take care of  
64 ageing and sick parents. 
65 So women opt out of the labour force, decline promotions, refuse overtime, choose  
66 less demanding career paths, feel anxious, guilty or depressed for perceived failures in  
67 fulfilling their traditional gender roles, thus perpetuating those roles even further and  
68 disadvantaging themselves in the marketplace. 
69 They are marginalised, taken less seriously by their employers and discriminated  
70 against in terms of employment and promotions because of their "mummy-track". 
[…] 
129 When men do not have to choose between family and work and women must make  
130 that choice, then that is a society that discriminates. 
131 What we need to do is to find ways to enable both men and women to enjoy a  
132 rewarding career as well as a rewarding family life. 
ZA continues to use a generic noun of “men” and “women” a few times in extract 3-1b but 
employs a specific classified noun “Malaysian women” (line 56). She also classified Malaysian 
women into “married women” (line 62) and “single women” (line 63). Other social actors involved 
are “government” (line 58), “society” (line 58) and “employers” (line 68). ZA employs a passive 
form in “single women who are expected to take care of ageing and sick parents” (lines 63-64). The 
agent who expected women to do that is backgrounded, and may be inferred to be men or the society 
in general. In lines 69-70, ZA uses another passive sentence but she does not background the agents 
who are “the employers” (line 69). In contrast, the use of passive form here is to draw attention to the 
subject, which is women, who “are marginalised, taken less seriously” and “discriminated against” 
(lined 69-70). While she uses the specific pronouns “they”, “their”, and “themselves” to refer to 
women in this extract, she uses an inclusive pronoun “we” (line 131) to appeal to everyone regarding 
a balanced career and family life for men and women. 
Here, ZA contests “a discourse of women as unequal to men” as she addresses the low level 
of “labour force participation and political empowerment” (lines 56-57) for Malaysian performance 
in the gender gap report. She contests another gender discourse, “a discourse of 
traditional/conservative women” by deconstructing the “traditional gender role” (line 61) to the 
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“changing roles of women today” (line 59). She criticizes the “traditional gender role”, created by 
Islamists, which resulted in positioning Malaysian women, involving both “married women” (line 
62) and “single women” (line 63), as “the home-maker and principal care giver” (line 62) and argues 
that women’s roles in Malaysia have changed (line 59). Due to the assumed “traditional gender roles, 
ZA reconstructs the gender discourse and positions women as “perpetuating those roles” and 
“ disadvantaging themselves” (lines 67-68) as they often suffer and miss out on a lot of opportunities 
as listed in lines 65 to 68.  
ZA also deconstructs the issue of choosing between “family and work” for women. She 
challenges “a discourse of women as inferior to men” when she positions women as pressured to 
give up working whenever there is a conflict between family and work. She positions “employers” 
(line 69) as being powerful and being in control over women. Because of that, she positions women 
as “marginalised”, “taken less seriously” and “discriminated against” (lines 69-70) by their 
employers and contests the disadvantages that women receive just because women take along their 
“mummy-track” to work (lines 69-70).  
In fighting against gender discrimination against women at work, ZA continues by putting 
the blame on the “government” and the “society” (line 58). She positions the government and the 
society as failing to address the issue of “changing roles” (line 59) women have undertaken today. 
ZA argues that the government and the society have not “dealt effectively or adequately” (lines 
58-59) to provide more chances for women in labour and politics. She also criticizes the 
discriminating society (line 130) which gives more employment prospects for men than women. 
Therefore, ZA again draws on “a discourse of women as equal to men” in seeking gender equality. 
She urges everyone to “find ways” (line 131) for more rewarding career and family lives for both 
women and men (lines 131-132). 
Extracts 3-1a and 3-1b above, from the article “Move fast to close gender gap”, was written 
in 2006. In extract 3-2a below, ZA chooses to talk about the same topic of the Global Gender Gap 
Index as Malaysia has dropped to a worse place at 98 in the 2010 Global Gender Gap report, 
compared to the ranking of 72 in 2006. The situation for women in Malaysia has not improved, 
therefore, ZA continues to deconstruct gender discourses and appeal for gender gap to close to end 
discrimination against women in Malaysia.  
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Extract 3-2a: “Closing the gender gap” (#63) 
(ZA, The Star, 2011, March 13)  
 
18 That Malaysia, a high middle income country, should be so lowly rated, joining the  
19 bottom quarter made up of largely Arab and African countries, should be cause for  
20 urgent concern to our political leaders and policy makers and their supposed  
21 commitment to Malaysia’s economic transformation. 
22 A country that aims to be globally competitive and join the ranks of developed  
23 countries by 2020 cannot afford to continue to discriminate against half its  
24 population. 
25 Women make up half of the potential talent base of the country. And in spite of the  
26 crisis of talent, Malaysian employers in the public and private sectors continue to  
27 undermine and overlook the talent among women. 
28 There is a disconnect between the level of education Malaysian women have  
29 received and their achievements in the economic and political fields. Malaysian  
30 women’s political and economic participation remain abysmally low. 
31 We can’t continue to use the fact that there are more women in universities than  
32 men to prove that women are making it in Malaysia. This access to education has  
33 not translated into proportionate economic and political opportunities and outcomes  
34 for Malaysian women because of continuing discrimination. 
 
Similar to extract 3-1b above, ZA also employs a specific classified noun “Malaysian 
women” (line 28, 30, 34) and “Malaysian employers” (line 26) as social actors in extract 3-1b. ZA 
also refers Malaysian women as “half its population” (lines 23-24) and “half of the potential talent 
base” (line 25), which indirectly informs the readers that the ratio of men and women in Malaysia is 
50:50. In this extract, ZA positions Malaysia as “a high middle income country” (line 18), and “aims 
to be globally competitive and joins the rank of developed countries” (lines 22-23). Thus, she 
expresses her frustrations and condemns Malaysia’s poor performance in the global gender report as 
“lowly rated” (line 18) especially when Malaysia sat in the same “bottom quarter” (line 19) group as 
70 
 
other “Arab and African countries” (line 19), which are not considered developed countries. In order 
for Malaysia to be “globally competitive” and become one of the “developed countries” ZA argues 
that Malaysia “cannot afford to continue to discriminate” (line 23) against women.  
Based on the global gender report, Malaysian women scored low in “political and economic 
participation” (line 30). Similar to extract 3-1b above, here, she also blames employers in Malaysia, 
both in the “public and private sectors” which “undermine and overlook” women’s talent” (line 
25-27) on the low ranking for women. ZA re-emphasizes the same point which appeared in extract 
3-1a above, in which she disagrees with the “fact that there are more women in universities than 
men” in Malaysia (line 31). This statement is always used as the basis of judging women’s 
achievement, however, ZA challenges that discrimination against women still exists in Malaysia. ZA 
contests “a discourse of women as unequal to men” as she still criticizes the disparity between 
Malaysian women’s achievement in education and their lack of participation in the fields of politics 
and economics and she claims that due to “continuing discrimination” (line 34), even women with 
education have difficulties to get equal chances to penetrate into economic and political careers. 
ZA continues to deconstruct gender discourses in extract 3-2b below as she suggests the 
inclusion of policies to close the gender gap especially involving balancing family and work, as well 
as economic and political participation. 
 
Extract 3-2b: “Closing the gender gap” (#63) 
(ZA, The Star, 2011, March 13)  
 
64 The arguments for a country’s progress and prosperity, the realities of women and  
65 men’s lives in the 21st century, the evidence-based research on the impact of  
66 women’s education, work, and leadership on the well-being of families,  
67 communities and companies are there for all to evaluate and shape policy. 
68 So what’s holding back the patriarchs who still rule our lives? Just fear of the  
69 unknown? 
70 How do you transform an economy to be more globally competitive when  
71 government and private sector policies drive talent away or fail to even unearth the  
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72 potential among the women already in employment? 
[…] 
110 It has little time left to introduce policies and incentives to make marriage and  
111 motherhood compatible with the economic and political participation of women. It  
112 must provide political leadership to change traditional mindsets that still regard  
113 women as inferior to men. 
114 This is after all the 21st century. To be developed and modern means decisions  
115 and policies that impact the well-being of society must be made on the basis of  
116 evidence, not emotions and personal prejudices. 
 
From extract 3-2b above, there are no specific social actors except for “men” and “women”. 
However, she uses a specific noun for men; “patriarchs” (line 68) which adds an interesting 
observation in looking at how ZA positions men and women in this sentence. ZA opts for 
interrogatives seen in three questions from lines 68-72. In the first question, “So what’s holding 
patriarchs who still rule our lives?” (line 68), she employs the inclusive pronoun in “our lives” to 
refer to women’s lives, including hers. She positions men as “patriarchs” (line 68) whom she claims 
still control women’s lives and refuse to improve the conditions of work policy for women.  
In deconstructing a gender discourse of “women as unequal to men”, ZA reconstructs and 
offers a possible solution to balance family and work for women, which is to “evaluate and shape 
policy” (line 67) in employment. Lexical items “policy” or “policies” (line 67, 71, 110, 115) reoccur 
a few times and serve as an important frame for extract 3-2b as ZA argues that the introduction of 
new and better policies is needed in order to improve employment opportunities for women.   
A discourse of “patriarchal society” refers to men’s power and bias exercised over women. 
In the traditional sense, a patriarchal society places men as heads of families to be in charged (or in 
control) of everything in the family, which extends to male dominance in matters pertaining to 
running organizations, companies and countries. Deconstruction of gender discourses is also seen 
through ZA’s disapproval of a “patriarchal discourse” as she challenges “a discourse of patriarchal 
society” in Malaysia in this extract. ZA positions “the patriarchs” (line 68) as the ones responsible for 
ruling women’s lives (line 68). She also claims that some patriarchal men know most of the 
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“arguments” (line 64) and “the evidence-based research” (line 65) on ways to implement new 
policies to improve employment conditions for women but choose to ignore these facts, which 
leaves family women with drawbacks. From the question “Just fear of the unknown?” in lines 68-69, 
ZA positions these patriarchs as cowards for denying equality that women deserve in work. In 
another question in lines 70 to 72, ZA challenges the general audience to think by employing a 
generic pronoun “you”. Continuing from extract 3-2a above where ZA blames government and 
private employers, here she challenges the policies made by the “government and private sectors” 
(line 71). She claims such policies fail to recognize women’s potential at work, thus creating 
discrimination against women in the workplace.  
Next, ZA brings up change for two things; policies and mindset. She proposes again the 
introduction of new “policies and incentives” (line 110) to balance family and career for women. ZA 
challenges “a discourse of women as inferior to men” as she criticizes the Islamists’ “traditional 
mindsets that still regard women as inferior to men” (lines 112-113).  
ZA’s lexical choice of “the 21st century” which appears twice in this extract (line 65 & 114) 
displays juxtaposition between the “realities of women and men” (line 64), “developed and modern” 
(line 114) versus “traditional mindset” (line 112). She argues that traditional practices are no longer 
relevant to today’s lives. Thus, ZA draws on “a discourse of modernity and progressive” as she 
reconstructs traditional lives to modern lives and empowers women to be involved with the 
economic and political career. Again, she proposes a change in policies so that marriage and 
motherhood can be no hindrance to women’s involvement in work (lines 112-113). ZA employs a 
strong modality in “must provide” in line 112 and “must be made” in line 115 to show her strong 
opinion of how change is a must. She argues that in line with progress and modernity, evidence has 
more weight than “emotions or personal prejudices” (line 116). She implies that some men may act 
based on emotions and refuse to look at the evidence in deciding upon something. 
 
3.3 Gender discrimination in the authority (MM) 
 
While ZA focuses mostly on gender gap in employment, in the next few extracts, MM brings up the 
discourse of gender discrimination and struggles faced by Malaysian women with power in the 
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authority or the government and in politics. In extract 3-3 below, MM talks about the issue of “silent 
majority” (appeared in other parts of the article, not cited here) and touches on the comparison 
between the expectations and behaviours of male and female politicians. She intertextually illustrates 
this as “silent majority” as explained by Mark Buchanan. 
 
Extract 3-3: “Shouting down the majority voice” (#55) 
(MM, The Star, 2007, June 8) 
 
28 We see this happening in many places. For instance, when people who are not part  
29 of the establishment say something silly, everyone else happily jumps on them  
30 because it is seen as the okay thing to do. But when establishment people say  
31 something equally silly, people hesitate. 
32 If no criticism is forthcoming, then people keep quiet, afraid that if they say  
33 something, they themselves may attract unwanted attention and negative feedback. 
34 This is particularly true in male-dominated societies on issues that concern women.  
35 We’ve seen several cases of despicable and insulting behaviour by men in public  
36 positions, yet very little reaction from female public figures on the same political  
37 side. 
38 Privately, they are probably just as angry as the ordinary woman, but they fear that  
39 speaking out on principle may not be politically expedient and may cost them their  
40 careers. 
[…] 
64 Given that we have so few women in Parliament and even less in the Cabinet, it is  
65 not surprising that when women are insulted, we cannot really rely on them to stand  
66 up for us. The solution therefore is to up the numbers of smart no-nonsense women  
67 winning seats in the next elections. Only then will women’s rights be upheld. 
 
In this extract, similar to ZA, MM also addresses gender inequality discourse concerning 
Malaysian women in general. MM divides social actors in this extract into two: “people who are not 
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part of the establishment” (lines 28-29), a group for ordinary people, and “establishment people” 
(line 30), who can be the authorities, politicians or people with power. MM also uses the nouns 
“people”, “women” and “ordinary women” for the non-establishment group. For the establishment 
group, MM refers to them as “men in public positions” (lines 35-36), “female public figures” (line 
36) and “women in Parliament” (line 64). She uses the pronoun “they” to refer back to generic 
“people” (anaphoric “they”) and also non-anaphoric “they” for a specific group, the female 
politicians. She also uses the pronoun “we” frequently in this extract, mostly as an inclusive 
reference to women. MM is more subtle in her choice of modality, as she uses “may” a number of 
times in “may attract” (line 33), “may not be politically expedient” (line 39). She uses a passive form 
in “women are insulted” (line 65) which hides the agent(s) who insults women but I can assume that 
she refers to men as the agents here, especially when earlier, she talks about men’s behaviour as 
“despicable and insulting” (line 35).  
MM challenges the double standard in how people react differently when people say silly 
things; “happily jumps on them” (line 29) for “people who are not part of the establishment” (lines 
28-29), and “hesitate” (line 31) or “keep quiet” (line 32) for the “establishment people” (line 30). She 
positions these people as the “silent majority” since they would rather keep quiet to avoid 
“criticisms” and “unwanted attention and negative feedback” (lines 32-33). 
MM deconstructs gender discourses when she challenges “a discourse of male-dominated 
societies” (line 34) which limits women’s ability to speak up or to rule and lets men do as they please. 
This is similar to ZA’s use of “patriarchal society discourse” in extract 3-2b above. MM positions 
some men in the authorities as bearing “despicable and insulting behaviour” (line 35-36). However, 
she positions female politicians as being silent on the unfavourable behaviour of some male 
politicians and gave “very little reaction” (line 36) to how those men behave. Even though there are 
some women in the Parliament and the Cabinet, MM doubts that their power is not the same as 
men’s. MM positions female politicians as weak because they “fear” (line 38) speaking out as not to 
offend other politicians, to avoid attention and also to save their political careers (lines 38-40). 
However, she does not deny that they may feel “angry” (line 38) but stuck in a situation where they 
cannot show their true feelings. She also positions some female politicians as “unreliable” because 
they cannot stand up for women who are insulted by male politicians (lines 65-66).  
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MM also challenges “a discourse of women as unequal to men” as women are 
underrepresented in the authorities. Therefore, she draws on “women as educated discourse” as she 
demands for not just any women, but for more “smart no-nonsense women” (line 66) to win more 
seats in the parliament. MM advocates “a discourse of women as equal to men” by campaigning for 
more women in the parliament so that there are more female representatives who can stand up for 
women’s rights. 
In the next extract, MM continues to talk about gender inequality discourse in Malaysian 
political scenario. 
 
Extract 3-4: “Still a man’s world, politically” (#72) 
(MM, The Star, 2008, February 27) 
 
36 The thing is, politics by and large is a man’s game. It is stacked against women in  
37 every way, from the finances needed to run for office, to the long hours, to the types  
38 of issues that are promoted. 
39 When women come in, they are pressured to not push for any women’s issues  
40 because these are seen as “discriminatory” against men. They are supposed to be  
41 “gender-neutral” instead. 
42 But gender-neutrality is not the same as gender equality when the playing field  
43 between men and women is not level. 
[…] 
60 There are going to be women representatives who will make blunders because of  
61 lack of experience. They will be judged far more harshly than male representatives  
62 of similar ilk. It will be seen as a far greater weakness than male incompetence. 
63 Sexism prevails, unless the women themselves want to change it and will unite,  
64 regardless of party affiliation. For that too, they need the numbers in order to be  
65 strong. 
66 If more women win seats this time, they will gain the confidence to stand up for  
67 their rights, or at least for greater respect in the House. 
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In extract 3-4, MM still focuses on politics in Malaysia involving men and women in general. 
She does not use any specific reference for the social actors except for “men” and “women”.  
However, unlike extract 3-3 where MM uses “men in public positions” and “female public figures” 
to refer to people involved in politics, here MM refers to “women representatives” (line 60) and 
“male representatives” (line 61).  
MM employs the use of passive form a few time in this extract, for example, “they are 
pressured” (line 39), “they are supposed to” (line 40), “they will be judged” (line 61), in which the 
pronoun “they” is used to refer to women in general. The use of passive voice is common in MM’s 
writing due to her focus on women as the subject, and her implicit reference to men as agents of 
doing the actions or causing the effects to women.  
In the second part of the extract, MM uses a strong probability “will” a number of times, for 
example, “will make blunders” (line 60), “will be judged” (line 61), “will be seen” (line 62), “will 
unite” (63) and “will gain” (line 66). I gather that MM is confident of the things that women 
representatives in the Parliament face and more women in the Parliament can do to change the 
situation. 
Again, in this extract, MM continues to deconstruct gender discourses. She challenges “a 
discourse of male-dominated societies”, although not explicitly mentioned like extract 3-3. She uses 
the analogy of a “game” to construct politics as “by and large a man’s game” (line 36) and positions 
men as having control over the game and even uses a phrase “it is stacked” (line 36), which is a 
popular expression for a card game (referring to cards as stacked). Like in a game, MM positions 
men as making it difficult for women to “win” when it comes to managing “finances”, “long hours” 
and “types of issues” related to politics (lines 36-38). She positions female politicians as 
discriminated against since they are “pressured to not push for any women’s issues” claimed as 
“discriminatory” against men (lines 39-40). She challenges “a discourse of men as superior to 
women” which in this case, female politicians are expected to be acclimatizing to the 
male-dominated political world and become “gender-neutral” (line 41). MM argues that there is a 
difference between “gender-neutrality” (line 42) and “gender equality” (line 42) and questions the 
validity and basis of gender-neutrality when gender equality for politicians is not there yet to start 
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with (lines 42-43). 
Here, MM also contests “a discourse of women as unequal to men” that new female 
representatives or politicians in Malaysia are facing.  She positions these few female representatives 
as “inexperienced” thus; “blunders” are commonplace and expected to happen (lines 60-61). 
However, she challenges the construction of female representatives who make mistakes at having 
“far greater weakness” (line 62) than their male counterparts. MM condemns the double standard 
faced by female representatives and also criticizes the possibility that female politicians who make 
mistakes will receive harsher criticisms than male representatives.  
MM’s deconstruction of gender discourses continues when she condemns sexism which 
continues to prevail (line 63) and empowers Malaysian women from different political parties to 
“change” and “unite” (line 63) in order to penetrate into men’s world. She also promotes the 
importance of getting more women to “stand up” (line 66) and be in the House of Parliament. She 
empowers women who are or will be involved in politics to be “strong” (line 65), to “gain the 
confidence to stand up for their rights” and also to gain respect from the other male representatives 
(lines 66-67). 
Next, in extract 3-5 below, MM writes about the appointment of female judges’ in Syariah 
Courts, which refers to Islamic courts under the jurisdiction of Islamic law. Up until 2010, there has 
never been any female judge in Syariah Courts in Malaysia.  
 
Extract 3-5: “Let women judges do their job” (#129) 
(MM, The Star, 2010, July 21)  
 
5 When the first women syariah judges were appointed this month, Muslim women  
6 were elated. At last, not only are women recognised for their ability to sit on the  
7 syariah bench but also perhaps now we can expect better justice for women in the  
8 syariah courts. 
[…] 
16 Then came the whammy. It seemed that only after appointing them, a syariah court  
17 panel, consisting only of men, was being set up to decide what the women judges  
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18 could rule on. 
19 How about that? Give someone a job and then decide what she can do. Was this just  
20 incompetency or an attempt at ensuring that they are kept “in their place”? 
[…] 
28 We do need to look at justice with a gender perspective. Otherwise “justice” will  
29 always be seen from a male perspective because it is generally men who make the  
30 laws. Or in the case of religious rulings, it is men who interpret them. 
31 It would be nice to expect men to simply be gentlemanly and ensure that the mother  
32 of their children and their progeny are well cared for after divorce. But this rarely  
33 happens. Thus someone needs to stand up for women. Invariably this should be a  
34 woman who truly has justice in mind. 
 
This is the first extract when MM uses “Muslim women” (line 5) as social actors. Other 
specific social actors mentioned by MM here are “women syariah judges” (line 5) as well as specific 
noun phrases such as “syariah bench” (line 7) and “syariah courts” (line 8 and 16) as this extract is 
about justice and syariah/Islamic law. She uses the passive form a few times in this extract, for 
example, “the first women syariah judges were appointed” (line 5), “they are kept “in their place”” 
(line 20). Again, the choice of using the passive voice is to focus on women and also I can infer that 
MM assumes that the hidden agents are known to be men. MM also uses interrogatives twice from 
line 19 to line 20, which I believe are thought provoking questions thrown at the audience. MM’s 
attempt to connect with the audience is also seen in her choice of an inclusive pronoun “we” (line 
28). 
MM’s deconstruction of gender discourses here has spread to specifically on Muslim 
women’s rights. Continuing from the issue of limited number of women participation in politics, 
MM extends the issue to challenge “a discourse of limitation on Muslim women” especially on the 
limitation of female judges in Syariah Courts in Malaysia. First of all, MM positions Muslim women 
as “elated” (line 5) when women were appointed as judges for the first time in Syariah Courts. MM 
draws on “a discourse of Muslim women as equal to Muslim men” as she celebrates the move of 
appointing female judges and recognition given to women as having the “ability” (line 6) to perform 
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their duties. However, MM does not explicitly disclose the people who appointed women as judges, 
most likely they are men who are in control of law. She also promotes “a discourse of women as 
equal to men” as she is hopeful that these newly appointed female judges can contribute to “better 
justice” (line 7) for Malaysian Muslim women.  
However, upon appointment, MM contests the action by men, which she calls a “whammy” 
(line 16), when a panel of Syariah Courts “consisting only of men” (line 17) was formed to decide 
the scope of law that female judges can work on. Again, MM challenges “a discourse of limitation 
on Muslim women”. Even when women get to be at the same level as men, yet their credibility and 
ability are still in question and controlled by men. She questions men’s positioning of Muslim female 
judges as “incompetent” (line 20) and wonders whether this move of controlling female judges is to 
ensure that they are kept “in their place” (line 20). 
MM challenges “a discourse of women as unequal to men” and promotes the importance of 
looking at justice with “a gender perspective” (line 28). She challenges “a discourse of men as 
superior to women” in which men dominate justice by making the laws with “a male perspective” 
(lines 29-30). MM also contests the control of religious rulings by men and their interpretation of 
religious law (line 30). The question of religious interpretations arises for the first time here, which 
remains as an important issue in MM’s and ZA’s writings. This male perspective and men’s 
interpretation of law may have contributed to women not getting equal rights as deserved. To 
illustrate a case related to justice in Muslim families, MM positions some men who are divorced as 
difficult to behave in a “gentlemanly” manner (line 31) and take good care of their ex-wives and 
children. Similar to extract 3-4 when MM calls for women to participate in the Parliament, here, she 
urges for someone “to stand up for women” (line 33), using the same phrase “stand up” as used in 
extract 3-4. Therefore, she empowers women who are involved with justice and the law to stand up 
for women’s rights so that women who face injustice in the court or have issues with the courts can 
get what they deserve.  
 
3.4 Blame the women discourse (MM) 
 
MM is the only author who chooses to deconstruct a gender discourse called “blame the women or 
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blame the victims discourse”, a dominant discourse globally which put the blame on women 
whenever something bad happen to women. Feminists around the globe have tried to eliminate the 
blame when women are actually victims. The following extracts 3-6 to 3-8 are all taken from MM’s 
work. In the extract below, MM shows her rejection of “blame the women discourse”. 
 
Extract 3-6: “True equality” (#21) 
(MM, The Star, 2006, January 26)  
 
32 Then there’s violence against women. Only recently yet another woman was raped  
33 and killed. Immediately you get letters in the papers advising women to be careful.  
34 Yes, but what is anyone going to do about the people with the sort of mentality that  
35 thinks that women out alone are fair game? Are we really dealing with the problem  
36 when we tell women to just stay home? Every time we curb the freedom of women  
37 because of the bad behaviour of men, we are not only discriminating against women,  
38 we are punishing the victims, not the perpetrators.  
 
Here, MM refers to women in general, thus, she only uses the nouns “woman” or “women” 
and “men” in this extract. However, she includes generic classified nouns for social actors in this 
extract, when she positions women as “victims” (line 38) and positions men as “perpetrators” (line 
38). “Victims” here may refer to women who are raped and killed, as well as victims of 
discrimination (line 37) while “perpetrators” may refer to men who raped and killed women, or 
simply men who have “bad behaviour” (line 37). She uses the passive voice in “another woman was 
raped and killed” without mentioning the person who raped and killed the woman. Again, I can infer 
that the focus is on the action and not the person who did the action, who may be assumed to be a 
man. To engage with the audience, MM also employs the use of interrogatives and she also uses the 
inclusive pronoun “we” in line 34 to 36. 
In this extract, MM deconstructs the gender discourse in relation to crimes involving women 
as victims. She challenges “a discourse of inequality and injustice” when she talks about injustice in 
“violence against women” and she gives the examples of rape and murder (lines 32-33). She also 
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contests “a discourse of blaming women or victims” when the issue of crimes occur. In addition to 
people blaming women for the crimes and not blaming the perpetrators, there are some other people 
who expect women “to be careful” (line 33) and there are others who expect women to “stay home” 
(line 36) as the solutions to control crimes. MM questions the kind of people who blame women and 
put women as responsible for their own actions, even if it includes violence against women. She 
further criticizes “a discourse of inequality and injustice” when certain people want to “curb the 
freedom of women” (line 36), as she sees that as women being discriminated against (lines 37) and 
the act as a punishment to victims (line 38). She also  
She contests “a discourse of boys will be boys” as men seem to get away with violent crimes 
that they may have committed and are often not blamed as much as the victims (line 38). Since the 
discrimination against women has resulted in some female victims not getting any justice, MM 
challenges “a discourse of limitation on Muslim women” and condemns some Muslim men who 
have blamed women, and also those who have suggested more limitations should be imposed and 
freedom be curbed for women, without suggesting more severe actions for male perpetrators or how 
men should behave, or addressing the problem of men with “bad behaviour”. 
In extract 3-7 below, MM continues to challenge “a discourse of blaming women” not only 
on violence, but also a discourse of “blaming of all forms of evil on women” (lines 1-2). 
 
Extract 3-7: “A matter of tolerance” (#43) 
(MM, The Star, 2006, December 20)  
 
1 HO HUM, here we go again. Is there no end to this ceaseless blaming of all forms  
2 of evil on women, just because they may not want to cover their heads? But I am  
3 really heartened by the many sensible retorts by various people, mostly ordinary  
4 citizens, who rightly pointed out that we really should get past the habit of blaming  
5 women for the bad things that happen to them, and letting perpetrators get away. 
 
In this extract, MM highlights the issue of women’s modesty as Muslim women in Malaysia 
are expected to cover their heads according to Islamic teaching. Although covering one’s head for 
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women is not compulsory in Malaysia, some strict Islamic scholars or conservative Muslim scholars 
have condemned women who do not wear any type of head gear and they also have positioned these 
women as “bad Muslim women”. 
Besides “women”, other social actors here are “ordinary citizens” (lines 3-4) and 
“perpetrators” (line 5), which also occurs in extract 3-6. MM employs a personal pronoun “I” (line 2) 
and the inclusive pronoun “we” to include the audience. She uses the pronouns “they”, “their” and 
“them” separately to refer to women. She also employs an interrogative in lines 1-2 to challenge “a 
discourse of blaming women”. 
MM does not specify who put the blame on women but I infer that some Islamist scholars or 
individuals may have come up with that statement of “blaming of all forms of evil on women” (lines 
1-2). Rather she challenges “a discourse of blaming women” by questioning the reason women are 
blamed because of not wanting to cover their heads, which seems not appearing for the first time as 
MM uses the expression “here we go again” (line 1). She also uses the word “ceaseless” (line 1) to 
suggest that this discourse of blaming women is still continuing.  
On a positive note, MM celebrates the act of some “ordinary citizens” who promote an end 
to blaming on women and not to let perpetrators get away (lines 3-5). She positions these ordinary 
citizens’ judgment as trustworthy since she refers to their retorts as “sensible” (line 3) and the action 
as “rightly” (line 4). At the same time, she also implicitly promotes an alternative discourse of 
“blaming perpetrators” so that proper convictions for perpetrators will be taken to achieve justice for 
victims.  
MM continues to challenge “a discourse of blaming women or victims” in the next extract.  
 
Extract 3-8: “A knee-jerk response, again” (#77) 
(MM, The Star, 2008, May 7)  
 
30 At heart it smacks of a patriarchal attitude that is so prevalent in our society; that  
31 women cannot fend for themselves and need to be “protected”. But that protection  
32 entails curbing women’s freedom for “their own good”. 
33 That was exactly the logic the Taliban used to keep women at home. The world is  
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34 just too dangerous. Therefore women should be kept at home to be safe, even  
35 though this curbs their access to education, employment and even healthcare. 
36 It’s the same mentality that says that women should be told to cover up so that they  
37 won’t get raped, or not carry handbags so that those won’t be snatched. Or that  
38 books should be banned so that people don’t get ideas that “may” be dangerous. 
39 It’s a mentality that accepts that the world is a bad place and, worse still, nothing  
40 can be done about it. Criminals roam free so people must curb their own freedoms  
41 so that they would never get in the way of these bad people. Men are inclined to  
42 rape, so women must never provoke them. 
43 Funnily enough, nobody suggests that for the protection of women, men should be  
44 locked up since they make up the majority of rapists, bag snatchers, thieves and  
45 murderers. 
 
In extract 3-8, besides the general social actors “men” and “women”, MM intertexually uses 
“Taliban” (line 33), a fundamentalist Islamic movement consisting of Muslim men in Afghanistan, 
as a point of reference for “patriarchal attitude” (line 30). She also names some men as “rapists, bag 
snatchers, thieves, and murderers” (lines 44-45) or as crime perpetrators. Similar to extracts 3-6 and 
3-7, here MM also positions some women as victims and some men as perpetrators. There are some 
strong modalities employed by MM in this extract, which suggests the expectations and restrictions 
imposed by men on women. For example, “women cannot fend for themselves” (line 31), “women 
should be kept at home” (line 34), “women should be told to cover up” (line 36), “people must curb 
their own freedom” (line 40), “women must never provoke them” (line 42).  
MM continues to deconstruct gender discourses related to the construction of a conservative 
society. She criticizes “a discourse of patriarchal society”, the same discourse challenged by ZA in 
extract 3-2b. Here, MM challenges the patriarchal society in Malaysia whereby some men have 
positioned women as “cannot fend for themselves and need to be protected” (lines 30-31). She 
claims that because of the protection that some men thought is needed by women, this may curb 
women’s freedom (lines 31-32). The mention of curbing women’s freedom also occurs in extract 3-6, 
line 36. MM disagrees with the reason given for the protection of women, which she quotes 
84 
 
intertextually as, “for their own good” (line 32).  
Similar to earlier extracts, here, MM also challenges “a discourse of limitation on Muslim 
women” (entailed from “a patriarchal society discourse”), specifically stemmed from Taliban men’s 
view of restricting women at home (line 33). This discourse which appeared earlier in extract 3-5 
was specifically on the limitation on women’s opportunities in higher positions in Malaysian society, 
whereas in this extract, MM challenges the limitation on women’s freedom and access to education, 
employment and healthcare. 
MM also deconstructs religious discourses in this extract. She challenges “a discourse of 
Islamic fundamentalism” which restricts women in many ways. In challenging “patriarchal attitude” 
(line 30), MM criticizes some men’s “logic” (line 33) and “mentality” (lines 36, 39) and their 
construction of the world as “too dangerous” (line 34) and “a bad place” (line 39) so it will be safer 
to make women stay at home. MM questions the “logic” (line 33) of Malaysian men protecting 
women and she intertextually compares the “logic” and the “patriarchal attitude” (line 30) of 
Malaysian Muslim men to the Afghan Taliban men’s practice of keeping women at home (line 33). 
She also criticizes the “mentality” of some conservative Muslim men who are in control of what 
women should or should not do, for example, to cover up or to not carry handbangs so that rape, 
snatch theft or other bad things will not occur (lines 36-37).  
MM again challenges “a discourse of boys will be boys” as the society at large still seems to 
not care about perpetrators’ actions and just accepts that “nothing can be done about it” (lines 39-40), 
and “criminals roam free” (line 40). She criticizes the perception that “men are inclined to rape” 
(lines 41-42), which is “a discourse of boys will be boys”. Because of this, MM condemns the 
injustice women have to suffer which suggest that women must never “get in the way” (line 41) and 
“must never provoke” the criminals (line 42) and questions the restrictions imposed on women and 
freedom taken away from them, but no actions are expected from men. She positions some men as 
“the majority of rapists, bag snatchers, thieves and murderers” (lines 44-45) thus she further 
questions the need for men to be “locked up” (line 44) instead of restraining women’s freedom and 
blaming women for the crimes. The deconstruction of “a discourse of Islamic fundamentalism” is 
addressed more in the next section. 
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3.5 Islamic fundamentalism or Islamism (ZA) 
 
In the next few extracts that follow, both ZA and MM deconstruct religious discourses specifically 
on authoritarianism and Islamic fundamentalism or Islamism in relation to the ideologies practiced 
by their group, Sisters in Islam (SIS). This section also includes the recurring question of whether 
religious credentials are needed in talking about Islam. 
In extract 3-9 below, ZA highlights the opposing views of the right way of practicing Islam 
in Malaysia and she also includes the views of an individual who is against the ideologies of 
moderate Islamic practice. 
 
Extract 3-9: “A flock that grows a-weary” (#43) 
(ZA, The Star, 2008, December 2)  
 
35 How odd this all seems. While one arm of government sells Malaysia abroad as a  
36 Muslim country that is progressive, democratic, peaceful, stable and respectful of all  
37 cultures and religions, other arms of that same government seem bent on undermining  
38 that message. 
[…] 
56 He sees young Muslims who believe in human rights as a danger to the race and  
57 religion as these ideas conflict with Islam, and he urges the authorities to take  
58 immediate action to stop the dangers posed by these young, educated, liberal  
59 Muslims. 
60 As another law professor from the International Islamic University said in an  
61 interview a few weeks ago, these young Muslims are poisoning the minds of other  
62 Muslims and they must be stopped! 
63 What is most distressing is that Zulkifli and those like him are trying to wipe out the  
64 diversity and differences of opinion endorsed, advocated and studied by generations  
65 of enlightened Islamic scholars. 
76 And yet those who claim to be the experts in Islam deny this rich and complex  
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77 heritage of Muslim scholarship, history and practice. Instead, using their authority,  
78 they interpret the authoritative text to impose authoritarianism on those who do not  
79 share their narrow understanding of the faith. To them, there can only be one way of  
80 knowing Islam and one way of being Muslim. 
 
Drawing from some Muslim fundamentalists’ meaning of “authentic” Islam and going back to 
traditional Islamic state, in this extract, ZA deconstructs “a discourse of Islamic fundamentalism” by 
promoting “a discourse of progressive Islam”. The first social actor is “the government” which ZA positions 
as “one arm of government” (line 35) and “other arms of the same government” (line 37). ZA criticizes the 
Malaysian government which has two very different ideologies. She is puzzled and expresses that it is “odd” 
(line 35) for one government to have two extreme opposing views on how a country should be. She supports 
the government which promotes discourses of “progressive, democratic, peaceful, stable and respectful 
of all cultures and religions”. On the contrary, she challenges the other side of the government which 
“undermines” (line 37) and opposes the progressive discourse of Islamic practice.  
Other social actors are “one law professor from the International Islamic University” (line 60) and 
one politician from the Opposition, Zulkifli Noordin, who is referred to as Zulkifli in this article. ZA also talks 
about “young Muslims” (line 56) who may refer to some liberal Muslim women in SIS. Here, ZA is talking 
about Zulkifli’s resistance to SIS even though ZA does not name any women’s groups or SIS specifically. 
From previous conflicts portrayed in the media, Zulkifli wanted National Fatwa Council to investigate SIS 
and other NGOS for criticising a caning sentence on a Muslim women called Kartika, and insulting a 
Syariah Court, and wanted to declare the groups as “deviant” (The Star, 2009, October 4). The case was 
known as “Kartika whipping case” and is mentioned later in extract 3-11. 
ZA condemns both Zulkifli and the professor as they do not agree with the views of “these young, 
educated, liberal Muslims” (lines 58). Zulkifli has been opposing SIS’s movement and during a few public 
occasions, he has criticized certain aspects of SIS’s actions and interpretations of Islam. In relating Zulkifli’s 
criticisms to “young Muslims” (line 56), as what I believe refers to SIS, ZA contests Zulkifli’s positioning of 
the “young Muslims who believe in human rights” as “a danger to the race and religion” (line 56). ZA 
criticizes Zulkifli’s rejection of the discourse of Islamic feminism as he believes that human rights “conflict 
with Islam” (line 57). She also condemns his action of pushing the authorities to take actions on SIS since he 
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considers SIS as dangerous (lines 57-59). ZA also contests the view from the law professor who also has 
criticized “the young Muslims” in SIS and positions them as “poisoning the minds of other 
Muslims” and also has called for the authorities to stop them (lines 60-62). She intertextually 
foregrounds loaded lexical items by Zulkifli and the professor suggesting the liberal young Muslims 
as having the potential to be dangerous and may poison others. To challenge these criticisms, ZA draws 
on “a discourse of “new” Muslim women today” and she positions “young Muslims” in SIS, herself 
included, as “educated and liberal” (line 58). She positions Zulkifli and others like him as conservative 
Islamists as they are “trying to wipe out the diversity and differences of opinion” (63-65). 
ZA also highlights the issue of religious credentials put forth by people in the authorities. 
Here, she includes people who are “experts in Islam” (line 76). ZA challenges the discourse of 
Islamic scholars as having the only or last say on religious matters. ZA rejects their rigid and strict 
implementation of Islam, thus, she positions those people who are “experts in Islam” as 
authoritarians as they use “their authority” (line 77) and “impose their authoritarianism” (line 78) on 
others. She believes in diverse ways of “rich and complex heritage of Muslim scholarship, history 
and practice (lines 79-77) and so she contests their belief that there is only “one way” of “knowing 
Islam” and “being Muslim” (lines 79-80), in which she positions the experts in Islam as in denial of 
all these different ways of Islamic practice. 
In extract 3-10 below, ZA explores “a discourse of limitation on Muslim women” and also 
contests the criticisms which she received of not having religious credentials herself to talk about 
religious issues. 
   
Extract 3-10: “Silence not the women” (#48) 
(ZA, The Star,  2009, July 5)  
 
1 WHENEVER I give talks on Islam and women’s rights in any part of the world, I am  
2 often asked the familiar question from Islamists in the audience: “What right do you  
3 have to speak on Islam? You are not an expert. When you are sick, you go to a doctor.  
4 When you have questions about Islam, you go to the ulama. He is the expert,” they  
5 say triumphantly, as if to end the debate. 
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[…] 
11 But I can’t do that with an ulama. If I challenge him and his prescription to my  
12 complaints of injustice and ill-treatment, I could be accused of going against God,  
13 against Islam, against Syariah. I could even be declared an apostate, my name  
14 denounced in mosque sermons and have rabid-looking men gather after Friday  
15 prayers with placards demanding my detention under the ISA. 
 
In this extract, ZA shares her personal experience involving herself, “Islamists” (line 2) an 
“ulama” or Muslim religious scholars (line 11) as social actors. She employs the first person 
pronouns such as “I” and “my” a few times for herself and uses the pronouns “they” to refer to 
Islamists and “he”, “him” and “his” to refer to the religious scholar. She intertextually quotes the 
Islamists’ questions to her from lines 2 to 4 by using direct quotations from them. This includes the 
use of the pronoun “you” in the questions to refer to ZA since the questions were asked by the 
Islamists to her.   
As mentioned earlier, religious credentials theme reoccurs here. ZA challenges the dominant 
discourse of Islamic scholars as having the only or last say on religious matters as she contests the 
restriction to speak about Islam or question Islam. From lines 1 to 5, ZA relates her own experience 
when she is often questioned and asked of her credibility of speaking on Islam. However, she has 
been positioned by some as “not an expert” (line 3) hence the reference to the discourse of only “a 
doctor” are experts about illnesses, which in this case, only “the ulama” (religious scholars) (line 4) 
are the experts on Islam.  
ZA admits that she cannot go against religious scholars: “But I can’t do that with an ulama” 
(line 11). This is because there may be repercussions from actions by people like herself who 
“challenge” (line 11) the ulama (religious scholars). She uses a presupposition here in lines 11 to 13 
and employs a modal verb “could” to suggest possibilities of happening. She presupposes those who 
challenge the scholars “could be accused of going against God, against Islam, against Syariah” (lines 
12-13), and “could be declared an apostate” (line 13) and having the possibility of their names 
“denounced” (line 14) or being held under “detention” (line 15). Nevertheless, she still contests these 
constructions of her identities by Islamic fundamentalists. ZA challenges the notion that only people 
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with religious credentials can speak on Islam and contest the repercussions of people who go against 
or question the ulama or authority. 
In extract 3-11 below, ZA expresses her dissatisfaction on how SIS is perceived and also 
expresses her plea for the government to be more open to new ideas especially concerning 
differences in opinions on religions, races or politics.   
 
Extract 3-11: “Treat us not like kids” (#54) 
(ZA, The Star,  2010, February 7) 
 
8 They think we are children, unable to rationally and intelligently discuss “sensitive”  
9 issues and respect differences and diversity. So they side with thugs who demonstrate  
10 and storm into peaceful indoor meetings by forcing those engaged in civil dialogue to  
11 disperse, instead of controlling and dispersing the hooligans outside. 
[…] 
37 Was it not possible, yet again, when faced with the advice to ban the Sisters in Islam  
38 book Muslim Women and the Challenge of Islamic Extremism, that the Home  
39 Minister not consider that the book had been in circulation for two years with no  
40 evidence of public disorder? 
41 Was it not possible to engage in dialogue with Sisters in Islam on the seven pages out  
42 of 215 that Jakim deemed to have violated its guidelines, and after hearing both sides  
43 to then decide whether indeed these passages as claimed would confuse Muslims,  
44 especially Muslim women and those with shallow religious knowledge, as alleged? 
[…] 
75 What is worrying too is the mob tactics used by racial and religious extremists and  
76 thugs for hire to engineer public disorder where none actually exists in order to force  
77 the Government to act its way. 
78 In recent times, Islamist extremists have resorted to intimidating demonstrations and  
79 storming of meeting halls to prevent those standing up for constitutional guarantees of  
80 fundamental liberties from organising public forums.  
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[…] 
84 Such mob tactics to manufacture fear, disorder and instability must not be allowed to  
85 triumph. The continuing sprouting of intra-ethnic chauvinist groups led by  
86 demagogues to “defend” and “promote” the so-called interests of a particular race or  
87 religion by adopting or threatening mob rule portents more explosive politics ahead. 
88 Belligerent non-state actors are also now adopting another tactic to intimidate their  
89 enemies – by lodging an avalanche of police reports. 
90 Islamist groups have lodged dozens of police reports against Sisters in Islam for its  
91 position on the Kartika whipping case, accusing the group of all manner of insults to  
92 race, religion, King and country.  
[…] 
97 Malaysians are tired of ideologues and demagogues who turn every difference of  
98 opinion into a threat to the survival of race and religion, all for short-term political  
99 gain. 
[…] 
103 We must show the extremists and desperate politicians that their actions which will  
104 destroy the Malaysia we know and love cannot and will not succeed. We must show  
105 that there is a political price to be paid for their relentless undermining of civility in  
106 our effort to develop a public culture of citizenship and inclusive participation. 
 
In this extract, ZA employs specific social actors: “Sisters in Islam” (SIS) and “the Home 
Minister”. Other classified social actors are “the Government”, “Islamist extremists”, “Islamist 
groups” alongside “Muslims” and “Muslim women”. In the first part of the extract, from lines 8 to 9, 
ZA uses the pronoun “they” to refer to the Government. In the final part of the extract, she employs 
the pronoun “they” to refer to “the extremists and desperate politicians” (line 103) and “we” as a 
reference to others on her side. 
ZA challenges the government’s positioning of the women’s group as “children” who are 
not able to discuss “sensitive issues” rationally and intelligently (line 8-9). She pleads to the 
government not to treat them as “kids” reflected in the title of this column “Treat us not like kids”.  
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ZA challenges “a discourse of Islamic fundamentalism” and she positions people (presumably some 
Islamist extremists) who oppose SIS (and other women’s groups’ activists) as “thugs” (line 9) and 
“hooligans” (line 11). She contests the government’s move to side with those “thugs” and 
“hooligans”, who have the history of storming into meetings involving feminists and human rights 
activists. She also questions the government’s credibility of handling such situation, in which they 
chose to disperse the activists’ meeting instead of dispersing those who demonstrated and stormed 
the meetings (lines 9-11).  
In the second part of this extract, ZA employs interrogatives in the form of rhetorical 
questions from lines 31 to 44. She repeats the questions twice, which began with the same “Was it 
not possible...”. Here, ZA’s questions suggest the presupposition that her views are true as she 
contests the actions and statements made by “the Home Minister” (lines 38-39) and “Jakim” (line 
42) (Jakim is the acronym for Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia, which means Department of 
Islamic Development Malaysia). ZA challenges “a discourse of limitation of speech” as she 
questions the Home Minister’s action of banning SIS’s book entitled “Muslim Women and the 
Challenge of Islamic Feminism” (lines 37-39) and thus positions SIS as victims of injustice. She 
challenges the basis of the decisions made by the Home Minister to ban their book as they were 
never told the banning reasons. She also contests the claims by Jakim that the seven pages from the 
book may “confuse” Muslim women and other Muslims who have “shallow religious knowledge” 
(lines 43-44). Instead, she argues that before the book was banned, there was “no evidence of public 
disorder” despite the two years of circulation (lines 39-40). In light of the situation, ZA also 
condemns the government which she positions as unwilling and failed to “engage in dialogue” with 
SIS and Jakim to listen to both sides of their argument on the content of the banned book (lines 
41-42). She claims that such open discussion could clear misunderstandings and the government can 
decide whether the book can really confuse Muslims.  
Again, in the third and fourth part of this extract, ZA challenges “a discourse of Islamic 
fundamentalism” and positions people who are against women’s groups and human rights activists 
as “racial and religious extremists and thugs (lines 75-76) and “Islamist extremists” (line 78). She 
uses the classified noun “extremists” a few times in this extract. Besides that, ZA also positions these 
people as “chauvinist” (line 85), “demagogues” (lines 86 & 97), “belligerent non-state actors” (line 
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88), “Islamist” (line 89), and “ideologues” (line 97). In contrast, ZA positions SIS as the extremists’ 
“enemies” (line 88) to show how different and big the gap is between what they believe and what the 
extremists believe. The choice of words by ZA for the Islamist extremists shows a pattern of lexical 
cohesion for the construction of the Islamic fundamentalism discourse which embodies people who 
are conservative and traditional in the implementation of Islam. 
Similar to lines 9 to 11, ZA rejects the actions of these extremists who used “mob tactics” 
(line 75), demonstrated and stormed meeting halls to stop meetings or public forums organised by 
women’s and human rights activists (line 78-79). She also describes the extremists’ mob tactics as 
“worrying” (line 75) and “intimidating” (line 78). She uses a strong modal verb in “must not be 
allowed” (line 84) to argue that mob tactics should not be accomplished as she claims that it can 
“manufacture fear, disorder and instability” (line 84). Besides the mob tactics, ZA also contests 
another tactic by the extremists, which is lodging police reports against SIS in which SIS has 
received “dozens of police reports” against them (lines 88-89). One particular report is related to 
Kartika case, which involves a Muslim woman who was arrested and ordered to be whipped for the 
offence of drinking alcohol. SIS is against the whipping punishment and as a result of that, some 
Islamist groups made police reports and labelled SIS’s action as “insults to race, religion, King and 
country” (lines 91-92). 
To deconstruct Islamic fundamentalist discourse, ZA promotes “a discourse of moderate 
Islamic practice” so as to “develop a public culture” and involve “inclusive participation” (line 106) 
from citizens of other faiths. She not only criticizes religious extremists here as she also brings in the 
“politicians” (line 103) who she positions as “desperate” for their “short-term political gain” (lines 
97-98). She also positions “Malaysians” (line 97) as “tired” of the extremists and politicians who 
create threats which will sacrifice the relations of many races and religions in Malaysia. In the end, 
ZA empowers Malaysians, by the use of the exclusive pronoun “we” (line 103) to refer to 
Malaysians. She repeats the phrase “We must show…” twice in lines 103 and 104 using a strong 
modal verb “must” to appeal to the readers to take actions to not let the extremists and politicians 
“destroy” Malaysia (lines 103-104) and to make sure that they “will not succeed” (lines 103-104).  
In extract 3-12 below, ZA deconstructs “a discourse of Islamic fundamentalism” displayed in 
the Muslim law claimed as discriminatory. ZA looks at the Islamic reform movements and revolts 
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that took place globally especially in the Arab world countries in the Middle East and Egypt, and 
compares that to what is taking place in Malaysia. She also challenges today’s Muslim practice as 
“un-Islamic”. 
 
Extract 3-12: “Beware wave for rights” (#62) 
(ZA, The Star, 2011, February 6)  
 
42 Even though only about 20% of Muslims live in Arab lands, too many among us  
43 who live on supposedly the periphery of the Muslim world still look upon the Arab  
44 world as everything that is authentically Muslim. We, in the supposed periphery,  
45 who have kept Islam alive for centuries by our ability to adapt the practice and  
46 understanding of the faith to our cultural particularities were suddenly told that the  
47 way we practised Islam – a kinder and gentler way – was “unIslamic”. It was  
48 jahilliyah – ignorant Islam. Now that we knew what “true” Islam was, we needed to  
49 follow its authentic ways. 
[…] 
54 Suddenly, hundreds of years  
55 of culture and tradition of the Malay archipelago, which had absorbed the influences  
56 of great world civilisations, were pronounced unIslamic. 
57 Never mind that we have become the poorer for it – as long as we are  
58 “authentically” Muslim. 
59 The political Islam that developed within the geo-political context of the conflicts  
60 and competition of the Middle Eastern world became our struggle and our burden. 
61 In the race to be “authentically” Muslim, we adopt laws that discriminate against  
62 women so that we can be more like the “authentic” Saudis. 
 […] 
117 As the revolt spreads in the Arab world and the democracy movement digs roots  
118 in that region, we might just find ourselves falling from the much-touted model  
119 modern Muslim state to an intolerant autocratic state where religion, race and  
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120 gender become increasingly entrenched as the basis of citizenship and exercise of  
121 rights. 
 
ZA criticizes some Muslims in Malaysia who aspire to build an Islamic state like the old 
Islamic days in the Arab world. ZA employs an exclusive pronoun “we” in this extract to refer to 
everyone in Malaysia, especially Muslims. She intertextually links the practice of Islam in Malaysia 
with other Muslim countries seen from her use of specific nouns such as “Arab lands” (line 42), 
“Arab world” (line 43), “the Middle Eastern World” (line 60), and “Saudis” (line 62).  
ZA employs an evaluative statement in lines 61 to 62: “In the race to be “authentically” 
Muslim, we adopt laws that discriminate against women so that we can be more like the “authentic” 
Saudis”, which further reinforces her argument of challenging the claimed discriminatory Islamic 
laws. She employs the passive voice in “were suddenly told…was “unIslamic” (line 46) and “were 
pronounced unIslamic” (line 56) and backgrounds the agents, which can be inferred as the Islamists 
or Islamic fundamentalists, or those who are against the way Islam is practiced.  
ZA makes a lot of comparisons in this extract regarding Islamic practice and interpretation in 
Malaysia: 1) “authentic Islam” (line 44) versus “unIslamic” (line 47), and 2) “intolerant autocratic 
state” (line 119) versus “modern Muslim state” (line 119). She challenges “a discourse of Islamic 
fundamentalism” and “a discourse of authentic Islam” as she questions the supporters who look up to 
the Arab world and perceive that everything related to the Arab world is “authentically Muslim” 
(lines 43-44, line 61). She also questions their definition of “true” and “authentic Islam” (line 49) and 
criticizes the implementation and interpretation of Islamic practices claimed as “authentic Islam”. ZA 
argues against the “need” (line 48) to rely on the “authentic” way Islam is practiced in the Arab 
world as she claims some Muslims “in the periphery of the Muslim world” (line 43) are able to 
“adapt the practice and understanding of the faith” (lines 45-46).  
ZA promotes “a discourse of moderate Islamic practice” as she supports the “kinder and 
gentler way” of practicing Islam (line 47). However, what ZA deconstructs the practice of Islam as 
following kind and gentler way was claimed by the Islamists as “unIslamic”, “jahiliyyah” or 
“ignorant Islam” (lines 47-48). ZA challenges the deemed construction of “unIslamic” (line 56) 
labelling by some critiques that are against the interpretation of Islam in Malaysia. She argues the 
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implementation of “authentic Islam” is a regressing or a backward move and may have caused 
Malaysia to be “poorer” (line 57) or to be losing culture and tradition which have been around for 
hundreds of years (line 55).  
ZA also claims there is a notion of inequality and injustice in some parts of Islamic law 
which is modeled after the law practice in Saudi Arabia. She condemns the Islamists’ desire to be 
“more like the “authentic” Saudis as she claims that this law is discriminating to women (lines 
61-62). Again she juxtaposes the conflict between the two extreme groups’ idea of Malaysia: a 
democratic Islamic state or a conservative Islamic state, similar to what she challenges in extract 3-9. 
ZA deconstructs Malaysia in this extract as stuck between the two ideologies of a “much-touted 
model modern Muslim state” and “an intolerant autocratic state” (lines 118-119) which may 
contribute to the deterioration of religion, race and gender understanding and violation of citizens’ 
rights (lines 119-121). She supports “a discourse of modernity” and a progressive Islamic practice in 
Malaysia but highlights the irony that while some Muslims in the Arab world are revolting against 
the Islamist fundamentalism discourse, some Muslims in Malaysia are taking the opposite stand. A 
more detailed analysis of ZA’s challenge of the Islamic law is addressed in Chapter Four. 
 
3.6 Islamic fundamentalism or Islamism (MM) 
 
While ZA criticizes the opinions of educated and liberal young Muslims as dangerous, MM 
deconstructs the criticisms towards her made by Islamic fundamentalists or Islamists. In the extract 
below, she expresses her frustrations in the lack of freedom of the things that are allowed for her to 
write in her column, and she also shares her own experience on the limitations imposed on women. 
 
 
Extract 3-13: “Limitations on speech” (#34) 
(MM, The Star, 2006, August 9)  
 
24 I’d like to talk about my religion and how self-appointed defenders have painted it  
25 as one that so lacks compassion, ignores justice and fairness and promotes  
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26 inequality between men and women and between those professing it and those not.  
27 But then some people have cited me as one of those who really should not be  
28 allowed to talk because apparently I give the country a bad name. I guess people  
29 who storm forums, write untruths, scream and shout at people with different  
30 opinions give a better image of our beloved country. So I can’t talk about this either. 
 
This is the first chosen extract from MM’s columns which features her repeated use of first 
person personal pronouns “I”, “me” and “my”. Other social actors mentioned by MM here are 
“self-appointed defenders” (line 24) and MM also uses the subject “some people” (line 27) instead of 
naming and criticizing specific people openly. Using an ironic tone, she implicitly criticizes and 
positions these people as having a “better image” (line 30) of the country even though they “storm 
forums, writes untruths, scream, and shout at people with different opinions” (lines 29-30).  
From this extract, MM challenges “a discourse of inequality and injustice” in Islam. MM 
claims the practice of Islam now encompasses inequality and injustice based on what some people’s 
portrayal of the religion as it “lacks compassion, ignores justice and fairness and promotes inequality 
between men and women” (lines 25-26). However, the main challenge here is on “a discourse of 
limitation on Muslim women” as she had her own voice restricted. 
MM challenges “a discourse of limitation on Muslim women” especially on making their 
voice heard and draws an example on the limitations of what she can and cannot write in her 
columns. In line 24, MM highlights that “I’d like to talk about my religion” but in line 30, she admits 
that “I can’t talk about this either”. Here, she states her points by juxtaposing what she wants to do 
and what she cannot do. In other words, she is talking about the issue of inequality and injustice in 
Islam by acknowledging that she cannot talk about it and at the same time disclosing the problem of 
limitation of speech in Malaysia.  
MM criticizes how “some people” (line 27) positioned her. She does not name who those 
people are but they can be inferred as some fundamentalist Muslim men who are against her. When 
MM writes that others feel she “should not be allowed to talk” (line 27-28) and that she gives “the 
country a bad name” (line 28), she highlights how she is positioned by her critics as not having 
enough credentials. MM de-constructs the criticism of the claim of her that she lacks credentials to 
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talk about religion (line 27-28), by positioning herself as positive and strong enough to take any 
repercussion and to stand up to her beliefs. MM challenges the “discourse of women as silent” and 
she also challenges the position of powerlessness which others tried to place her in and instead tries 
to re-position herself as powerful through her writing about the limitation in her writing. 
In the extract below, MM deconstructs “a discourse of Islamic fundamentalism” by 
challenging the Islamic fundamentalists’ act of labeling feminist groups as un-Islamic or anti-Islam. 
 
Extract 3-14: “Veiled view of equal rights” (#103) 
 (MM, The Star, 2009, June 10)  
 
12 Meanwhile, at home, a political party decided that women who do not wear  
13 headscarves are not only not equal to men – any man – but also unequal to women  
14 who do wear headscarves. 
15 And that’s saying plenty since all women, covered heads or not, are irredeemably  
16 inferior to men. According to them, to be a woman is to be a bit disabled because it  
17 renders us unable to think for ourselves especially about religion. 
18 And if interpretations of religion are making our lives miserable, then we should  
19 just shut up and bear it, because that’s what life is like for the disabled. Who are we  
20 to complain about that when, after all, it was God who made us disabled? 
21 Isn’t that odd, when God gave us the strength to bear children and put up with  
22 infinite patience the foibles of men? 
23 When men admit to weakness in order to justify supremacy – as in women should  
24 cover themselves so that men cannot be tempted – you have to wonder who are the  
25 disabled beings here. 
[…] 
39 Instead we get a party that is supposedly trying to be open to all Malaysians calling  
40 for the investigation of a women’s group to check whether or not they are really  
41 Islamic. If not, their group should be banned and the members rehabilitated. 
42 Oh my! A group that has always fought for equality and justice for women has to be  
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43 put on trial as unIslamic. The group that has made people aware of the difficulties of  
44 women in getting fair hearings in our religious courts is deemed wrong. 
45 So what sort of rehabilitation is needed? Are we to be punished until we agree that  
46 women are inferior beings and do not deserve fair treatment? Do we have to be  
47 waterboarded until we plead to put on headscarves? 
 
The main social actors in this extract are “a political party” (line 12) and “a women’s group” 
(line 40). I infer that the political party mentioned by MM is the Islamist party in Malaysia, which is 
an opposition party with aspirations to create an all-Islamic state. Similar to ZA in extract 3-1, MM 
does not name the women’s group here but I can imply that she is also referring to SIS. I believe 
MM’s action of not disclosing the feminist group’s name is because of the frequent criticisms that 
the group has received. She also employs inclusive pronouns “we” and “our” to refer to Muslim 
women, especially those in the women’s group. I make these assumptions because these two groups 
have had a history of differing views on Islam, with the political party leaning towards “a discourse 
of Islamic fundamentalism” and the women’s group promoting “a discourse of moderate Islam”. 
Because of this, the political party is always criticizing the move and actions by SIS regarding Islam. 
MM argues the decision made by the political party regarding headscarves for women. Here, 
MM challenges “a discourse of Muslim women as unequal to Muslim men”. She positions the 
political party as demeaning and discriminating Muslim women when they declared that women 
who do not wear headscarves are not equal to any man and also to women who wear headscarves 
(lines 12-14). MM also challenges “a discourse of conservative Muslim women” as MM and SIS 
itself have debated about dress codes according to Islam and argues that wearing headscarves is not 
compulsory, as long as Muslim women dress modestly. On the other hand, the Islamist party and 
other Islamic scholars believe that not only Muslim women should dress modestly, but they must 
also wear headscarves. Some religious scholars also position women who do not cover their heads as 
“un-Islamic”. 
MM also challenges “a discourse of women as inferior to men” and “a discourse of women 
as disabled”. She contests the situation that Muslim women in Malaysia are facing, which causes 
them to be inferior, despite wearing headscarves or not. Her lexical choice of “irredeemably inferior 
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to men” (lines 15-16) suggests the hopeless situation that women have to succumb to being inferior. 
She disagrees with the political party’s positioning of woman as “a bit disabled” and unable to think 
for themselves especially on matters related to religion (lines 16-17).  
MM employs a presupposition in lines 18 to 19: “if religious interpretations are making our 
lives miserable, then we should just shut up and bear it”. MM challenges “a discourse of Islamic 
fundamentalism” as she disagrees with the conservative religious interpretations. She also contests “a 
discourse of Muslim women as silent or must shut up” and she injects sarcasm in her argument when 
she suggests that “we should just shut up and bear it” when she relates to life of disabled people as 
how the political party has positioned women (lines 18-19). She criticizes “a discourse of women as 
disabled” and argues that people are not in the position to complain about it since “it was God who 
made us disabled” (lines 19-20). She draws on “a discourse of Muslim women as equal to Muslim 
men” as everyone is God’s creation. At the same time, MM challenges the reasoning behind men’s 
weakness in controlling their temptations over women who do not cover themselves which resulted 
in the ruling that “women should cover themselves” (lines 23-24). Based on this reason, MM 
positions men as “the disabled beings” (line 25), not women.  
In line 39, MM is also referring to the same political party that was mentioned earlier in 
which is not in favour with the women’s group’s (SIS’s) ideologies. MM condemns the party’s acts 
of questioning whether the women’s group or SIS is “really Islamic” (lines 40-41) and demanding a 
thorough investigation on SIS. She also challenges the political party’s labelling of SIS as 
“unIslamic” (line 43) and “wrong” (line 44). 
MM points out how the political party draws on conservative Islamic fundamentalist 
discourse which suggests that SIS “should be banned and the members rehabilitated” (line 41). MM 
challenges the argument that the women’s movements are un-Islamic to Islam and thus, contests the 
rehabilitation of SIS. MM promotes the alternative discourses of Islamic feminism, and equality and 
justice to challenge the unIslamic discourse. She positions SIS as a group that fights for “equality and 
justice for women” (line 42) and highlights the irony of how SIS works for justice and equality for 
Muslim women but instead they are positioned as un-Islamic.  
MM employs interrogative questions from lines 45 to 47 in which she questions the meaning 
of rehabilitation (line 45) that the political party has suggested for SIS members to engage in. 
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Through her questions, she mocks the suggested rehabilitation process by suggesting the women to 
be “punished” (line 45) and “waterboarded” (line 47) to accept something which is against what they 
believe. She suggests that the idea of rehabilitation will not work because the objective is for the 
members of the women’s group to follow what the political party believe to be correct Islamic 
teaching. However, she asserts it would mean those women will accept that “women are inferior 
beings and do not deserve fair treatment” (lines 45-46), or in other words, believe in the discourse of 
inequality and injustice for women. 
In the next extract, MM deconstructs “a discourse of Islamic fundamentalism” by looking at 
the competing discourses of “progressive Islam” versus “regressive Islam”. The competing 
discourses entail the issue of what is deemed as “un-Islamic” and what is perceived as “true” Islam, 
as discussed in the previous extract. 
 
Extract 3-15: “Beware of ‘terrorists’ within” (#114) 
(MM, The Star, 2009, November 25)  
 
19 What I found was disquiet among the people about the growing conservatism in this  
20 country. 
21 It seems that there are people who are insisting that this country must prove its  
22 Islamic credentials by being more repressive, more punitive, more unforgiving of  
23 human transgressions. 
24 These people insist that to be truly Islamic is to be harsh. Any-thing progressive is  
25 deemed not Islamic enough, if not outright un-Islamic. 
[…] 
33 This conservatism should properly be called extremism and all ignore it at their  
34 peril. The oft-used tactic is to insist that nobody with a different viewpoint be  
35 allowed to speak for fear that it will cause “confusion”. 
36 Yet for many Muslims raised on a benign gentle Islam, this aggressive and harsh  
37 Islam is the one that is confusing. 
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In this extract, MM does not refer to any specific social actors; instead she employs a generic 
noun “people” to refer to Malaysians in general in line 19. However, “people” in lines 21 and 24 
may refer to a different group of people who are promoting a conservative approach to Islam. MM 
challenges the discourse of Islamic fundamentalism that is drawn on by some “people” (line 21) and 
emphasizes the “disquiet” or uneasiness which others feel about the “growing conservatism” in 
Malaysia (line 19-20). I can imply that the “people” are the same religious people who are against 
SIS. MM positions these people as conservative as they place great importance on “Islamic 
credentials” (line 22). She also contests these people’s demands for Malaysia to prove having Islamic 
credentials by “being more repressive, more punitive, more unforgiving of human transgressions 
(lines 22-23), all of which are features of conservatism and Islamic fundamentalism.  
The issue of un-Islamic resurfaces here. MM challenges the view put forth by a political 
party that a women’s group fighting for equality and justice is un-Islamic. Here, she contests some 
people’s understanding of true Islam as being “harsh” (line 24) and she also contests “anything 
progressive is deemed not Islamic enough, if not outright un-Islamic” (line 25). MM challenges “a 
discourse of regressive Islam” by promoting “progressive Islam” and challenging that progressive 
does not mean un-Islamic. She further positions these people as against progress, which is another 
characteristic of Islamic fundamentalism discourse. This discourse clashes with SIS which draws on 
Islamic feminism discourse that promotes a progressive Islamic state. Thus MM resists how SIS is 
positioned as an un-Islamic group.  
MM suggests that conservatism should be called “extremism” (line 33) instead and she 
positions the “extremists” as drawing on “a discourse of limitation of speech”. She claims that these 
extremists forbid anyone with “different viewpoint” to speak as they believe that this will cause 
“confusion” (lines 34-35). MM contests the discourse of Islamic extremism by promoting a 
discourse of “benign gentle Islam” (line 36). She argues that there are some Muslims who are 
confused with the approach of the Islamist extremists, whom she positions them as carrying out 
“aggressive and harsh Islam” (lines 36-37). This continues as ongoing debates for most Malaysian 
Muslims because of the ideological differences among the same believers in Islam. 
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3.7 Summary 
 
This chapter has answered the research questions by addressing how MM and ZA deconstructed 
gender and religious discourses in Malaysia as undesirable through the analysis of linguistic features 
in their columns. Both feminist writers looked at gender inequality concerning Muslim women’s 
issues in Malaysia, thus challenging both gender and religious discourses. This chapter has explored 
MM and ZA’s resistance and struggle on how Malaysian women, especially Muslims women are 
treated.  
Both MM and ZA used passive sentences in certain extracts to hide implicit reference to men 
as agents who do certain actions or discriminate women. Social actors in their columns were mostly 
generic, however, in some columns, ZA foregrounded “Malaysian government”, “Islamist groups” 
and specific individuals as social actors. MM also foregrounded specific social actors such as “the 
political party” and “the Parliament”. Both of them tried to engage personally with the audience with 
the use of the inclusive pronoun “we” to refer to those who have the same beliefs and values like 
them.  
Regarding discursive actions, ZA looked more at the gender gap issue concerning education, 
economic and political participation, while MM addressed specifically the discrimination of women 
at the authority level. ZA was referring to the Gender Gap Index in which Malaysia dropped to a 
lower ranking in 2011 compared to 2006, especially regarding women’s low scores in political and 
economic participation. ZA deconstructed gender gap as marginalizing Malaysian women which 
almost always left them having to choose between studies or work and family and she challenged the 
“traditional gender role” assigned to women. Continuing to deconstruct gender discourses as 
discriminating to women, MM explored Malaysian women’s struggle in competing with men in 
higher positions. MM also addressed the issue of the newly appointed Muslim female judges and at 
the same time acknowledged the small number of female judges in the Muslim courts. She 
challenged the limitations imposed on their scope of work, which is seen as another form of 
controlling Muslim women. Both MM and ZA challenged the patriarchal dominated societies and 
contested “a discourse of women as unequal to men” and blamed men in power as dominating and 
responsible for the position of women. ZA has shown the effort to empower women to not succumb 
103 
 
to the low position and be more proactive in economic participation. MM did a similar thing as she 
advocated for more women whom she positioned as educated to be involved more in politics and get 
into higher positions in the government. They both endorsed the discourse of “women as equal to 
men”.    
I also explored how both authors drew the attention to criticisms against their group, SIS. 
Both of them deconstructed the religious discourse of Islamic fundamentalism as irrelevant to 
today’s modern lives. ZA brought up the different views on Islamic practice as she promotes “a 
discourse of modernity and progressive” in Islam. Those who support “Islamic fundamentalism 
discourse” believe in practicing “authentic” and “true” Islam like how it was practiced in the old 
days and labeled other ways as “un-Islamic”. Both MM and ZA positioned the followers of “Islamic 
fundamentalism discourse” as Islamist extremists and ZA positioned them as authoritarians. The 
authors challenged some individuals who positioned the women’s group as being un-Islamic, being 
liberal and practicing Islam in a moderate way. A question of religious credentials was also explored 
as many people believe only Muslim scholars can say anything regarding the religion because they 
are the experts. Thus, MM, ZA, SIS members and their supporters are always condemned whenever 
they tried to say anything. MM challenged “a discourse of women as inferior to men” when some 
Muslim women who do not wear headscarves as expected are thought of as not equal to men.  
From the data, I found that only MM explored the dominant discourse of “blame the women 
or victims”, which she deconstructed as curbing women’s freedom and making them responsible for 
crimes or evil. She contested the traditional mindset of some men who tend to put the blame on 
women who were crime victims. She also contested the blaming of all evils on Muslim women who 
are considered bad or not following Islamic teachings. Again, MM challenged the patriarchal 
dominance on deciding what is considered good or bad for women and limitations on women’s 
freedom. She linked the gender discourse to a religious discourse when she likened the traditional 
patriarchal mindset to Taliban’s way of thinking, which promotes “Islamic fundamentalist discourse”. 
Another dominant discourse of “boys will be boys” is addressed by MM as she disagreed with 
perpetrators who are not punished or blamed, just because they are boys or men. She proposed a 
serious thought on the protection of women and the real party to blame; the perpetrators. Both 
authors also looked at “a discourse of limitations on Muslim women”, which is a part of “a discourse 
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of Islamic fundamentalism”. MM disagreed that Muslim women must shut up and she also voiced 
her experience of the difficulties to write freely in her column. ZA shared the same sentiment when 
she shared how her credibility was questioned whenever she talked about Islam.  
In the following chapter, I examine how MM and ZA challenge Islamic law in Malaysia, 
especially Islamic Family Law, through their columns. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Challenging (separate) Islamic Law (syariah law) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Similar to my analysis in Chapter Three, the analysis in this chapter uses the same methodological 
framework as used in Chapter Three to answer the research questions. I examine MM’s and ZA’s 
linguistic features and their actions and discursive strategies. I also look at how MM and ZA position 
themselves and other social actors in their columns. I also analyse how both writers draw on 
dominant and alternative discourses. 
While I look at various inequality issues involving gender and religious discourses in 
Chapter Three, in this chapter, I only look at the central issue of Islamic Law or syariah law in 
Malaysia which MM and ZA wrote frequently throughout 2005 to 2011. This chapter’s theme is on 
how MM and ZA challenge the system of (separate) Islamic laws (Syariah Law) in Malaysia. The 
theme covers the issue of the practice and injustice of Islamic or syariah law, with close attention on 
the matter of Islamic Family Law (henceforth IFL). This chapter still looks at both gender and 
religious discourses since the issues in Islamic Family Law is a specific feminist focus for the two 
authors and SIS. Some discourses found in Chapter Three also reoccur here. 
Islamic Family Law in Malaysia has undergone various reforms since 1996 and Sisters in 
Islam (SIS) and other women’s groups have been active in lobbying the Malaysian government for 
any amendments deemed as causing injustice to women. SIS advocacy involved sending 
memoranda to the government on various issues such as the discriminatory provisions of IFL 
(Othman, 2009: 349). In 2002, some NGOs including SIS presented their objections to rectify the 
amendments of IFL. In 2005, the Parliament of Malaysia passed the amendments to the already 
existing IFL in Malaysia. Some women’s groups in Malaysia found this new law as discriminatory to 
women and called for the new law to be revoked. The 2005 Amendments are already mentioned in 
Chapter One.  
To answer RQ2, I explore how MM and ZA delve in this matter and my analysis is separated 
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into a few headings, starting with how they challenge the dominant discourses underlying the Islamic 
law followed by how they offer alternative discourses. 
 
4.2 Inequality and injustice in Islamic law 
 
Based on the arguments that the reform of Islamic law in Malaysia went through discriminatory 
changes, both MM and ZA challenge inequality and injustice in the law which they claim 
discriminate against Muslim women. 
In extract 4-1a below, MM wrote in the column about the new amendments in the law; the 
changes that were passed and how she felt about it.  
 
Extract 4-1a: “Ignominious end” (#19) 
(MM, The Star, 2005, December 28) 
1 What an ignominious way to end the year! The Government admits that it got  
2 Parliament to pass a law that was unjust and discriminatory to half the population.  
3 As a member of that particular half, I am gobsmacked.  
4 How could this have happened? The Women, Family and Community Development  
5 Ministry claims to have found even more flaws in the new law than even the  
6 women’s groups. And they kept quiet? All because they wanted to keep a promise  
7 to standardise the Islamic family laws? Does that make sense? Why risk looking  
8 like fools by rushing to pass a seriously flawed law? Why not make sure it is clear  
9 of the kinks before presenting it to anyone? 
 
In this extract, MM challenges the amendments made in IFL. She gave the title of this 
column, “Ignominious end” and she repeats the same word “ignominious” to start her article, in an 
exclamation sentence (line 1) to mark her disbelief of the amendments made to a law. In line 2, MM 
uses a general reference to “law” but specifies it as “Islamic family laws” in line 7, which serves as 
the main theme for this chapter. MM’s choice of using the lexical item “ignominious” may imply her 
opinion that the law amendments are humiliating to women. The phrase “ignominious end” here 
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refers to the time the article was written, which was the “end of the year” (line 1). I believe the 
“ignominious end” may also refer to a dead, disgraceful end to Muslim women in getting equal 
rights. MM foregrounds the agents that were responsible in passing the law: “the government” (line 
1) and the “Parliament” (line 2), both representing the higher authorities in Malaysia which consists 
of a majority of men. Another social actor in this extract is “The Women, Family and Community 
Development Ministry” (lines 4-5) (henceforth, the Ministry) and MM uses a pronoun “they” to 
refer specifically to the Ministry as the out-group. She uses the first person pronoun “I” (line 3) for 
herself to mark her personal disagreement.  
Concerning the new changes in the Islamic family law (line 7) that was passed by the 
Parliament, MM makes her stand from the beginning to construct the act of passing the law (line 2) 
as “ignominious” (line 1) or something humiliating, and even uses a British slang “gobsmacked” 
(line 3) to express her shock at the government’s action.  MM challenges “a discourse of inequality 
and injustice” in IFL because it imposed discriminatory positions on Muslim women. She claims that 
the new law is “unjust and discriminatory” (line 2), has “flaws” (repeated in lines 5 and 8) and 
contains “kinks” (line 9).  
From lines 4-9, there are a number or Wh-interrogative sentences which are marked with the 
initial ‘wh’ words like “what”, “how”, and “how”. However, there are also some questions from lines 
6-7 without any ‘wh’ words: “And they kept quiet? All because they wanted to keep a promise to 
standardise the Islamic family laws?” Even though these questions come with question marks, they 
function more as “declarative questions” as well as rhetorical since MM is not really expecting 
answers here but rather making her own stand, and of course, questioning the act of the government. 
This may also represent that MM herself does not have the answer to what she sees as preposterous 
in the new law.    
MM poses the declarative questions in reference to two governmental bodies: the 
Government, and the Women, Family and Community Development Ministry. Since the Ministry 
themselves claimed the new law has more flaws (lines 4-6), MM challenges their action of keeping 
“quiet” (line 6) and questions the need to “pass a seriously flawed law” (line 8).  She blames the 
Ministry for not looking after Muslim women’s welfare even though they are aware of the flaws. 
MM positions the government as unreasonable and “looking like fools” (line 7-8) and also the 
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government’s “rushing” act (line 8) is seen as something not well thought of. 
In extract 4-1b below, MM continues to challenge the flawed Islamic family law as she 
claimed. 
 
Extract 4-1b: “Ignominious end” (#19) 
(MM, The Star, 2005, December 28) 
 
10 The NGOs that protested that the laws were unjust had presented 42 pages of  
11 objections to the new amendments way back in January 2002. It will be interesting  
12 to see how many more pages of flaws the Ministry came up with, and then still  
13 allowed the laws to go through Parliament unchanged. If they knew it was  
14 discriminatory to women, how could the Ministry, set up to ensure that women are  
15 treated justly in this country, have let it pass? Was someone sleeping on the job? Or  
16 did political expediency triumph once again? 
17 And how easy will it be to amend flaws in an already passed law? (It makes you  
18 wonder whether this episode is typical, that in fact numerous flawed laws are passed  
19 through Parliament each year.)  
20 Let us get it straight what this new law means. In its zeal to be “gender-neutral” in a  
21 field that was never level in the first place, whoever drafted this law amended it in  
22 such a way that rights that originally were given to women are now also given to  
23 men. This, mind you, on top of the many more rights that men already enjoyed.  
[…] 
46 If anyone wants to argue that this is Islamic law, then it implies that Islamic law is  
47 unjust and discriminatory. Yet Islamic law upholds women’s rights. How to explain  
48 these contradictions then? What has this done to the image of a religion based on  
49 equality, justice and compassion?  
 
In the later part of the same article above, besides “the Ministry” and “Parliament”, MM 
adds other specific social actor: “the NGOs” (line 10). Similar to extract 4-1a, MM uses the pronoun 
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“they” (line 13) in reference to the Ministry and the pronoun “us” (line 20) to refer to everyone who 
is not part of the Ministry, which distinguishes the Ministry as the out-group and others as the 
in-group. Even though in extract 4-1a MM positions “the government” and “Parliament” as the 
agents who are responsible for passing the law, in this extract, she backgrounds the agent who 
“drafted this law” (line 21) and only names the agent as “whoever” (line 21), which suggests MM’s 
indifference.  
MM constructs the NGOs (line 10), SIS included, as the protesters for the unjust laws since 
they “presented 42 pages of objections to the new amendments” (lines 10-11) as well as protectors 
for women. MM continues to pose a few more declarative questions in lines 13-17. She questions the 
real agenda of the Ministry since it is “set up to ensure that women are treated justly” (lines 14-15) 
but did not act upon the flaws regarding injustice to women which were found in the law. She also 
highlights the ironic situation of how the amendments to the Islamic family law were passed. MM 
seems puzzled that the Ministry went along to support the passing of the amendments to take place 
despite knowing “it was discriminatory to women” (lines 13-14). She positions the Ministry as 
lacking credentials and even accuses “someone” in the Ministry as “sleeping” (line 15). 
Again, MM contests “a discourse of inequality and injustice” in the passing on the “flawed 
law” as she labels the act as “easy” (line 17). She continues to challenge the “inequality and 
injustice” discourse in the new law that is supposed to be “gender neutral” (line 20) but it ended up 
giving men the same rights that women had, “on top of the many more rights that men already 
enjoyed” (lines 22-23). 
Based on the flaws in the Islamic law that causes women to be discriminated again, MM 
suggests the implication of how “anyone” may imply that Islamic law is “unjust and discriminatory” 
(lines 46-47). This brings to another contradictory situation of the Islamic law as upholding women’s 
rights but the new law states otherwise.  MM herself has no answer to explain the “contradictions” 
(line 48) and also questions the image of Islam that supports “equality, justice and compassion” 
(lines 47-49). In exploring the stark comparison of Islam as an equal and just religion but the 
amended law turns to be unjust and discriminatory, she fails to find the answer or understand it 
herself. 
In extract 4-2 below, ZA also challenges the Islamic Family Law after it was passed by the 
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Parliament. 
 
Extract 4-2: “Let there be public debate on laws” (#1) 
(ZA, New Straits Times, 2006, March 24) 
 
58 This process of deriving "the right" opinion to codify into positive law is a human  
59 construct. The product of this very human engagement with the divine text is not the  
60 divine law of God. 
61 It is human knowledge and under ailing standing, limited by human experience,  
62 human frailties and the context of time, place and circumstance. 
63 The Islamic Family Law recently passed by Parliament, the Hudud passed by  
64 Kelantan and Terengganu and the Syariah Criminal Offences Law are all a product of  
65 this process. They are not divine law just because they bear the name Islam or  
66 Syariah. It is human beings who codified and drafted the laws, it is human beings who  
67 passed them through the legislative assemblies. 
68 Thus, when Islam is a part of public law and public policy as in Malaysia, then by  
69 necessity such laws and policies must be opened to public debate and public feedback.  
70 This is how governments are held accountable in a democracy. 
 
ZA takes a different approach in addressing the issue. While MM appears to be rather 
emotional and uses more rhetorical questions in extract 4-1a, ZA’s extract is made up of evaluative 
statements. ZA foregrounds the same agent as in MM’s extract 4-1a, the “Parliament” (line 63) 
which passed the Islamic Family Law. There are no other specific social actors here but the nouns 
“human”, “human beings” and “public” reoccur a few times in extract 4-1. Parliament represents the 
out-group consisting of the authorities while the public is the in-group, referring to lay people. Unlike 
MM who appears indifferent in extract 4-1 and casually refers to the law drafters as “whoever”, here 
ZA foregrounds “human beings” (line 66) as the agents that codified, drafted and passed the laws 
(line 66-67). She stresses it twice using the phrase “it is”.  
ZA challenges “a discourse of inequality and injustice” in the law by juxtaposing the 
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discourses of “humanity” versus “divinity” to justify inequality and injustice represented in the IFL is 
not of divine origin but a result of human intervention. Here, ZA not only talks about the Islamic 
Family Law, but also the Hudud law (refers to Islamic laws stating the limits ordained by God and 
including the deterrent punishments for serious crimes) that was passed by two different states in 
Malaysia, Kelantan and Terengganu. ZA contests the process of codifying the Islamic law in 
Malaysia, claimed as “divine law of God”, as a “human construct” (lines 58-60) in which she argues 
that whatever humans interpret from the religious texts is questionable and cannot be defined as 
“divine”.  
ZA refuses to accept that the codification of the Malaysian Islamic law can be defined as 
“divine”, thus challenges “a discourse of Islam as divine law”. She negates this twice in this extract: 
“the divine text is not the divine law of God” (lines 59-60), “they are not divine law just because they bear the 
name Islam or Syariah” (lines 65-66). ZA argues that the process of legalising the Islamic law in 
Malaysia is “human construct” as the engagement of humans with the “divine text” (line 59) 
involves “human knowledge”, and is also limited by “human experience” and “human frailties” 
(lines 61-61). She emphasizes that it was “human beings” (repeated twice in line 66) who were 
responsible for codifying, drafting and passing the laws, thus it cannot be referred to as “divine’. 
ZA rejects “a discourse of Islamic fundamentalism” as she promotes “a discourse of 
progressive Islam”. She believes in a moderate practice of Islam in Malaysia as she seeks for a 
progressive Malaysian state. In doing so, ZA persists that any laws including Islamic laws, which is 
“a part of public law and public policy” (line 68) are relevant to everyone, the in-group, and are 
subject to “public debate and public feedback” (line 69). ZA positions the governments in general as 
having the accountability in a democracy (line 70), implying the Malaysian government as 
democratic. 
In the next extract, ZA continues to contest the amendments of the Islamic Family Law. 
 
Extract 4-3: “Seeking justice for Muslim women” (#2) 
(ZA, New Straits Times, 2006, April 7) 
 
1 MALAYSIA once had the most progressive family law in the Muslim world. But now  
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2 countries like Morocco, Turkey and Tunisia are way ahead of us. 
3 The regressive trend began in the 1990s with the slow chiselling away of the rights  
4 women gained through the 1984 Islamic Family Law. 
5 While other Muslim countries are now finding ways to ensure that their laws begin to  
6 reflect contemporary realities, the discriminatory amendments continually made to the  
7 Islamic Family Law in Malaysia seeks to preserve a world that no longer exists. 
8 It continues to insist on a legal framework where men will always be superior to  
9 women, men will always be leaders, protectors and providers; never mind if this flies  
10 in the face of reality. 
[…] 
25 Other Muslim countries looked at Malaysia's law as a model. But by the 1990s, this  
26 reputation began to change. 
27 The global forces of the Islamic revivalism movement engulfed Malaysia and the  
28 subsequent exploitation of faith for political purposes led to a steady regression in the  
29 legal status of Muslim women in this country. Suddenly, the gentler, kinder, inclusive  
30 Islam of our parents and forefathers was no longer authentic. It was deemed Jahilliyah  
31 (Age of Ignorance before the coming of Islam) Islam. We must adopt the "authentic"  
32 Islam of patriarchy and tribal culture. 
 
As a supporter of Malaysian state as a progressive nation, ZA always makes the comparison 
of the practice of Islamic law in other Muslim countries and Malaysia. ZA mentions “other Muslim 
countries” a few times in this extract (lines 5, 25). ZA highlights the fact that Malaysia once practiced 
“the most progressive family law in the Muslim world” (line 1). In the 90s, issues of women’s rights 
in Malaysia started to be affected when amendments in Islamic Family Law was made in 1984 (lines 
3-4). ZA challenges “a discourse of the law as regressive” as she calls these amendments as the start 
of “the regressive trend” (line 3) and implies that other countries now are more advanced in terms of 
their law practice, whereas Malaysia is going backwards, back to a traditional practice (line 7).  
“A discourse of inequality and injustice/discrimination in IFL” (Islamic Family Law) 
resurfaces here.  The “discriminatory amendments” (line 6) in the IFL is a result of Muslim 
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society’s rejection of practising religion based on “contemporary realities” (line 6). ZA also draws on 
competing discourses of “progressive” and “regressive” here. Judging from the “discriminatory 
amendments” (line 6) in Malaysian’s IFL, ZA positions men who dominate Malaysian Muslim 
society as “regressing” since they try “to preserve a world that no longer exists” (line 7). ZA challenges 
the conventional practices of Islam which she believes is no longer relevant to “contemporary realities” 
(line 6). 
ZA contests “a discourse of Malaysian men as superior” in this extract to promote “a 
discourse of Muslim women as equal to Muslim men”. She challenges men’s position in IFL’s “legal 
framework” (line 8) as men “always be[ing] superior to women” (lines 8-9) and also as men “always 
be[ing] leaders, protectors and providers” (line 9). 
Challenging “a discourse of regression”, ZA asserts how Malaysia used to be looked up by 
“other Muslim countries” as Malaysia had a reputation of practising progressive laws that made 
Malaysian law a model to other Muslim countries (lines 25-26), suggesting the practice of Islamic 
law now may turn Malaysia into a regressive state. ZA blames it on “the Islamic revivalism movement” 
(line 27) that took place all over the world, including Malaysia, which strived to go back to the traditional 
Islamic practice and build an Islamic state. She argues that the Islamic resurgence is responsible for the 
“steady regression in the legal status of Muslim women” in Malaysia (lines 28-29).  
ZA highlights similar challenges of “a discourse of Islamic fundamentalism” and “a discourse 
of authentic Islam” from Chapter Three (extracts 3-9 and 3-12). Here, ZA explores the meaning of 
“authentic” Islam from two sides. One side of the Islamic resurgence rejected the previous Islamic practice, 
declared it as not authentic (line 30) and deemed it as ““Jahilliyah” (Age of Ignorance before the coming of 
Islam) Islam” (lines 30-31), which was why they want to go back to the glory days of Islamic past. On the 
other hand, ZA claims the “gentler, kinder and inclusive Islam” (line 29) practiced by “our fathers and 
forefathers is still authentic and relevant. She rejects the discourses of “traditional Islam” and “patriarchal 
Islam” in which she mocks that in a strong modality statement, “We must adopt the "authentic" Islam of 
patriarchy and tribal culture” (lines 31-32). 
 
 
114 
 
4.3 Religious segregation 
 
As mentioned earlier, laws pertaining to personal matters in Malaysia fall under separate laws: 
Federal Law for non-Muslims and syariah law for Muslims.  
In extract 4-4 below, MM continues to challenge Islamic law as she highlights the 
differences in Malaysian laws concerning Muslim women and non-Muslim women, emphasizing on 
the discrimination that Muslim women are facing. 
 
Extract 4-4: “No cheer for Muslim women” (#24) 
(MM, The Star, 2006, March 10) 
 
10 With the end of that racist system, people may be forgiven for thinking that  
11 apartheid does not exist anymore. While few countries practise any formal systems  
12 of discrimination, nevertheless you can find many forms of discrimination  
13 everywhere. In many cases, it is women who are discriminated against. In our  
14 country, there is an insidious growing form of apartheid among Malaysian women,  
15 that between Muslim and non-Muslim women. 
16 We are unique in that we actively legally discriminate against women who are  
17 arguably the majority in this country, Muslim women. Non-Muslim Malaysian  
18 women have benefited from more progressive laws over the years while the 
19 opposite has happened for Muslim women.  
[…] 
43 These differences between the lot of Muslim women and non-Muslim women beg  
44 the question: do we have two categories of citizenship in Malaysia, whereby most  
45 female citizens have less rights than others? As non-Muslim women catch up with  
46 women in the rest of the world, Muslim women here are only going backwards. We  
47 should also note that only in Malaysia are Muslim women regressing; in every other  
48 Muslim country in the world, women have been gaining rights, not losing them. 
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In this extract, MM uses an intertextual reference in her use of the word “apartheid” (line 11 
and 14), calling up an image of the South African context of racial apartheid or the “racist system” 
(line 10). While acknowledging that discrimination can exist everywhere (lines 12-13), she uses this 
term “apartheid” as a metaphor to illustrate the severe religious discrimination of Muslim women in 
comparison to non-Muslim women (as well as all men) in Malaysia, as a result of the dual judiciary 
systems in Malaysia.  
MM draws on “a discourse of religious segregation” in the Malaysian context by pointing 
out how “Muslim and non-Muslim women” (line 15) are differently positioned in Malaysia based on 
the dual-judiciary systems. She uses the passive voice in referring to women who are discriminated 
against (line 13) which leaves out the agent of the action, although the hidden agent could be 
assumed to be Muslim men. Her use of the passive form implicitly foregrounds Muslim men as 
responsible for the discrimination towards women. MM uses an ironic, sarcastic tone to describe the 
practice of discrimination against Muslim women as “unique” (line 16). She uses this ironic voice in 
a sarcastically humorous way in saying, “we actively legally discriminate against women who are 
arguably the majority in this country, Muslim women” (line 16) in order to make her point strong.  
Drawing on “a discourse of religious segregation” for Muslim women, MM further points 
out the irony of the situation, by showing how non-Muslim Malaysian women have progressed over 
the years, whereas Muslim women have not been able to at the same pace (lines 17-9). MM states 
the problem in very overt terms (lines 44-45) by questioning the two different and separate 
categories for citizenship concerning equality for women in Malaysia. In so stating this, she implies 
an alternative “discourse of religious parity” for everyone. 
MM also draws on “a discourse of Islamic women as regressing” and positions Malaysian 
Muslim women as “going backwards” (line 46), “regressing” (line 47) and “losing” rights (line 48). 
She presents non-Muslim women in Malaysia as being in a better place since they “have benefited 
from more progressive laws” (line 18), as explained earlier in matters or marriage, divorce, 
guardianship and inheritance. As non-Muslim women can also enjoy more rights and have more 
privileges and advantages than Muslim women, MM also positions them as progressive since they 
are able to “catch up with women in the rest of the world” (lines 45-46). By drawing on “a discourse 
of women as progressive”, her main point here is to illustrate how Muslim women in Malaysia are 
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particularly marginalized and disempowered compared to their fellow non-Muslim women citizens 
who have benefitted from the same country’s more progressive laws. For example, in divorce cases, 
both non-Muslim men and women have equal rights to file for a divorce but for Muslims, only men 
have the rights to pronounce a divorce inside or outside the courts whereas Muslim women have to 
go through a somewhat different process of legalizing a divorce, often claimed as discriminating to 
women. 
Extract 4-5 below is taken from the same column as extract 4-3. ZA also draws on “a 
discourse of religious segregation” and uses the same comparison of “apartheid” for Muslim women 
when she talks about injustice and discrimination in the implementation of Islamic laws in the next 
extract. 
 
Extract 4-5: “Seeking justice for Muslim women” (#2) 
(ZA, New Straits Times, 2006, April 7) 
 
71 For Muslim women, it is all the more painful that it is Islam that is used to deny  
72 change. Is it any wonder then that many are beginning to describe Malaysia as a  
73 country that practises religious apartheid as it formally establishes one set of rights for  
74 non-Muslims granting equality and justice between men and women, and a separate  
75 set of rights for Muslims, moving toward more inequality and injustice for Muslim 
76 women. As it was under apartheid rule in South Africa, separate can never be equal. 
[…] 
85 No less than the Prime Minister himself has committed the Government to ending all  
86 laws that discriminate against women. It is responsive to public outcries of injustice.  
87 It is committed to appointing qualified women to top positions. 
88 Yet, even when the Cabinet has ordered the Attorney-General to review the  
89 discriminatory Islamic Family Law amendments, there remains those within  
90 Government who cannot bring themselves to support this move. 
91 When misogyny, injustice and political mission hide behind the cloak of religion, too  
92 many people in too many high places choose silence or acquiescence — out of fear,  
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93 out of ignorance, out of personal belief, out of political ideology, or out of expediency 
94 for short-term political gains. 
 
There are three groups of social actors mentioned in extract 4-5: men, Muslim women and 
non-Muslim women in Malaysia. Besides that, ZA employs specific nouns representing those with 
power in high positions, “the Prime Minister”, “the Cabinet”, and “the Attorney General”. In 
positioning Muslim and non-Muslim women in Malaysia, like MM, ZA also intertextually links the 
practice of “apartheid” in South Africa with her term, “religious apartheid” (line 73) and in so doing 
deconstructs IFL as “separate can never be equal” (line 76). ZA also draws on the same “discourse of 
religious segregation” by MM. ZA describes Malaysia as “a country that practises religious apartheid” 
(lines 72-3). She positions Muslim women as victims of this “religious apartheid” in that there is “a 
separate set of rights for Muslims” (lines 74-5), which in the end has resulted in “more inequality and 
injustice for Muslim women” (lines 75-6). ZA also positions Muslim women in Malaysia as being 
discriminated against in their own country as the Islamic law creates separate rights for Muslim and 
non-Muslim women. On the other hand, ZA promotes an alternative “discourse of equality and 
justice” for non-Muslim in Malaysia (line 74). Unlike the apartheid in South Africa where white 
people discriminated against black people, the analogy MM and ZA make here does not refer to 
non-Muslims as the agents responsible for the religious segregation, but they place the responsibility 
on the government consisting of Islamic scholars as causing discrimination against Muslim women.   
ZA contests the misuse and manipulation of Islam by some people who gain benefits for 
themselves from this exploitation. Based on the claims by women’s groups that IFL brings  inequality 
and injustice to Muslim women, ZA challenges people who use Islam as a tool “to deny change” (lines 
71-2) for Muslim women.  While ZA uses the passive form in lines 71-2: “it is all the more painful 
that it is Islam that is used to deny change”, the hidden agent can be assumed to be some Muslim men who 
deny Muslim women equal rights.  
ZA uses an active voice in line 85 and foregrounds the Prime Minister as the agent who “has 
committed” to help eliminate injustice face by women. She positions the Prime Minister and the Cabinet as 
sensitive to the issues involving discrimination against women, but more importantly, they are positioned as 
making the efforts to take actions; the Prime Minister “has committed the Government to ending all laws that 
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discriminate against women” (lines 85-87), while “the Cabinet has ordered the Attorney-General to review 
the discriminatory Islamic Family Law amendments” (lines 88-89). However, despite all this, ZA also draws 
the attention to some people in the Government itself who oppose the action; those who “cannot bring 
themselves to support this move” (lines 89-90). 
In relation to people who are against the move to end discrimination against women, ZA also uses 
strong language to deconstruct the way that religion is used to “cloak” (line 90) another agenda 
which comes across as “misogyny, injustice and political mission”. ZA reveals how the name of 
“religion” (line 90) is being used to manipulate and create injustice in law and discrimination against 
women. ZA also positions people who “choose silence or acquiescence” (line 91) as being passively weak as 
they only hide under various excuses such as “fear” (line 91), “ignorance” (line 92), “personal belief” (line 
92), “political ideology” (line 92), and “expediency for short-term political gains” (lines 92-3). 
 
4.4 Inequality and injustice of child marriage 
 
In the following extracts 4-6 and 4-7, both ZA and MM still discuss the Islamic law, but question the 
issue of legalizing child marriage in Malaysia. According to Islamic law in Malaysia, the legal age of 
marriage is sixteen for girls and eighteen for boys. Those under the legal age can still get married if 
their parents give the permission but they must also apply for approval from the Syariah Court. Child 
marriage is a dilemma faced by Muslims in general, not necessarily coming from those who support 
Islamic fundamentalist discourse. Although it is difficult to prove, based on most Islamic historical 
books, Muslim’s Prophet Muhammad married his wife, Aisha, when she was nine. This became a 
bone of contention as it made some Muslims to view child marriage as acceptable but Islamic 
feminists are calling it injustice to young girls. Islamic feminists argued that Muslim men are only 
using religion as an excuse to marry young girls. 
 Below, in extract 4-6a, ZA challenges the existence of child marriage and presents its 
consequences in general for the Malaysian society. 
 
Extract 4-6a: “Nothing divine in child marriage” (#57) 
(ZA, The Star, 2010, June 6) 
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39 That child marriage exists in Malaysia should be of grave concern to a country that is  
40 categorised in the upper middle income bracket in UN tables. 
41 Not only that, the data shows it is a problem that crosses all races, and richer and  
42 poorer states in Malaysia. The figures raise many disturbing questions that need to be  
43 studied and answered. 
[…] 
85 The Ministries of Health, and Women, Family and Community Development must  
86 undertake a serious study on the particular situation in Malaysia, and especially the  
87 higher prevalence rate in the more developed states. 
 […] 
98 But we know that early marriage can have serious harmful consequences for  
99 children, including the denial of childhood and adolescence, denial of education,  
100 premature pregnancies leading to higher rates of maternal and infant mortality,  
101 vulnerability to sexually-transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS, and not least,  
102 domestic violence. 
103 The Malaysian Shadow Report has called on the Government to lift all its  
104 reservations on CEDAW, including Article 16 (2) which states: “The betrothal and  
105 the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, and all necessary action, including  
106 legislation, shall be taken to specify a minimum age for marriage and to make the  
107 registration of marriages in an official registry compulsory.” The NGOs have thus  
108 demanded that both civil and syariah laws be amended to raise the minimum age for  
109 marriage of girls to 18, equal to that of men. 
 
In this extract, ZA addresses that the issue of child marriage is not just confined to Muslims as it 
“crosses all races, and richer and poorer states in Malaysia” (lines 41-42). ZA uses an evaluative statement 
in voicing her opinion in lines 39 to 40, using a modal verb “should” in “That child marriage exists in 
Malaysia should be of grave concern”. ZA also highlights the demand of the two separate laws, “civil and 
syariah laws” (line 108) to amend the permissible marriage for girls, implying that the child marriage issue 
120 
 
affects everyone in Malaysia. 
ZA condemns the legalization of child marriage in Malaysia. From the same article (data not 
included here), she provided the report from the 2000 Population and Housing Census that 6,800 
girls under the age of 15 were married (lines 28-29). She appears baffled by the fact that Malaysia 
allows child marriage to exist (lines 39-40) and she views this as contradictory to the fact based on the UN 
that Malaysia is considered as within the upper middle income bracket. Considering that the subject of 
child marriage is a “grave concern” (line 39), ZA challenges that there are “many disturbing questions” and 
recommends that the issue to be “studied and answered” (lines 42-43). ZA’s choice of lexical items “grave” 
and “disturbing” suggests how serious she feels the issue really is, and at the same time, the subject of child 
marriage really bothers and upsets her. Similar to extract 4-1a by MM, in this extract, ZA foregrounds 
the same ministry in the Malaysian government, “The Women, Family and Community 
Development Ministry” alongside another ministry, “The Ministry of Health” (line 85).  She proposes 
that the two ministries be liable and take the responsibility to conduct a comprehensive study on child 
marriage (line 85).  
ZA challenges “a discourse of inequality and injustice” for children, especially girls, as she 
contests the legalization and practice of child marriage in Malaysia. She argues that early marriage 
may cause children to suffer “serious harmful consequences” in which she listed a few consequences 
as examples (line 98-102). She employs the inclusive pronoun “we” in line 98 to refer to the in-group 
consisting of herself and readers with the same beliefs and values, which can suggest that she is implying 
that most people, or at least those who have the same knowledge as her, know that child marriage 
can lead to terrible consequences. Thus, she indirectly condemns those who allow children to get 
married despite more harmful things the marriage can bring than good ones. ZA’s choice of lexical 
items of a verb “know” and a modal verb “can” (line 98) suggests her certainty of the ability of what early 
marriage can cause. However, here, ZA backgrounds the agents who permit early marriage. Instead, ZA 
makes use of nominalization, a process of changing a verb to a noun, which can be seen in the lexical word 
“denial” (repeated twice in line 99). ZA does not disclose the agents who deny children of their childhood 
and education. I infer that ZA refers to the Government and people in the authority as they are responsible for 
making, passing or rejecting any laws. 
Other specific social actors mentioned by ZA are “the Government” (line 103) and “the NGOs” 
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(line 107). ZA addresses the act of the Malaysian Shadow Report which has asked the Government to 
lift the reservations on CEDAW (Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women) especially concerning the occurrence of child marriage (lines 104-108). ZA draws on “a discourse 
of equality and justice” for girls to be equal as boys as she supports the act of some NGOs which 
demanded the minimum age for girls to marry be raised to 18 by having both civil and syariah laws be 
amended (lines 107-109). 
In extract 4-6b below, ZA continues to criticize the practice of child marriage in conservative Islamic 
societies.  
 
Extract 4-6b: “Nothing divine in child marriage” (#57) 
(ZA, The Star, 2010, June 6) 
 
110  But any campaign to end the practice of child marriage in traditional Muslim  
111 societies face particular criticisms and challenges from the conservative religious  
112 perspective. The Minister in Charge of Religious Affairs has already said the law  
113 should not be amended. 
[…] 
122 There is nothing Islamic about child marriage. It is historical and contextual. Up to  
123 the 19th century, the age of marriage under English and Scottish common law was  
124 12 years old! 
[…] 
134 Under the Islamic revolutionary government in Iran, the age of marriage for girls  
135 was brought down from 15 to eight years and nine months to reflect true “Islamic”  
136 teachings. But this was later raised to 13 because of pressure from women’s groups  
137 and also a population explosion that adversely impacted Iran’s education, health and  
138 social services. In both situations, Islamic arguments were used to justify opposite  
139 actions. 
140 It is clear there is nothing divine that prevents a government from setting the  
141 minimum age of marriage at 18. It is whether it chooses to make political gains by  
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142 flying the flag of tradition and religion or it chooses to do what is right, just and fair  
143 for its citizens. 
 
Here, ZA specifically talks about the practice of child marriage in Muslim societies. ZA 
appears disappointed and frustrated that the NGOs’ work, efforts and campaigns to stop the practice 
of child marriage do not get enough support and approval from the religious authorities, but instead 
they receive “criticisms and challenges” from them (line 111). She foregrounds the agents, the religious 
authorities, who criticize and challenge the campaigns and positions the religious authorities as 
having “conservative religious perspective” (lines 111-112). In addition, ZA also includes a specific 
social actor, “the Minister in Charge of Religious Affairs” (line 112), and she intertextually quotes his 
statement that the law which allows child marriage to take place should not be amended (lines 112-113). His 
statement implies his support on the practice of child marriage.  
ZA challenges “a discourse of Islamic fundamentalism” seen in the “traditional Muslim societies” 
(line 110-111) and the “conservative religious perspective” (lines 111-112). She challenges it by 
claiming that “there is nothing Islamic about child marriage” (line 122), and also form the title of this 
column “Nothing divine in child marriage”. She also claims that the practice of child marriage is “historical 
and contextual” (line 122) and is not only exclusive to Islam as she made an intertextual reference to English 
and Scottish common law in the 19th century which set the age of marriage to 12 years only (lines 123-124). 
From lines 134 to 139, ZA uses an intertextual reference to the issue of age of marriage for girls in 
Iran. She employs the passive voice in the sentences from lines 134 to 139: “the age of marriage for girls was 
brought down”, “this was later raised to 13”, “Islamic arguments were used to justify opposite actions” in 
which the agents are not explicitly mentioned, but can be implied as the conservative Muslim men who may 
be the ones responsible for the law formation. Under various clashed Islamic arguments between Iranian 
Islamic revolutionary government and women’s group there, the age of marriage changed a few times, at first 
from 15 years, to eight years and nine months, before settling at 13.  
ZA rejects “a discourse of child marriage as Islamic or divine” as the age of marriage was 
changed based on various opinions on what the right age is. Similar discourse or “divinity” as 
mentioned in extract 4-2 appears here. She argues that “there is nothing divine that prevents a 
government from setting the minimum age of marriage at 18” (lines 140-141). She criticizes the government 
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as having the choice of using (or misusing) tradition and religion to benefit “political gains” from those who 
support the same traditional and religious beliefs (lines 141-143). ZA draws on “a discourse of equality and 
justice”, as well as “a discourse of Islam as fair” as she positions the government also as having another 
choice of doing “what is right, just and fair” (lines 142-143) for the people, which in this case, reviewing the 
practice of child marriage and raising the minimum age of marriage to 18, for both girls and boys, regardless 
of race. 
MM also challenges child marriage in her column. Similar to ZA, she also rejects “a 
discourse of Islamic fundamentalism” and draws on “a discourse of equality and justice” for children 
as can be seen in extract 4-7a below.  
 
Extract 4-7a: “Marriage is not about legalising sex” (#139) 
(MM, The Star, 2010, December 8) 
 
6 Despite signing on to the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of  
7 Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) we are still allowing child marriages to  
8 happen with the pretext that religion allows it. 
9 What has child marriage got to do with discrimination against women? When child  
10 marriages occur, it is almost always girls who are the ones married off, rarely ever  
11 boys. 
12 And in almost all cases, they are married to much older men, sometimes old enough  
13 to be their grandfathers. Child marriage is therefore never one of equality because  
14 how can a child ever be an equal partner to her adult husband? 
15 One might argue about the presumption of equality in marriage; that wives should  
16 be, by default, inferior to their husbands. Even if this is a valid belief (and it is not),  
17 doesn’t a girl child have even more odds stacked against her than an adult wife? 
 
Similar to extract 4-6a by ZA, MM also mentions CEDAW to address the issue of child 
marriage. Even though there is no explicit mention of Malaysia in this extract, I can infer that MM is 
talking about a Malaysian context. In this extract, MM challenges “a discourse of inequality and 
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injustice” on behalf of Malaysian Muslim girls as Malaysia still allows child marriages to take place, 
as some people claim that Islam allows it (line 8). She employs an inclusive pronoun “we” to refer to 
Malaysians in general since the issue of child marriage involves everyone. In MM’s interrogative 
sentence in line 9, she questions Malaysia’s stand on child marriage since Malaysia signed on 
CEDAW and she argues that it is also a form of discrimination for girls. MM compares boys’ and 
girls’ positions to illustrate child marriage as discriminating to girls, as more girls are “married off” 
(line 9-11), thus MM positions girls as helpless and challenges “a discourse of Muslim girls/women 
as inferior to men”. MM constructs Muslim girls as inferior victims because their grooms are usually 
“older men” or “old enough to be their grandfathers” (lines 12-14) and presumably “inferior to their 
husbands” (line 16).  
MM contests “a discourse of inequality and injustice” as she claims that there is no equality 
in child marriage after which she poses another interrogative, “how can a child ever be an equal partner 
to her adult husband?” (line 14) to further states her refutation of inequality and injustice in the practice of 
child marriage. She juxtaposes “a child” and an “adult” to illustrate the differences between these too, which 
cannot be equals, what more to achieve equality in child marriage. 
MM also rejects “the presumption of equality in marriage” whereby wives are expected to be 
inferior to their husbands (lines 15-16). She challenges this “default” notion (line 16) which is based 
on “a discourse of Muslim girls/women as inferior to boys/men”. MM poses a rhetorical question at 
the end of this extract, “doesn’t a girl child have even more odds stacked against her?” (line 17) as 
she tries to reason the “valid belief” of wives being inferior to their husbands. She however, exerts 
her opinion in parentheses “(and it is not)” (line 16) to reject this belief. She argues that in the case of 
female adults, equality is not entirely achieved yet; thus, girls who marry young have even less 
equality.  
Continuing from the same article, in extract 4-7b below, MM continues to contest child 
marriage and questions the religious officials who legalise the marriage. She also questions their 
rationales and motives. 
 
Extract 4-7b: “Marriage is not about legalising sex” (#139) 
(MM, The Star, 2010, December 8) 
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30 It is entirely sick that there are religious officials who view child marriage as the  
31 answer to “social problems”. What problems are they talking about? Is sex outside  
32 marriage the greatest evil there is? Is not child marriage with its virtual enslavement  
33 of girls, its proven physical damage to girls’ bodies and the utter lack of  
34 preparedness for a life of responsibility not a bigger social evil? 
[…] 
44 Is marriage only about legalising sex? And therefore if anyone is in “danger” of  
45 having illegal sex they should be married off regardless of age? 
46 Indeed, when we think of child marriages as a way of fending off “social evils”,  
47 who do we think is the would-be perpetrator of that evil? Is it not the groom? So, if  
48 he does legally what in all other cases would be called rape, he is all right? 
[…] 
65 In the 21st century when we’re trying to become a modern nation, why are we not  
66 ashamed that we find excuses to allow child marriages? 
67 It is now time to just ban this outright and become civilised. 
 
In this extract, MM criticizes the opinion made by some “religious officials” that child 
marriage is the answer to “social problems” (lines 30-31). She displays her negative evaluation as 
she views the opinion as “entirely sick” (line 30). Extract 4-8b is full with the use of interrogatives by 
MM. I think this is MM’s way of voicing her opinions by making the readers think about the 
problem as well. By asking questions, she is also challenging the reasons that some “religious 
officials” used to allow child marriage.   
She positions the religious officials as “senseless” as she asks about the “problems” they 
referred to (line 31). She challenges the religious officials’ definition of “social problems” because 
she argues that the “physical damage to girls’ bodies and the utter lack of preparedness for a life of 
responsibility” (lines 33-34) carry more importance than other social ills.  
MM also questions the meaning of “marriage” and the act of legalising sex by getting married 
despite the young age one is (line 44-45). She employs the pronoun “we” a few times in this extract to refer to 
Malaysians, positioning everyone as responsible in the issue of child marriage. She positions the “groom” as 
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the “perpetrator of that evil” (line 47). Indirectly, MM de-constructs child marriage as “rape” (line 48) 
because the wives are under-aged but people can get away with it because the marriage is legal. 
MM condemns how child marriage is permissible in Malaysia and sees that it is only an “excuse” 
(line 66) for a legal sex with a minor. Similar to ZA where she constructs Malaysia as “modern and 
progressive” (extract 3-12, Chapter Three), MM also draws on “a discourse of modernity and 
progressive” since Malaysia is becoming a “modern nation” (line 65), again using the pronoun “we” 
to refer to Malaysians. She draws on “a discourse of Islam as fair” as she advocates for a ban on child abuse 
and be more civilised (line 67). She rejects “a discourse of Islamic fundamentalism” as she sees the practice 
of child abuse is uncivilised and not suitable for Malaysia which is turning into a modern state. 
 
4.5 Equality and justice in Islamic law 
 
Earlier, MM and ZA have attempted to offer alternative discourses to challenge “a discourse of 
inequality and injustice” of Islamic law. Other alternative discourses found in MM’s and ZA’s work 
are explored more in this section. 
From an column called “True equality”, MM talks about the amended Islamic Family Law 
(abbreviated as IFL in the extract), after SIS and other NGOs from feminist and human rights groups 
held a special gathering to discuss the changes in IFL. This column looks at how MM explores the 
definition of equality with regards to men and women’s rights and IFL. In extract 4-8a below, MM 
promotes an alternative discourse of “equality and justice” and constructs various positionings for 
men and women. 
 
Extract 4-8a: “True equality” (#21) 
(MM, The Star, 2006, January 25) 
 
4 Women and men, old and young, filled the seats, the steps and stood through the  
5 two hours to listen and express their concerns about how this new law will impact  
6 on women. The mood was of genuine anger that this could have happened, that we  
7 are retrogressing rather than progressing, and that each person needed to do  
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8 something to ensure that this law does not pass as it is.  
9 What was interesting was the number of men who turned up. Their wives and  
10 daughters had obviously dragged some of them, but there were those who were  
11 there on their own volition, and who expressed concern that these laws were an  
12 impediment to the type of Malaysian society that they wanted to see in the future,  
13 one in which women did not have to suffer discrimination as they do now.  
14 But for every man who was there, there were plenty more who didn’t come, who  
15 wouldn’t be seen dead at such a meeting. Apart from the sort of Neanderthals who  
16 have knee-jerk reactions to anything that levels the playing field between men and  
17 women (you know, the sort who are proud to describe themselves as predators and  
18 prowlers), there are a whole lot of men out there who simply don’t get what this is  
19 all about and therefore just stay out of it.  
 
In this extract, MM only employs the generic nouns “men” and “women” but they can be 
implied to be Muslims since they attended a talk concerning “the new law” (line 5), also implied as 
the Islamic Family Law. Pronouns “they”, “their” and “them” are mostly referring specifically to 
men and women who attended the talk. MM uses an inclusive pronoun “we” (line 6) for Malaysian 
Muslim women. The significance of MM’s writing about men and women is to highlight the 
empathy of men on women’s issues. 
MM divides the social actors to three groups: women who attended the gathering, men who 
also came to the same gathering, and men who were absent. First of all, MM positions everyone who 
came, “women and men, old and young” (line 4) as those who have real “concerns about how this 
new law will impact on women” (lines 5-6) and the mutual general feeling of everyone who attended, 
was of “genuine anger” with the passing of the new law (line 6). MM draws on “a discourse of 
Malaysian women as retrogressing” as she challenges the impact of IFL causing women (or 
Malaysians) as “retrogressing rather than progressing” (line 7). She draws on “a discourse of equality 
and justice” as she challenges everyone who attended the gathering to “do something to ensure that 
this law does not pass as it is” (lines 7-8).  
Secondly, MM focuses on “the number of men who turned up” (line 9), who either came 
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because their wives or daughters “dragged” them (line 10) or “on their own volition” (line 11). MM 
positions these men as “caring supporters” of Muslim women as they have voiced out their concern 
over the new law. She also positions these men as “sensitive” to the discriminating issue as they were 
aware of the impacts of the law which may prevent an ideal Malaysian society that they dreamt of, 
“one in which women did not have to suffer discrimination” (lines 11-13). 
Finally, MM talks about other “plenty more” men who did not join the gathering (line 14). 
She positions these men as “conceited” as they “wouldn’t be seen dead at such a meeting” (line 15). 
There are two types of men from this group. She employs strong lexical choices to construct the first 
group of men as primitive, culturally and intellectually backward: “Neanderthals” (line 15), and 
“predators and prowlers” (lines 17-18). I assume that MM uses these descriptions to refer to the 
traditionalist Islamist men who often make statements loaded with conservative views. For the third 
group of men, whom MM herself presupposes that there could be “a whole lot of men out there” 
(line 18), MM positions these men as plain ignorant and indifferent to what is going on. This 
situation is worrisome to MM as this type of men who “simply don’t get what this is all about” (lines 
18-19) may take the easy way out by staying out of it (line 19).  
In extract 4-8b below, MM highlights the inequality and injustice she claims brought by IFL, 
and explains further the reason behind women’s battle against discrimination. She also tries to 
unpack the meaning of equality. 
 
Extract 4-8b: “True equality” (#21) 
(MM, The Star, 2006, January 25) 
 
20 I think a lot of men are wondering first of all, why women complain endlessly about 
21 discrimination. And secondly, what does equality actually mean.  
22 Firstly, yes we complain about discrimination all the time but that’s because we are  
23 discriminated against. It is one thing to have no laws that actively discriminate  
24 against women, it is quite another in day-to-day life when women still get penalised  
25 in job promotions if they take time off to care for young children. The facts are  
26 there.  
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27 While some 60% of undergraduates are female, only 23% of administrators and  
28 managers in the workplace are women. Malaysian women still earn only 47% of  
29 what men earn for the same jobs. In fact, overall, despite what looks like progress  
30 for women in our country, the participation of women in the workplace has not 
31 changed in 30 years.  
[…] 
39 So what does equality mean? Some people have interpreted what is good for the  
40 goose is also good for the gander in ways that have actually led to less equality.  
41 That is exactly what happened with the IFL. Giving men who already have a lot of  
42 rights more [rights], just because women had those lesser rights, only meant that the   
43 end result was [that] the inequality between men and women got more pronounced.  
[…] 
47 So the IFL only creates inequality and injustice. Some people think that this is the 
48 way it should be, simply because this law supposedly has some religious basis. But  
49 this is like saying that religion essentially supports inequality and injustice. Surely  
50 this is an insult to religion.  
51 So why should men support laws that provide for equality and justice for women?  
52 Would they lose out by doing this, or be seen as a bunch of ninnies controlled by  
53 women? I think the men who are against the IFL are intelligent and compassionate  
54 men who really believe that discriminating against women is passé, that it is an  
55 insult to humankind to treat one half as lesser beings.  
[…] 
61 There are men who are hesitant to sign the petitions against the IFL because they   
62 are wary of being associated with women’s groups. This is shortsighted and  
63 irrational. Men have so much to gain by promoting true equality and justice for all,  
64 and nothing to lose except empty egos. And I’ve never known a woman who has  
65 genuinely liked any man who treats women as inferior. 
 
130 
 
Here, MM uses the lexical cohesion of antonymy a few times in this extract: “equality” 
versus “inequality”, and “justice” versus “injustice. She challenges and attempts to deconstruct “a 
discourse of inequality and injustice”, and then she reconstructs it as “a discourse of equality and 
justice”. 
MM highlights that men may not understand why “women complain endlessly” (line 20) 
and they may not know the meaning of discrimination and equality (line 21). Thus she positions 
these kinds of men as ignorant and fail to understand the roots of the problem. MM defends women 
who always “complain about discrimination” (line 22) by giving a reason that women are 
“discriminated against” (lines 22-23). She provides the facts to showcase the discrimination against 
women in Malaysia, especially women’s participation in the workplace (lines 27-31).  
MM questions the real meaning of equality as Malaysian Muslim women appear to have less 
equality after the implementation of the new law of IFL (lines 39-40). MM claims that IFL 
encompasses “a discourse of inequality and injustice”. With regards to the IFL, she challenges an 
agenda of gender differences: men should not be given more rights than women with the result being 
even more inequality for women (lines 41-2).  
 MM mocks the IFL, saying that it “supposedly has some religious basis” (line 48) and at the 
same time suggests that the “religious basis” of Islam should contain equality between the sexes. In 
lines 49-50, MM challenges the IFL credibility by drawing attention to how it insults religion in its 
seemingly overt support of inequality and injustice.  
From extract 4-8a, MM positions men in two different ways according to whether or not 
they support the IFL or sign petitions against it. MM deconstructs the notion put forth by the 
supporters of the IFL that “men are a bunch of ninnies controlled by women” (lines 52-3), and 
reconstructs men who support equality and justice for women as “intelligent and compassionate” 
(lines 53-55). On the other hand, she positions men who support the IFL as passé (line 54), “an insult 
to humankind” (line 55), “shortsighted and irrational” (lines 62-63) with “empty egos” (line 64). 
Furthermore, in lines 64-65, she draws on a feminist positioning that women genuinely do not want 
to be treated as inferior.  
In the next article, ZA challenges the Islamic laws in Malaysia by advocating Datuk Seri 
Shahrizat Jalil (referred to as Shahrizat for short), a female minister in the Malaysian government. A 
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different extract from the same article also appeared earlier in Chapter 4. ZA writes about Shahrizat’s 
appointment as the Prime Minister’s Special Adviser for Muslim Women and Social Development Affairs, 
and things that she hopes Shahrizat can and must carry out to eliminate injustice and inequality for Malaysian 
women, especially in Muslim family laws involving Muslim women. 
 
Extract 4-9: “Unjust and unnecessary” (#39) 
(ZA, The Star, 2008, July 6) 
 
96 It was stunning that the legal drafters could introduce gender neutral language to  
97 extend rights traditionally given to women to men, with no reciprocal attempt at all  
98 to extend rights traditionally given to men to women. And the then Minister in  
99 charge of religion had the gall to explain that these amendments were made in the  
100 name of equality and non-discrimination as provided for in the Federal Constitution! 
[…] 
106 On top of Shahrizat’s agenda must be the need to push through the re-negotiated  
107 amendments to these discriminatory amendments which were finalised almost two  
108 years ago. All other laws and policies that discriminate against Muslim women must  
109 also be amended. Then work must begin for a longer-term comprehensive reform of  
110 the Muslim family laws to recognise the principles of justice and equality in  
111 marriage and divorce, a right that non-Muslim women in this country have enjoyed  
112 for over 25 years. 
113 She must advocate for Muslim women in Malaysia to enjoy the same rights as her  
114 sisters of other faith, and as all men. It is ridiculous that the Government tells the  
115 world that its policies on equality and non-discrimination apply only to non- 
116 Muslims while Muslim women must continue to suffer discrimination because of  
117 narrow-minded and outdated understandings and interpretations of culture and  
118 religion that no longer have bearing to the realities of women and men’s lives in the 
119 21st century. 
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In this extract, ZA employs a mix of generic and specific social actors, involving general “women” 
and “men”, “Muslim women” and “non-Muslim women” in Malaysia, “legal drafters” and specific social 
actors, , “the then Minister in charge of religion” and “Shahrizat”, a female Malaysian minister. 
ZA foregrounds the “legal drafters” (line 96) as the agents who introduced “gender neutral 
language” (line 96) to the Islamic law. She employs passive voice twice to refer to changes made to the 
Muslim law: “these amendments were made in the name of equality and non-discrimination” (lines 99-100) 
and “these discriminatory amendments which were finalised” (line 107). Although the legal drafters are not 
named and in the passive sentences the agents are excluded, I can assume that they are mostly Malaysian 
Muslim men.  
ZA compares the amendments and policies claimed to be on “equality and non-discrimination” with 
“laws and policies that discriminate against Muslim women”. ZA challenges “a discourse of inequality and 
injustice” in the amendments of the Muslim law which she claims as unfair to Muslim women. She criticizes 
the act of the “legal drafters” who added “gender neutral language” to the law, which resulted in men getting 
the rights “traditionally given to women” (line 97), but those rights are not “reciprocal” to women (line 98). 
Previously, only the wife is given the right for fasakh (to dissolve a marriage), but under the 2005 
Amendments, the husband is also allowed to apply fasakh, including the right to divorce. In an evaluative 
statement, ZA employs a lexical item “stunning” (line 96) which suggests her shock and overwhelm over the 
legal drafters’ act. ZA protests against the statement of a former “Minister in charge of religion” (lines 98-99) 
who claimed that the “amendments were made in the name of equality and non-discrimination as provided 
for in the Federal Constitution!” (lines 99-100). She positions the former minister as “had the gall” (line 99), a 
position loaded with sarcasm of someone who has courage. This is an irony by itself because ZA assumes 
that someone who has the knowledge of religion should know that Islam does not discriminate against 
women. 
As mentioned earlier, ZA wrote this article on the appointment of a female minister in the 
government, Shahrizat. Here, ZA constructs her expectations and hope on Shahrizat to carry out her 
responsibilities on behalf of women since she is the Prime Minister’s Special Adviser for Muslim Women 
and Social Development Affairs. She employs a strong modality “must” a few times in lines 106, 109, 113 
and 116 to assert “Shahrizat’s agenda” (line 106). First of all, ZA proposes that Shahrizat has to “push through 
the re-negotiated amendments to these discriminatory amendments”, as well as to amend any discriminating 
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laws or policies to women (lines 106-109). She also proposes that the Muslim family laws need a 
“longer-term comprehensive reform” (line 109-110). ZA compares the rights of Muslim and non-Muslim 
women in Malaysian and she promotes “a discourse of equality and justice” for Muslim women to attain 
rights in marriage and divorce similar to justice and equality rights that Malaysian non-Muslims women have 
(lines 110-112).  
Again, ZA contests “a discourse of religious segregation” that exists between Muslim and 
non-Muslim women in Malaysia, as a result of the different laws. Thus, the other thing that she proposes for 
Shahrizat to do is to “advocate for Muslim women in Malaysia to enjoy the same rights as her sisters of other 
faith, and as all men” (lines 113-114). ZA positions non-Muslim women as “sisters of other faith” using the 
lexis “sister”. ZA’s positioning of Muslim and non-Muslim women here may suggest her view of seeing 
these women as having the same rights and equality despite their religious differences. Hence, she promotes 
“a discourse of equality and justice” and “a discourse of religious parity”, as not only she sees Muslim 
women as equal to non-Muslim women, but also to men. 
ZA uses another evaluative statement in line 114 as she condemns the Malaysian government by 
calling their act as “ridiculous” when they indirectly admit to the world that only non-Muslim women can 
enjoy the “policies on equality and non-discrimination” (lines 115-116) in Malaysia. Again she challenges “a 
discourse of inequality and injustice” and promotes “a discourse of equality and justice”. She appears 
to be strongly opposing the government’s action that made Muslim women “suffer discrimination” and 
blames it on people’s understandings and interpretations of Malaysian culture and Islamic religion which she 
labels as “narrow-minded and outdated” (lines 117-118). ZA employs nominalization in “understandings and 
interpretations of culture and religion” since she backgrounds the agents who understand and interpret culture 
and religion. She argues that the traditional and outdated interpretation is no longer relevant and not realistic 
to the modern lives of Muslims in Malaysia. 
In extract 4-10a below, MM talks about the roles that many women’s groups have 
demonstrated to challenge the Islamic law. MM advocates an international Islamic feminist 
organisation called Musawah, which was launched in Malaysia in 2009 with ZA as the Director. This 
group collaborates with many other women’s groups from all over the world, including SIS from 
Malaysia since both groups have similar agendas. 
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Extract 4-10a: “Great to be making history” (#95) 
(MM, The Star, 2009, February 18) 
 
3 WE DON’T always know when we are participating in something special and  
4 historic at the moment it is happening. 
5 But this past weekend I have been privileged to be part of one such moment in time;  
6 Musawah, a global movement for equality and justice in the Muslim family was  
7 launched here in Kuala Lumpur.  
[…] 
15 The Musawah (“equality”, not as some allege, “sameness”) gathering sought to find,  
16 within Islamic texts and jurisprudence, solutions to the contemporary problems  
17 facing women and men in ways that ensure that justice is served. 
18 As many of the scholars pointed out, Islam brought justice to the society it was  
19 revealed to via Prophet Muhammad, especially to women. 
20 If women feel that they are being treated unjustly in many societies today, it is not a  
21 failing of Islam but of interpretations of the religion that ignored its essential just  
22 and egalitarian spirit. 
 
From extract 4-10a, MM addresses the issue of Islamic law by connecting it to an 
international group called “Musawah” which held a gathering in Malaysia in 2009. Even though the 
gathering was held in Malaysia, in this extract, MM only uses general social actors “women and 
men” (line 17) to refer to any Muslim women and men. This particular group looks at inequality and 
injustice issues concerning Muslim family, especially issues on global Islamic family law in various 
Muslim countries.  
MM draws on “a discourse of equality and justice” as she talks about this group, Musawah, a 
word which comes from an Arabic word for “equality” (line 15). MM points out that there is a 
difference between “equality” for women and men, as compared to “sameness” between women and 
men. Implicitly, MM suggests that some people have alleged (line 15) Musawah to take the meaning 
of “sameness”, not “equality”. Those people are presumably those who oppose this movement. The 
135 
 
timing of Musawah’s launch in Malaysia was apt for SIS, which needed much support in dealing 
with Islamic family law issues. So when Musawah came to Malaysia, MM positions herself to be 
among the “privileged” (line 5) ones as she had the chance to participate in “something special and 
historic” (lines 3-4).  
MM foregrounds the objective of the intellectual Musawah gathering in Malaysia as to 
gather international scholars and activists to look at ways to find solutions regarding problems for 
Muslim men and women that occur based on injustice in the Islamic system (lines 15-17). The 
Musawah group challenges the Islamic fundamentalist discourse and instead draws on a more 
progressive “discourse of Islamic feminism” and “a discourse of equality and justice”. Even though 
MM foregrounds Musawah as challenging the flaws and loopholes in the existing Islamic family law, 
she asserts that the group still works “within Islamic texts and jurisprudence” (line 16) to justify their 
claims for equality and justice for Muslim women and men.  
  MM employs generic social actors, “scholars” (line 18), which may refer to Muslim scholars 
at the Musawah gathering. She draws on the “discourse of equality and justice” that is supported by 
the scholars during the gathering. This is evident when MM wrote about the scholars’ intertextual 
reference to what the Muslim Prophet Muhammad conveyed; “Islam brought justice to the society it 
was revealed to via Prophet Muhammad, especially to women” (lines 18-19). She backgrounds the 
agent in line 20, “If women feel that they are being treated unjustly”. MM defends the injustice 
faced by many women nowadays as not because of the “failing of Islam” (line 21) but she contests 
the practice of Islam today has interpretations “that ignored its essential just and egalitarian spirit” 
(lines 21-22). She uses a nominalization in “interpretations” (line 21) as the agents who interpreted 
the religion are not mentioned, which again, can be assumed to be men.  
  In extract 4-10b below, MM continues to talk about equality and justice in the practice of 
Islamic law and she cited some examples of how some parts of the Islamic laws in other countries 
have improved for the better. 
 
Extract 4-10b: “Great to be making history” (#95) 
(MM, The Star, 2009, February 18) 
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40 Attempts to amend these laws to make them better for women have thus far been  
41 derided as “changing God’s laws”, never mind that they were already amended  
42 from the originally just ones to ones that are far less fair to women. 
43 It was exhilarating to learn from these learned scholars that God does not  
44 discriminate between men and women, both His creations, the proof of which is in  
45 the Quran itself. 
46 Nor does it allow for men to mistreat women, enjoining repeatedly that women and  
47 orphans be always fairly treated. 
48 Even more exhilarating was to listen to people from Morocco, Turkey and  
49 Afghanistan talk about the strides they have made to better the lot of their societies  
50 by making family laws more just and equitable. None of this was easy, and took a  
51 very long time and hard and dedicated effort. But it paid off. 
52 Today, Morocco has a family law that describes marriage as “an equal partnership”  
53 between a man and a woman. 
54 Turkey, which is governed by an Islamist party, has a civil and penal code that were  
55 amended to ensure that women were treated as equals in the law and not as passive  
56 recipients of whatever male jurists decided. 
57 Even Afghanistan managed to pass a law that gave women the right to contract their  
58 own marriages, rather than through their male relatives, despite a lack of stable  
59 government and institutions. 
60 All of these countries did it while adhering to Islamic teachings, thus showing that  
61 Islam is no barrier to justice and equality. 
 
Continuing from extract 4-10a, here, the social actors that MM uses are still Muslim women 
and men in general, in relation to “these laws” (line 40) (referring to Islamic family law), discussed 
during the Musawah gathering. MM foregrounds that there are “attempts to amend these laws to 
make them better for women” (line 40), presumably some women’s groups like Musawah are 
making those attempts. She employs the use of passive voice in “have thus far been derided as 
“changing God’s laws”” (lines 40-41). She hides the agent who describes the attempts of amending 
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the law, which is also an intertextuality since she uses a quotation in “changing God’s laws”, also 
from unknown agents. She uses another passive voice in “they were already amended” (lines 41-42), 
referring to the amendments made the laws by hidden agents. I could assume that the agents are 
some traditionalist Islamist scholars and organisations since they always object the progressive/new 
interpretation of Islamic texts.  
The efforts of the Musawah group to amend the laws and discuss the issues by meeting other 
scholars in the Musawah gathering in Malaysia drew many criticisms, especially from those Islamist 
scholars and other Islamic organizations. MM challenges “a discourse of injustice and inequality” as 
she claims the law amendments has brought upon injustice and inequality to women. She constructs 
the original laws as “just ones” (line 42) and the amended laws as “far less fair to women” (line 42). 
Furthermore, MM describes the women’s groups’ attempts to seek equality and justice is also 
described as “derided” (line 41), which suggests that their efforts are not approved or taken seriously, 
and their actions are even looked down with contempt by the critics.  
As in extract 4-10a where MM feels “privileged” to be a part of Musawah gathering, MM 
continues to be grateful here as well. Sentences in lines 43 and 48 are MM’s evaluative statement 
and she employs a lexical item “exhilarating” twice in both lines to suggest her feelings of being 
stimulated and enlightened by what she experienced at the gathering. MM positions the scholars 
from the Musawah gathering as “learned” (line 43) and implicitly positions those who changed the 
laws claimed to bring injustice as uneducated and ignorant. She contests those critics who said their 
attempts are “changing God’s laws” (line 39), which is an irony because the “learned scholars” from 
the Musawah gathering used an intertextual reference to the Quran (line 45) to affirm that “God does 
not discriminate between men and women” (lines 43-44). MM again draws on “a discourse of 
equality and justice” in the practice of Islam as the words from the Quran itself prevent women 
(including orphans) from being mistreated, and must be treated fairly (lines 46-47). 
Since Musawah is an international group, MM includes various anecdotes on Islamic law 
from countries such as Morocco, Turkey and Afghanistan. Scholars and activists from the Musawah 
meeting shared stories from their countries regarding their efforts to improve family laws to be 
“more just and equitable” (line 50). Writing about the Musawah gathering in her article is also 
another form of intertextuality. By illustrating other example from other Muslim countries, MM is 
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able to establish the legitimacy of her argument and also support the reinforcement of her claims on 
the loopholes in the Malaysian Islamic law. MM foregrounds the Moroccan family law which now 
recognizes marriage as “an equal partnership” (line 52), while in Turkey, “women are treated as 
equals” according to their secular law (line 55).  She also pinpoints that women in Afghanistan are 
given “the right to contract their own marriages” (lines 57-58). What MM is really emphasizing is 
that all these Muslim countries are able to achieve a level of equality in their laws but still adhere “to 
Islamic teachings” (line 60). Again, MM draws on “a discourse of equality and justice” and “a 
discourse of Islam as fair”. She asserts that the implementation of new laws in those countries is still 
within Islamic framework which has “no barrier to justice and equality” (line 61). MM not only 
celebrates the Islamic family laws stories from Morocco, Turkey and Afghanistan as successful but 
also draws on this exemplary stories to show that it is possible to have laws that is equal and just to 
women and men, according to Islamic realm, as she hopes for a similar approach to take place in 
Malaysia. 
In the final extract below, ZA offers an alternative discourse of the rights of citizens to speak 
out about injustices in society. She promotes the rights for all Muslims to talk about Islam especially 
concerning Muslim laws. The extract below is taken from the same column as extract 3-15 in 
Chapter Three. 
 
Extract 4-11: “Silence not the women” (#48) 
(ZA, The Star,  2009, July 5)  
16 But my serious answer is this: When Islam is used as a source of law and public  
17 policy, then everyone has the right to talk about the subject. Public law, public policy  
18 must by necessity be opened to public debate, and pass the test of public reason. 
19 If I am discriminated against, treated unjustly, fined, jailed, sentenced to death, or  
20 have my hands and feet cut off in the name of Islam, then of course I will speak out  
21 and protect my rights and my interests. Those who do not want anyone but the ulama  
22 to speak on Islam must realise that the only way to preserve the religion from public  
23 scrutiny is to take it out of the public sphere and keep it private between the believer  
24 and God. 
139 
 
25 But when you proclaim that Islam is a way of life, Islam is the solution, Islam has all  
26 the answers, you cannot then tell everyone who disagrees with you to shut up because  
27 only you will provide the answers. That is tantamount to totalitarian rule. 
28 Women’s groups demanding for equality and justice in Islam are not questioning the  
29 religion as revealed by God, but questioning the decision by those in authority, be it  
30 religious, political, or social, who adopt a position that discriminates against women,  
31 and then proclaim that their position is the one true Islam. 
 
To challenge the limitation of speech, ZA promotes that “everyone has the right to talk” (line 
17). She employs the first person pronouns “I” and “my” to declare her stand and uses a generic 
noun “everyone” to include the rest. She opposes the view that people should be silent just because 
they are not experts because Islam is “a source of law” (line 16) and a part of public law and public 
policy, therefore, everyone is entitled to be involved in public debates (lines 16-18). ZA employs a 
conditional “If” (line 19) as a presupposition of what she may do in any case of her being 
“discriminated against, treated unjustly, fined, jailed, sentenced to death…” (line 19). She 
presupposes with a strong modality that she “will speak out and protect” her rights and her interests 
(lines 20-21) thus promoting “a discourse of the rights to speak out”. In the conditional sentence, ZA 
also uses the passive voice and backgrounds the agents who may discriminate, treat her unjustly, fine, 
jail or sentence her to death, who may presumably be Muslim men in the authority. ZA empowers 
other discriminated citizens including herself to speak. For those who believe that only those with 
religious credentials have the rights to speak about Islam i.e. the ulama, ZA reconstructs a limitation 
on them to “keep it private between the believer and God” (lines 23-24) to avoid “public scrutiny” 
(lines 22-23) of the religion.   
Next, from lines 25 to 27, ZA uses the pronoun “you” to refer to some Islamists who are 
against her or SIS, which serves as a direct message to them, as if ZA is talking to them face to face. 
Here, she rejects “a discourse of everyone with no religious credentials must shut up” which in the 
example here, anyone who disagrees must shut up (lines 26-27). She positions people who “proclaim 
that Islam is a way of life, Islam is the solution and Islam has all the answers” (lines 25-26) as 
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authoritarianism because they do not allow others to say or question anything about Islam, and ZA 
likens the practice to “totalitarian rule” (line 27).  
She draws on “a discourse of equality and justice” by asserting the stand made by “women’s 
groups” of not “questioning the religion” (line 28) but instead they question the authority’s decision 
(line 29). ZA positions those in authority as contradicting themselves as they claim “their position is 
the one true Islam” (line 31) yet they “adopt a position that discriminates against women” (line 30). 
As she promotes the rights of everyone to have a voice, she also positions women in the women’s 
groups as powerful in defending their actions as not going against Islam, but their work is in the 
name of Islam. 
 
4.6 Summary 
 
Through the analysis of linguistic features of the newspaper columns, I showed how MM and ZA 
challenged the fundamentalist interpretation of Islamic law (syariah law), in which Islamic law is a 
separate law for Muslims in Malaysia. Various women’s groups in Malaysia have claimed that the 
implementation of syariah law in Malaysia is unfair and discriminating to women. MM and ZA 
indeed have made their columns as a platform to show their dissatisfaction in the execution of 
syariah law, especially when a few “discriminatory” amendments were made to the existing law.  
Both MM and ZA foregrounded the agents responsible for the amendments of IFL, “the 
government”, “the Parliament” and some ministries. They also compared two groups of social 
groups, Muslim women and non-Muslim women in Malaysia with regards to the family law. 
However, in certain extracts, they used passive voice and nominalization, a process of changing a verb 
to a noun. ZA used nominalization when she backgrounded the agents who permit early marriage in the 
word “denial” as the agents who deny children of their childhood and education were not named. She also 
employed nominalization when she backgrounded the agents who understand and interpret culture and 
religion. MM’s use of nominalization was seen when the agents who interpreted the religion were not 
mentioned. Intertextuality is another linguistic feature employed by MM and ZA, which is a 
reference drawn upon other texts, genres and discourses. MM used intertextual quotes and examples 
of family law in other Muslim countries. Both of them referred to the intertextuality of South African 
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“apartheid” to describe the dual judiciary systems in Malaysia for Muslims and non-Muslims, 
claimed as discriminatory for Muslim women. 
Both of the authors contested the dominant discourse of “inequality and injustice” in Islamic 
law, religious segregation faced by Muslim women in Malaysia and “inequality and injustice 
discourse” of child marriage. I also showed how both of them offered the alternative discourse of 
“equality and justice” in Islamic law. ZA also offered “a discourse of speaking out” in this chapter to 
challenge the Islamic law. 
With regards to men and women’s rights and Islamic Family Law (IFL), MM was seen 
challenging the amendments in the law as “flawed”, “unjust and discriminatory” to women. MM 
foregrounded the government and the ministries as the agents who passed the law with new 
amendments. She blamed the government and the ministries for not doing anything and causing 
Muslim women to be discriminated against, and positioned the NGOs as the women’s protectors. 
When MM brought up the contradiction of Islam as a just and equal religion, yet Islamic law is 
claimed to be the opposite, she could be suggesting that it is due to some people’s interpretation of 
the law, possibly the extremists.  
ZA challenged the injustice in the practice of Islamic law by bringing up the “discourses of 
humanity versus divinity”. She rejected the law as “divine” as she argued it is humans who 
interpreted the laws and carried out the implementation. ZA contested the “regressive discourse” and 
“a discourse of men as superior to women”. Because of the amendments in the law, Malaysian 
Muslim society was seen as regressing and women are thought of as inferior to men.  
I also explored how MM and ZA drew on “a discourse of religious segregation” when they 
compared separate laws involving Muslim and non-Muslim women in Malaysia. Both of them use 
the intertextuality of “apartheid” to describe the state of Malaysian Muslim women. They positioned 
Islamic authorities in the government as causing the religious segregation on Muslim and 
non-Muslim women. This is because they claimed the amendments in IFL are discriminatory to 
Muslim women as non-Muslims do not fall under the jurisdiction of Islamic law. As a result of the 
separate laws, MM positioned Muslim women as regressing as opposed to non-Muslims who are 
progressive. ZA highlighted the separate law for non-Muslims allowed non-Muslim women to gain 
equality and justice whereas she claimed Islamic law only brought inequality and injustice to Muslim 
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women. It was shown how both MM and ZA drew on “a discourse of religious parity” in promoting 
justice for Muslim men and women.  
Since many cases of child marriage among Muslims took place in Malaysia, I also examined 
MM’s and ZA’s columns on child marriage as it involves the law concerning legal age of marriage. 
ZA deconstructed child marriage as embodying “a discourse of Islamic fundamentalism” which 
historically and traditionally made child marriage a common practice, while MM deconstructed child 
marriage as discriminating to girls as child marriage usually affects girls rather than boys. Both 
writers challenged “a discourse of inequality and injustice” in child marriage since it denies young 
girls of education and could bring negative consequences to them. ZA challenged the claimed 
“divinity” of child marriage as she argued it is human construct rather than coming from God. Both 
MM and ZA questioned and rejected the legalization of child marriage. They urged the government 
and religious officials to take action to adopt “a discourse of equality and justice” for girls. 
In challenging the Islamic law in Malaysia, I showed how MM and ZA promoted “a 
discourse of equality and justice” in Islam. MM celebrated women and men who demanded a more 
equal and just law and were seen adamant in their demands. While ZA advocated for a female 
minister to make sure Muslim women get equal or similar rights to non-Muslims, MM supported 
another international women’s group called Musawah, which also worked on getting Islamic law to 
be more equal and just for Muslim women. As MM and ZA rejected the traditional and outdated 
Islamic practice, both of them promoted discourses of women and Islam as progressive. ZA 
empowered everyone in Malaysia especially Muslims to speak out as a means to protect their rights 
concerning the law and religion. 
In the following chapter, I explored how the two writers pursued their feminist agenda in an 
Islamic context in Malaysia. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Pursuing a feminist agenda within a Malaysian Islamic context 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
I apply the same format for analysis and use the same methodological framework as what I have 
done in the two previous analysis chapters. I attempt to look at linguistic features, actions and 
discursive strategies employed by both MM and ZA through micro and macro analysis to answer the 
research questions. Besides that, I also look at the MM’s and ZA’s positionings of themselves and 
others, as well as what they challenge or promote through dominant and alternative discourses.  
Most feminists have a common global agenda which is to eliminate gender gap and gender 
inequality in any society. In this chapter, through MM’s and ZA’s selected columns, I look at how 
both of them challenge the gender discrimination especially on Muslim women in Malaysia and 
criticisms on Sisters in Islam (SIS) by pursuing their feminist agenda in the Malaysian society which 
is predominantly a Muslim country. The pursuit of MM’s and ZA’s feminist agenda within an 
Islamic context in Malaysia is the theme for this chapter. I show how the two writers build their 
arguments in general and eventually include an Islamic context in seeking Islamic feminist agenda 
through their writings.  
Even though there are distinct Islamic women’s organizations in Malaysia, there are still 
many more Muslim women who do not belong to any official women’s groups. Whether Muslim 
women in Malaysia are associated with any religious groups or not, their identities as Malaysian 
Muslim women still receive constant public debates. This is because traditional and conservative 
Islamic groups seek to practice Islam in an all Islamic state, thus construct their identities based on 
Islamic fundamentalist discourse. On the other hand, there are some moderate women’s groups like 
SIS which adopt a more liberal approach to Islam since they strive to build a multi-ethnicities 
country that has various ethnic groups with different religions and cultures. The liberal approach is 
definitely different from the conservative point of view, thus it has resulted in criticisms and debates 
as well.  
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Both MM and ZA challenge the criticisms aimed at SIS and themselves personally, as well 
as at Muslim women in general. They also challenge the discourse of Islamic fundamentalism by 
promoting Islamic feminist discourse, and a discourse of equality and justice in Islam and Malaysian 
society. Their pursuits are unpacked in a few sections. 
 
5.2 “New” women today (ZA) 
 
MM and ZA pursue their feminist agenda involving Muslim women in Malaysian society by writing 
about new, liberated roles that Muslim women can play and position women as able to contribute to 
empower other women and obtain equality. Both of them also deconstruct and re-construct women’s 
new identities in various powerful ways. 
In extract 5-1a below, ZA defends the Sisters in Islam (SIS) group and its members’ 
identities, views and faith in Islam, as well as challenges injustice and discrimination in the 
implementation of Islamic laws. 
 
Extract 5-1a: “Let there be public debate on laws” (#1) 
(ZA, New Straits Times, 2006, March 24) 
 
24 For me and my group, Sisters in Islam, it is an article of faith that Islam is just and  
25 God is just. If justice is intrinsic to Islam, then how could injustice and discrimination  
26 result in the codification and implementation of laws and policies made in the name  
27 of Islam? 
28 It is at this level that Muslim women all over the world have begun to organise and  
29 demand reform of laws and policies to uphold the principles of justice, equality,  
30 freedom and dignity in Islam. 
31 For most Muslim women, rejecting religion is not an option. We are believers, and as  
32 believers we want to find liberation, truth and justice from within our own faith. We  
33 feel strongly that we have a right to reclaim our religion, to redefine it, to participate  
34 and contribute to an understanding of Islam, how it is codified and implemented — in  
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35 ways that take into consideration the realities and experience of women's lives today. 
 
The group “Sisters in Islam” (SIS) (line 24) is mentioned for the first time in extract 5-1a. 
ZA constructs her faith and SIS’s faith by saying “Islam is just and God is just” (lines 24-5), which 
draws on “a discourse of religious parity”.  ZA does not include specific names for social actors here. 
She only uses nouns and pronouns to refer to women. As indicated by her use of the inclusive 
pronoun, “we” (lines 31-32), ZA is not just positioning herself here, but is also referring to in-group 
members. She positions Muslim women as “believers” (repeated several times in line 31, line 32, 
5-1b: line 47) which constructs these women as faithful believers in the religion and as living 
according to Islamic ways. ZA emphasizes that “rejecting religion is not an option” (line 31) for them.  
The importance that ZA gives to the idea that SIS members are believers in Islam and her argument 
that the SIS movement aims to be acceptable within Malaysian Muslim society functions to establish 
reliability. She constructs the women members of SIS not to be taken as renegade or as infidels 
working against the Islamic framework, but as Muslim insiders and believers. 
ZA juxtaposes the competing discourses of “equality and justice discourse” with “inequality and 
injustice discourse” in this extract.  She highlights the contradiction between the “intrinsic” (line 25) 
value of Islam in upholding “justice” (line 25) and the “injustice and discrimination… [resulting in]… the 
codification and implementation of laws and policies made in the name of Islam” (line 25-7).  
ZA draws on “a discourse of Muslim women’s solidarity” here but she not only refers to 
Muslim women’s solidarity in Malaysia, but also to “Muslim women all over the world” (line 28). She 
celebrates these women upholding “the principles of justice, equality, freedom and dignity in Islam” (lines 
29-30).  ZA positions them as progressive and courageous to “organise and demand reform of laws and 
policies” (lines 28-9) in Islam. “A discourse of female solidarity” is addressed further in sections 5.3 
and 5.4. 
By drawing on “a discourse of ‘new’/liberated women today”, ZA celebrates progressive 
women’s will “to find liberation, truth and justice from within our own faith” (line 32). Again, ZA suggests 
that women interpret their “own faith” based on their own interpretation of Islam. She positions herself 
and other Muslim women in feeling “strongly” about their right to “reclaim” and “redefine” their 
religion (lines 33-4). As ZA rejects the patriarchal construction of Muslim women, she draws on “a ‘new’ 
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Muslim women today discourse” as educated, brave, and unwilling to accept the “so-called-facts” about 
religion based on outdated patriarchal interpretations. 
In extract 5-1b below, ZA continues to pursue her feminist agenda by empowering Muslim 
women with new positionings.  
 
Extract 5-1b: “Let there be public debate on laws” (#1) 
(ZA, New Straits Times,  2006, March 24) 
 
36 For many women today, our lives are at a collision course with patriarchy's  
37 construction of the "ideal" Muslim woman. For too long, men have defined for us  
38 what it is to be a woman, how to be a woman and then used religion and tradition to  
39 confine us to these socially constructed limitations that reduce us to being the inferior  
40 half of the human race. For too long, we submitted, seeking their approval and  
41 applause because the power of reward and punishment lay in their hands. 
42 But not anymore. Women today are educated and economically independent. They  
43 will not be cowed into silence in the face of injustice. If the injustice is committed in  
44 the name of religion, then today's women will go back to the original source of the  
45 religion to find out for themselves whether it is the revealed text that perpetrates  
46 injustice or is it an act of interpretation by human beings. 
47 For those of us in civil society, as feminists, as believers and as activists living within  
48 a democratic constitutional framework, it is important that we assert and claim our  
49 right to have our voice heard in the public sphere and to intervene in the decision- 
50 making process on matters of religion. 
 
Here ZA talks about how men who dominate the society have tried to disempower women 
today. The occurrence of the term “Muslim women” (5-1a: line 28, 5-1b: line 31, line 37) reappears 
in this extract. ZA contests the “ideal” Muslim woman’s construction by men with patriarchal values (line 
37). She positions men as “controlling” when they preach “what it is to be a woman” and “how to be a 
woman” (line 38). She also constructs such men as using “religion and tradition to confine” women (lines 
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38-9). Also, she claims that these men mix “religion and tradition” as a pretext to create “limitations” (line 
39) for women, which she implies is not religion-based but potentially “socially constructed” (line 39). 
These “limitations” (line 39) have resulted in women being “the inferior half of the human race” (lines 39-40). 
The lexical items “confine”, “limitations” and “reduce” index negative connotations which diminish 
women’s worth based on men’s attempts to exert control over women. ZA also challenges women’s 
acceptance of the patriarchal construction of ‘ideal’ Muslim women “for too long” (line 40) as she contests 
the idea of women as submissive (line 40) and even “seeking their [father’s/husband’s] approval and 
applause” (lines 40-1). She contests the position of Muslim men as powerful and formidable since “the 
power of reward and punishment lay in their hands” (line 41) so some women perceive how to behave or act 
based on the approval of men. 
In line 42, ZA changes course, making a shift from talking about an older social worldview 
to a ‘new’ Muslim women’s identity today, using “But not anymore” (line 42). The phrase “women 
today” reoccurs several times (5-1a: line 35, line 36, line 42, line 44) drawing on “new women 
discourse”. Intersecting with this, ZA also constructs women’s beliefs and understanding of Islam today 
in a progressive manner. Similar to MM, ZA positions women today as “educated and economically 
independent” (line 42). ZA celebrates the new position of educated and economically independent 
women as not being easily “cowed into silence” (line 43).     
Referring to injustice “committed in the name of religion” (lines 43-4), ZA positions “today’s 
women” as being knowledgeable enough to be able to refer themselves to “the original source of the 
religion” (lines 44-5), the Quran. ZA positions educated women today as being able to differentiate 
whether “the revealed text [the Quran] perpetrates injustice” (line 45) or whether “is it an [biased] act of 
interpretation by human beings” (line 46).  
ZA constructs other Malaysian Muslim women as “feminists,” “believers” and “activists” 
(line 47) and as in-group members who may share similar knowledge, beliefs and values. ZA is 
making the claim here that it is important for women, as citizens within a democratic constitutional 
framework of Malaysia, to speak out and to contribute to decision making, especially on matters of 
religion that directly affect them; women should “assert and claim…[the] right…[for their] voice[s to 
be] heard in the public sphere” (line 47-50). 
Extract 5-2 below is taken from the article “Unjust and unnecessary” which is also analysed 
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in Chapter Four. In this article, ZA talks about a female minister, Datuk Seri Shahrizat Jalil (referred 
to as Shahrizat for short), who was appointed as the Prime Minister’s Special Adviser for Muslim 
Women and Social Development Affairs in the Malaysian government. ZA talks about the role of 
Muslim women by relating to Shahrizat’s appointment as a minister. She celebrates another woman’s 
high position in the government, which is in line with her feminist pursuit to involve more women in 
higher positions. 
 
Extract 5-2: “Unjust and unnecessary” (#39) 
(ZA, The Star,  2008, July 6) 
 
25 Moreover, Shahrizat is taking on this special task at a time when there is greater  
26 awareness throughout the Muslim world that the problem is not with Islam, but with  
27 patriarchal Muslims who hide behind the sanctity of the divine message to perpetuate  
28 men’s perceived superiority over women. The game is up as Muslim women today  
29 have not just studied the religion for themselves, but are organising and networking  
30 across geographical boundaries, to demand equality and justice and an end to the use  
31 of Islam to perpetuate discrimination against women. 
 
In this extract, ZA foregrounds the identity of a social actor, Shahrizat. It is uncommon for Malaysian 
women to become a minister so Shahrizat’s appointment is a significant event. Besides the generic social 
actors, ZA uses a specific noun “patriarchal Muslims” (line 27) to refer to some Muslim men. Even though 
ZA talks about Shahrizat, she also makes a reference to “the Muslim world” (line 26) to emphasize that 
inequality and injustice Muslim women are facing are global problems.  
ZA draws on “a discourse of women as leaders” and supports the appointment of Shahrizat as a 
minister as it signifies one step closer to equality for women’s place in the governmental position, as 
demanded by Malaysian women’s groups. She believes that Shahrizat’s appointment is timely and 
appropriate with the global awareness on discrimination against Muslim women which is receiving a lot of 
attention, which she acknowledges that “the problem is not with Islam, but with patriarchal Muslims” 
(lines 26-27). 
149 
 
Again, “a discourse of divinity” resurfaces as ZA challenges “a discourse of Islam as divine 
law of God”. She claims that the interpretation of Islam now is “human construct”. ZA positions 
patriarchal Muslims as hiding behind the “sanctity of the divine message” (line 27) and thus she 
rejects “a discourse of patriarchal Islam”. She also contests “a discourse of Muslim men as superior 
to Muslim women” in which she positions the patriarchal Muslims as those who “perceived 
superiority over women” based on their interpretation of the divine law (lines 27-28). 
ZA pursues her feminist agenda by drawing on “a discourse of “new” Muslim women 
today” (line 28) to challenge the dominant discourses adopted by patriarchal Muslims. She positions 
Muslims women today as educated when it comes to ending discrimination against women as they 
are now able to study “the religion for themselves” (line 29) which is important to understand 
Islamic law and interpretation of religious texts. She also positions Muslim women today as 
independent and again, draws on “a discourse of female solidarity” as they are now able to organise 
and network “across geographical boundaries” (line 30) to connect with Muslim women from other 
Islamic countries in their search for equality and justice.  
 
5.3 “New” women today (MM) 
 
In extract 5-3 below MM narrates a past event involving herself and two other women who 
are all daughters of previous prime ministers. The women are Hanis Hussein, the daughter of 
Hussein Onn, the third Malaysian prime minister, and Nori Abdullah who is the daughter of 
Malaysian fifth prime minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. MM addresses them as Hanis and Nori in 
the extract, but I used the initials HN for Hanis and NR for Nori in the analysis. They got together for 
a public discussion during the Sisters in Islam International Consultation on Trends in Family Law 
Reform in Muslim Countries in 2006. 
 
Extract 5-3: “A first for women” (#25) 
(MM, The Star, 2006, March 22)  
 
26 As someone who has been publicly castigated for being “ignorant” and a  
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27 “bad Muslim”, I have some experience in taking these sorts of public stands and  
28 exposing myself to pretty violent negative reactions. Hanis had none while Nori has  
29 some. It therefore involves a lot of personal risk to do this, especially if you’re  
30 basically a gentle soul who would never hurt a fly – like Hanis – or someone young,  
31 like Nori. I would therefore like to personally congratulate both my sisters for their  
32 enormous courage and thank them for their solidarity with their many less  
33 privileged sisters in this country. 
[…] 
43 But times are a-changing. Along with the continuing progress of women in our  
44 country, personal laws notwithstanding, comes greater awareness that women’s  
45 issues are hidden away only at great cost to society. Therefore it is no wonder that  
46 the daughters of leaders have also become more educated, and, having been brought  
47 up with the right values at home, cannot and will not keep quiet.  
[…] 
54 I think the wish of all three of us was that with this significant act, we give our  
55 sisters who are suffering injustices in this country hope. We would like them to  
56 know that they are not alone, that they have in us champions who empathise with  
57 them and who are willing to fight for their rights. We believe that as women who  
58 have positions of privilege, we have an enormous capacity and a responsibility to  
59 bring attention to issues that affect women in this country. Furthermore, as women  
60 who believe in the inherently just spirit of our faith, one in which the Almighty  
61 explicitly states that men and women are equal, it is therefore our duty to not keep  
62 silent.  
 
Similar to how ZA contests women’s ideal construction by men in extract 5-1b, “a discourse 
of bad Muslim women” is seen above when MM relates how she has been positioned as ‘bad’ with 
adjectives like “ignorant” and a “bad Muslim” (lines 26-27). MM uses the expression “publicly 
castigated” (line 26) to position herself as a victim. MM deconstructs this victimization by drawing 
on “a discourse of educated women” where she re-constructs herself as having “experience” [of 
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social criticism] (line 27) and states that she is ready to expose herself “to pretty violent negative 
reactions” (line 28).  
Besides herself, MM includes discussion of HN and NR in this extract, who, like her, are 
also daughters of previous Malaysian prime ministers. MM admits that it “involves a lot of personal 
risk to do this” (line 29). “This” (line 29) refers to a public event attended by the three prime 
minister’s daughters on the issue of equality for Muslim women that took place shortly before this 
extract was written. MM positions both HN and NR as somewhat naïve, compared to her, in terms of 
speaking out about women’s rights. MM positions HN as “a gentle soul who would never hurt a fly” 
(line 30) and she positions NR as “someone young” (line 30).  Besides HN and NR, MM also 
brings in other female actors as “less privileged sisters” (lines 32-33), referring to other Muslim 
women who might be more victimized and unable to speak out for themselves. 
MM draws on “a discourse of female solidarity” by referring to HN and NR as ‘sisters’ (line 
31) and congratulates (line 31) and thanks them for “their enormous courage” (line 32) and “their 
solidarity” (line 32). Afterwards, she draws on “a discourse of women as progressive” and positions 
women with new identities of “continuing progress” on the grounds that “times are a-changing” (line 
43).  MM also positions women today as more aware of women’s issues which she claims to be 
“hidden away only at great cost to society” (44-45). She also draws on “a discourse of educated 
women” where she positions herself and other “daughters of leaders” (line 45) as “educated” (lines 
45-46) and as people who were brought up with “the right values at home” (lines 46). MM uses 
negative modality “cannot and will not keep quiet” (line 47) to emphatically create solidarity 
between herself and the other daughters of leaders in their shared determination and promise to speak 
out for the other “less privileged sisters”. 
When MM talks about herself and the other two women above, she uses “we”, “us” and 
“our” repeatedly. The inclusive pronouns “we”, “us”, “our”, and even “I” function as in-group 
membership markers -- women who share the same beliefs, values or knowledge. MM uses the noun 
“sisters” frequently to refer to both groups of Muslim women: the more privileged in-group 
including herself and two other women (HN and NR) (“both my sisters”: line 31); and also the 
out-group Muslim women who are “less privileged sisters” (lines 32-33) and “our sisters who are 
suffering injustices” (lines 54-55). For the other female actors; MM uses the pronouns “they”, 
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“them” and “their” several times to refer to the less-privileged “sisters”. “A female solidarity 
discourse” appears again when MM positions the “daughters of leaders” or “we”, the in-group 
members, as “champions” (line 56) to assist the other less privileged “sisters” or “they”, the 
out-group members, although she speaks of them fondly, taking up a position like a ‘big-sister’. The 
lexeme “sisters” acts as an important keyword to index “a female solidarity discourse” among 
Muslim women. MM intertextually draws on the Muslim notion that “all Muslims are 
brothers/sisters” even though there is no actual blood relationship among them. By utilizing the word 
“sisters”, MM constructs solidarity for readers to relate to and in so doing she constructs a special 
symbolic bond to unite Muslim women.  
MM also draws on “a discourse of female solidarity” and “a discourse of champions or 
leaders” in the wish shared by herself and the other daughters of previous leaders to protect other 
Muslim women. They want to give “hope” (line 55) to women who are victims of injustice. As 
“champions” (line 56), MM tries to reassure the out-group that they will never be “alone” (line 56) as 
her in-group will always be around to protect them. The daughters’ “wish” also includes being able 
to “empathise with them” (lines 56-57) and MM pledges that they are “willing to fight for the rights” 
(line 57) of the less privileged. MM positions the daughters of prime ministers as capable of leading 
since they have not only education, but also experience. 
Regarding the “less privileged” group, MM positions herself, HN and NR as being in 
“positions of privilege” (line 58), drawing on a new progressive discourse of “Muslim women 
today”. She also positions these daughters as powerful because they have “an enormous capacity” 
(line 58) in them to speak for women. To protect other women, she positions the daughters of leaders 
as being accountable to others in that they have to accept their “responsibility to bring attention to 
issues that affect women in this country” (lines 58-59). MM also puts herself and the other daughters 
in a position to take the responsibility to be spokeswomen for others: “it is our duty to not keep 
silent” (lines 61-62).  Hence, MM challenges people who try to position Muslim women as 
powerless and instead re-positions them as powerful.  
It is important to note that MM constructs her own interpretation of “the Almighty” (line 60) 
and understanding of Islam. “A discourse of equality and justice” re-emerges here when MM 
intertextually quotes the Quran in saying “the Almighty explicitly states that men and women are 
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equal” (line 61). MM uses the “discourse of new Muslim women today”, which she connects with 
the “equality and justice discourse” as seen when she positions all three of them as believing “in the 
inherently just spirit of our faith” (line 60).  
Next, in extract 5-4 below, MM talks about what she found out after attending a workshop 
by two female Indonesian Islamic scholars while at the same time uncovers the issue of fatwa 
(religious edicts), issues that are not mentioned in the Quran, religious credentials and criticisms that 
she often receives. 
 
Extract 5-4: “Energised and empowered” (#88) 
(MM, The Star, 2008, November 5)  
 
6 These two women undoubtedly had all the religious educational credentials. They  
7 knew their Quran and hadiths thoroughly. 
8 But what was different was that they were able to apply their knowledge to real-life  
9 situations and were able to see how misinterpretations can lead to injustices, the  
10 very opposite of what Islam intends. 
11 In the course of the workshop, they were asked about the frequent criticism thrown  
12 at people like me who are critical of religious scholars who pronounce unjust edicts.  
13 Apparently, I am not allowed to criticize because I never studied at a religious  
14 institution, am female and don’t cover my head. 
15 The two women scholars had a very simple answer to that: even if we don’t have all  
16 the knowledge, we still have a conscience. So if something feels wrong, it probably  
17 is. 
18 We are all given a conscience which acts like an internal compass, which tells us  
19 what is right and what is wrong. Regardless of what religion we profess, our  
20 conscience tells us the same things. This is why nobody can say that killing is ever  
21 right, for instance. 
22 Thus, when certain people claim that women hold a lesser position in the eyes of  
23 God, you know in your heart that that cannot be right. 
154 
 
 
In extract 5-4, MM employs two unnamed Muslim women scholars as her social actors. She 
also includes herself in her column seen in her use of the first person pronouns such as “I”, “me” and 
“my”. From lines 6 to 11, she makes uses of the pronouns “they” and “their” to refer to the women 
scholars. However, she changes to use the inclusive pronouns “we”, “us” and “our” in lines 15 to 20 
to connect the two women scholars with other Muslim women, creating an in-group with similar 
beliefs and values. The use of the pronoun “you” and “your” in line 23 suggests MM’s attempt to 
appeal to the audience directly. 
To deconstruct Islamic fundamentalist discourse, MM draws the attention to the two female 
Indonesian Islamic scholars as a distinction to herself who does not have any religious credentials. 
She positions these women scholars as “undoubtedly had all the religious educational credentials” 
(line 6).  Here, MM draws on “a discourse of Muslim women as educated” as she also positions 
these two women as knowledgeable and qualified since they “knew their Quran and hadiths 
thoroughly” (lines 6-7), using Muslim holy texts as points of reference. Not only that, MM positions 
these two female scholars as “different” from the other religious scholars as they had the ability to 
understand “how misinterpretations can lead to injustice” (lines 8-9). These are new identities for 
Muslim women as they are also capable of attaining knowledge to become experts about the 
religion.  
MM challenges “a discourse of Muslim women as silent” and “a discourse of injustice and 
inequality” when she discloses the criticisms aimed at some people, including herself. She positions 
herself and others who are like her as “critical of religious scholars who pronounce unjust edicts” 
(line 12). At the same time, she positions some religious scholars as being unjust in declaring “unjust 
edicts” (line 12) or fatwas regarding certain issues. In line 13, “I am not allowed to criticize”, MM 
does not provide the agent who does not allow her to criticize. However, I can imply that the hidden 
agents can be referred to some religious scholars who adopt Islamic fundamentalist approach and 
some scholars whom she positions as not being fair. Again, she positions herself as a victim when 
she speaks about the reasons why some people, whom I assume are those religious scholars or critics, 
do not allow her to criticize fundamentalist understanding of Islam. The reasons were because she 
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has not “studied at a religious institution”, she is “female” and she does not “cover her head” (lines 
13-14). 
In this extract, MM relates the question to which the female scholars were asked about 
criticisms that people like her always gets. While most Islamist scholars mostly believe in having 
proper education to obtain knowledge about Islam, these two scholars believe that people without 
religious knowledge can still rely on their “conscience” on something that feels wrong (lines 15-17). 
Here, MM draws on “a discourse of citizens to speak out about injustice in society”. She argues that 
regardless of religion, everyone has conscience that can tell “what is right and what is wrong” (lines 
18-19). Here, she is referring to injustice to Muslim women in Malaysia regarding human 
interpretation of the Islam that put women in an unequal position or “lesser position in the eyes of 
God” (lines 22-23). Drawing on her own conscience, MM contests the notion put forth by Islamic 
fundamentalist discourse that women should receive different status or rights from men.  
 
5.4 Female solidarity (ZA) 
 
MM’s and ZA’s pursuit of a feminist agenda is to challenge men’s construction of women in a weak 
and powerless position by seeking solidarity among other women: Malaysian Muslim women and 
women from other faiths. 
In extract 5-5 below, ZA promotes “a discourse of Muslim women’s solidarity” and also 
celebrates things she is proud of about Malaysia. This extract also includes the hope she has that her 
country will be able to attain justice for Muslim women. 
 
Extract 5-5: “How much I love thee, Malaysia” (#12) 
(ZA, New Straits Times, 2006, August, 25)  
59 I am proud that as a Malaysian Muslim feminist, I see no contradiction between my  
60 religion and my feminism; and that my fellow Malaysian feminists of other faiths see  
61 no problems joining hands in a common struggle for justice with a group like Sisters  
62 in Islam. My Muslim friends from the Middle East and other South Asian countries  
63 are puzzled at how we can work together and even socialise together, when in their  
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64 countries rights-based groups don't engage with religion at all, let alone join hands  
65 with groups that work within the religious framework. 
[…] 
73 I am proud that it is my Malaysian friends of other faiths who have defended and  
74 promoted the work of Sisters in Islam to Muslims from other Muslim countries, that it  
75 is possible to find justice and liberation within Islam. I am proud that in my travels to  
76 developing countries, whether in Southeast Asia, Africa or the Middle East, people I  
77 have met were keen to know more about Malaysia and how we did it— the political  
78 peace and stability, the growth and development, the affirmative act in policy, the low  
79 poverty rate, the First World facilities, the independent foreign policy, the existence  
80 of a group like Sisters in Islam. 
 
There are specific social actors used by ZA in this extract: “Malaysian Muslim feminist”, 
“Malaysian feminists of other faiths”, “Muslim friends” and “Malaysian friends of other faiths”. She also 
combines both the Malaysian context with the global context when she includes references to places such as 
“the Middle East and other South Asian countries”, “Muslim countries” and “Southeast Asia, Africa or the 
Middle East”. 
ZA draws on “a proud citizen discourse” in this extract which is also apparent from her 
choice of the title “How much I love thee, Malaysia”. The phrase “I am proud” is repeated three 
times (lines 59, 73 and 75). ZA’s pursuit of her feminist agenda is evident as she is proud to position 
herself powerfully as a “Malaysian Muslim feminist” (line 59) which is indicative of her advocacy 
for Muslim women’s rights. ZA uses a lot of first person pronouns such as “I” and “my” to draw 
attention to her own identity positioning. ZA displays her pride as she reconstructs her “religion” 
(line 60) and her “feminism” (line 60) as not being in contradiction to each other. She draws on the 
public debate challenging the separation of religious and feminist values. She contests the notion that 
the feminist agenda should be kept totally “secular” and not as something that should be accepted in 
Islam.  
ZA draws on “a proud citizen discourse” again when she celebrates how “friends of other 
faiths… have defended and promoted the work of Sisters in Islam to Muslims from other Muslim countries” 
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(lines 73-74). She forms solidarity with “friends of other faiths” as she sees them as helping to 
promote SIS in Malaysia to Muslims from other countries as progressive Muslims.  ZA positions herself 
as “proud” (line 75) of Malaysia as being successful, stable, developed, as well as socially 
progressive (lines 77-79), again drawing on “a proud citizen discourse”. She includes “the existence 
of a group like Sisters in Islam” (line 80) as another positive aspect of her country. She is implying 
that, because on a global scale, her country is a forerunner in economic, political and social issues, 
she both loves and trusts, and at the same beckons her country to insure justice for women alongside 
men. 
ZA also draws on “a discourse of female solidarity” when she brings in her group, “Sisters in 
Islam” (lines 61-62) to depict SIS’s relationship with Malaysian women of other faiths. She acknowledges 
and celebrates “Malaysian feminists of other faiths” (line 60) who have “no problems joining hands in a 
common struggle for justice” (line 62) with SIS. ZA shares a commonality with these women of other 
faiths and draws on “a female solidarity discourse” in which she positions them as “fellow … feminists” 
(line 60). 
“A discourse of female solidarity” is also seen when ZA positions her “Muslim friends from 
the Middle East and other South Asian countries” (line 62) as “puzzled” about the gap between the social 
development of their countries compared to the progressive situation in Malaysia. She draws the 
attention to the differences between SIS and other Muslim countries. SIS is a member of Joint Action 
Group for Gender Equality (JAG) in which SIS collaborates with various women’s NGO groups on 
gender equality. She compares how, in contrast to Malaysia, “rights-based groups” (line 64) in “the 
Middle East and other South Asian countries” “don't engage with religion at all” (line 64) or support “groups 
that work within the religious framework” (line 65). ZA also draws on “a discourse of justice” in Islam, and 
incorporates “a discourse of liberation” as she explicitly states that it is possible to achieve “justice and 
liberation within Islam” (lines 74-75).  
In the next extract, ZA promotes “a discourse of female solidarity” through her experience of 
attending a conference in the US called Women’s Islamic Initiative in Spirituality and Equality 
(WISE). She shares her views and her positionings of Muslim women whom she met or saw there. 
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Extract 5-6a: “Women wise up to their rights” (#20) 
(ZA, New Straits Times, 2006, December 15) 
 
35 This New York meeting was not a full Beijing event, but it came close in terms of  
36 spirit and energy. A dazzling array of accomplished Muslim women took the stage,  
37 discussing with knowledge, confidence and eloquence a range of issues that included  
38 women in politics, in spirituality, in faith-fuelled activism, women interpreting the  
39 Quran and fiqh, women fighting for social justice, and women using the arts to bring  
40 change. And they were all Muslim. 
41 Confident young women who did not make it on stage, stood in line to share their  
42 experiences, their initiatives, their struggles for justice or to ask questions and give  
43 their views. I was energised. Here was a public gathering that was breaking the  
44 Western stereotype of the oppressed, voiceless and downtrodden lot of the Muslim  
45 woman. We all knew we were not alone in demanding to be treated as human beings  
46 of equal worth and dignity. If only we could get the many powerful Muslim men who  
47 see us as a threat to see reason and recognise reality. 
 
In this extract, ZA does not include a Malaysian context specifically but she make a 
connection of the story of other Muslim women to Muslim women in Malaysia. There are three 
groups of “Muslim women” as social actors whom ZA talks about: women who presented at the 
WISE conference in the US, women who were the audience at the conference, and Muslim women 
in general. ZA also draws on the discourse of “new” Muslim women and her feminist agenda is seen 
as she empowers Muslim women, especially Malaysian Muslim women, by acknowledging new 
roles that Muslim women all over the world have accomplished.  
First of all, she talks about experienced, older Muslim women who gave the talk at the 
conference by drawing on the discourse of “new” Muslim women as educated and experienced. ZA 
positions these women as “accomplished women” (line 36) who undoubtedly have a lot experiences, 
and came from various backgrounds such as politics, spirituality, faith-fuelled activism, as well as 
women who are interpreting the Quran and religious texts, fighting for social justice, and using the 
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arts to bring change (lines 38-40). She positions them as the accomplished Muslim women as they 
displayed “knowledge, confidence and eloquence” (line 37) in the discussion of various issues 
related to Muslim women. She speaks about them with pride because they are not just any women, 
but specifically Muslim women (line 40).  
 Next, ZA turns the attention to other least experienced women who were mostly young 
audience at the conference. She also draws on the discourse of “new” Muslim women when she 
talks about young women here. ZA positions them as the “confident young women” (line 41) who 
were also taking active part at the conference. She empowers other young Muslim women to be 
confident and active like how these young women ask questions and shared their experiences, 
struggles, views regarding justice in Islam (lines 41-43).   
 When ZA compares the young and elder Muslim women in this extract, she contests how the 
West constructs stereotypical images of Muslim women as “oppressed, voiceless and downtrodden” 
(line 44). ZA does not foreground the social actors who produce the “Western stereotype”, however, 
this dominant discourse is drawn by many in the West that Muslim women are oppressed (Bullock 
& Jafri, 2000; Mishra, 2007). Instead, she celebrates the WISE conference as responsible to break 
the “Western stereotype” and able to empower young and elder Muslim women to voice opinions 
and take control of what they believe to fight injustice. She then continues to include other Muslim 
women in general, not just those who were present at the conference when she starts using the 
inclusive pronoun “we” in line 45. Because many women were present during the gathering, ZA 
draws on the discourse of female solidarity by positioning Muslim women at the conference as 
champions to reach other Muslim women, not just from Malaysia. She draws on the discourse of 
Muslim women as equal to Muslim men and thus she empowers Muslim women by relating that 
they are not alone in their quest “to be treated as human beings of equal worth and dignity” (lines 
45-46). However, the use of the inclusive pronouns “we” and “us” in lines 46 and 47 may refer to 
Islamic feminists including SIS members in Malaysia. ZA positions many Muslim men as 
“powerful” (line 46) and relates how women are positioned as a “threat” by those powerful Muslim 
men and wishes that those men could “see reason and recognise reality” in what the Muslim women 
are fighting about (lines 46-47).  
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 In the next extract, ZA elaborates more about what came out of the WISE conference. Her 
feminist agenda is explicit here, specifically the discourse of Islamic feminism.  
 
Extract 5-6b: “Women wise up to their rights” (#20b) 
(ZA, New Straits Times, 2006, December 15) 
 
50 What came out thunderingly clear at the WISE conference was the faith of Muslim  
51 women, young and old, in an Islam that is just and liberating. That there is no  
52 contradiction between faith and feminism. 
53 Initiated by Daisy Khan of the ASMA Society (American Society for Muslim  
54 Advancement), WISE aimed for four ambitious outcomes: An International Advisory  
55 Council for Women to take positions on gender and social justice issues of concern to  
56 Muslim women globally; a Global Muslim Women’s Fund; a network of Muslim  
57 women leaders; and a long-term initiative to support the growth of distinguished  
58 Muslim women mufti. 
59 The details remain to be worked out, but the participants engaged seriously in  
60 defining the scope and function of such a Council and the Muslim Women’s Fund.  
61 The network of Muslim women leaders already exists and is fast growing and a  
62 handful of Muslim women mufti and assistant mufti have already been appointed in  
63 Syria, Turkey and in Hyderabad, India. The big challenge remains on how to multiply  
64 the numbers and to enable their voices to make a difference. 
65 Nothing is more powerful than an idea whose time has come. All over the world,  
66 Muslim women are organising and standing up for their rights. Yes, they would be  
67 surrounded by men who will riot and burn halls, or threaten to do so, yes, they would  
68 be condemned as murtad, anti-God and anti-Syariah, some would even be killed, but  
69 Muslim women will not be silenced and be unseen anymore in their demand for  
70 justice. 
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Besides “Muslim women” as mentioned in extract 5-1a earlier, ZA adds more social actors 
in this extract using classified specific nouns in “Muslim women mufti” (line 58), “Muslim women 
mufti and assistant mufti” (line 62) and “Muslim women leaders” (line 57, 61). However, ZA still 
refers to the global context as she includes other Muslim countries in this extract, such as Syria, 
Turkey and India. She also includes a few international associations that are linked to Muslim 
women and gender issues, such as American Society for Muslim Advancement (ASMA Society) 
(lines 53-54), International Advisory Council for Women (lines 54-55) and Global Muslim 
Women’s Fund (line 56).  
ZA employs the passive voice a few times in this extract: “a handful of Muslim women 
mufti and assistant mufti have already been appointed” (lines 62-63), “they would be condemned” 
(lines 67-68), “some would even be killed, but Muslim women will not be silenced” (lines 68-69). 
ZA backgrounds the agents but they can be inferred as Muslim men. However, in “they would be 
surrounded by men who will riot and burn halls, or threaten to do so” (lines 66-67), ZA foregrounds 
the agent as “men” and she also positions them as having the tendency to act violently. She also 
employs two types of modals here, “will” and “would”. While she uses “would” to show the 
possibilities of how men treats women, she uses “will” to display higher, more definite possibilities 
of different positionings of women and men: “women will not be silenced” and “men who will riot 
and burn halls” 
“A discourse of equality and justice” also reoccurs when ZA celebrates the “faith of Muslim 
women” in a “just and liberating” Islam (lines 50-51). Again, she includes both “young and old” 
women (line 51) who attended the conference to show that the women are united and that the 
women’s beliefs are the same. ZA displays her feminist agenda by promoting “a discourse of Islamic 
feminism” which can be seen in the sentence “there is no contradiction between faith and feminism” 
(lines 51-52). ZA uses a similar sentence before in extract 5-5, “I see no contradiction between my 
religion and my feminism” (lines 59-60). Here she still promotes that there is no separation in 
religious and feminist values as opposed to what the critics have condemned about the discourse of 
Islamic feminism, which have also challenged the movement of Islamic feminist groups. 
 ZA also celebrates the outcomes of WISE conference, which includes various initiatives by 
the ASMA Society to improve issues related to gender and equality for Muslim women. Besides the 
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“new” identities of Muslim women mentioned in the extract 5-1a, she also draws on “a discourse of 
Muslim women as leaders” when she positions Muslim women as “Muslim women leaders”, 
“Muslim women mufti and assistant mufti” (lines 61-62) from other countries and empowers others, 
especially Muslim women in Malaysia to emulate the same positions and identities.  In this extract, 
again, ZA draws on “a discourse of female solidarity” as she celebrates Muslim women from all 
over the world who are “organising and standing up for their rights” (lines 65-66).  She positions 
men who condemn Islamic feminists as conservative Islamists as they have the predisposition to 
“riot and burn halls, or threaten to do so” (line 67). ZA contests some men’s positionings of Islamic 
feminists as “murtad, anti-God and anti-Syariah” (line 68) and also rejects the discourse of Muslim 
women as silent or unseen (line 69). Instead, in search for justice and equality in Islam so that they 
“will not be silenced and be unseen anymore” (lines 69-70), she empowers Muslim women to stand 
up for their rights and have their voice heard. 
From extract 4-10a in Chapter Four, I analysed the data from MM’s column, “Great to be 
making history” about a gathering with an international Islamic feminist group called Musawah. In 
extract 5-7 below, ZA also celebrates “a discourse of female solidarity” with Musawah members. As 
the Director of Musawah herself, she promotes the endeavor of Musawah in obtaining equality and 
justice in Islam as well as their role in empowering Muslim women. 
 
Extract 5-7: “Neither alien nor a threat” (#46) 
(ZA, The Star, 2009, February 1) 
 
8 It is a love for Islam, a belief that equality and justice are Islamic values and a burning  
9 desire to make our faith meaningful to the realities of our lives that brought many of  
10 these activists and scholars together to be a part of Musawah, a global movement for  
11 equality and justice in the Muslim family. 
[…] 
16 The over 180 activists at Musawah who work with Muslim women at the grassroots  
17 level know what it is to suffer discrimination, pain and injustice, justified in the name  
18 of religion and to be told to shut up because they have no authority to speak on Islam. 
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[…] 
55 There is already a “paradigm shift” in Muslim theological and jurisprudential  
56 scholarship. Much scholarship has been unearthed from the Islamic classical tradition  
57 and knowledge and understandings produced over the past two decades point to the  
58 possibility and potential for deriving concepts of equality and justice from within an  
59 Islamic framework. 
60 What Musawah hopes to do is to build this growing international discourse on  
61 equality and justice in Islam, and create a very visible national, regional and  
62 international presence of a movement led by Muslim women. 
[…] 
93 Shame on those who speak in the name of Islam but have nothing more to offer than  
94 to perpetuate the stereotypical image of the religion as violent, intolerant and  
95 misogynistic. 
96 At a time of Islamophobia where Muslims are stereotyped as fanatical and backward,  
97 and Muslim women as oppressed and victimised, Muslims should celebrate Musawah  
98 as a historic moment in a Muslim world where authoritarianism, oppression and  
99 discrimination reign. 
[…] 
107 It is our prayer that Musawah as a global movement will lead to that day when those  
108 in the Muslim world will realise that women’s demands for equality and justice are  
109 neither alien nor a threat to Islam. They are rooted in the Islamic tradition, and they  
110 are what it takes for us to be respected as human beings of equal worth and dignity  
111 in the world. 
112 Equality and justice are non-negotiable – and these values must be at the core of  
113 what it means to be Muslim today. 
 
Similar to extract 4-10a, here, ZA also foregrounds Musawah as “a global movement for 
equality and justice in the Muslim family” (lines 10-11). As the Director of Musawah, ZA regards 
Musawah as similar to her own Malaysian group, SIS, thus she employs the inclusive pronoun “our” 
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(lines 9, 107) to refer to the in-group Islamic feminists, including herself, who have similar beliefs 
and values like Musawah and SIS.  
ZA draws on “a discourse of equality and justice” as she supports the efforts by Musawah 
members who roots for equality and justice in Islam. She celebrates the in-group’s belief and values 
in Islam as equal and just and rejects discrimination against Muslim women. She positions the social 
actors in this extract, “activists and scholars” (line 10) who attended the gathering as Muslims who 
“love Islam”, believe in “equality and justice as Islamic values” and desire to make Islam 
“meaningful” to their lives (lines 8-10). ZA also positions the “over 180 activists” (line 16) as 
champions for Muslim women who “suffer discrimination, pain and injustice” (lines 16-17). She 
promotes “female solidarity discourse” as she constructs Musawah as an organization which brings 
together those activists and scholars. 
ZA challenges one Islamic fundamentalist discourse which is “a discourse of Muslim 
women as silent or must shut up”. She condemns when these activists are often “be told to shut up” 
(line 18). ZA backgrounds the agents who told these activists to shut up but I can assume that these 
may be some conservative Islamist men who are taking the authoritative roles. ZA again brings up 
the issue of religious credentials as she contests conservative Islamists’ construction of the activists 
as having “no authority to speak on Islam” (line 18).  
ZA celebrates the “‘paradigm shift’ in Muslim theology and jurisprudence” (lines 55-56). 
The phrase “paradigm shift” is an intertextuality of a popular notion of a radical change which in this 
case refers to changes or new interpretations in Islamic studies and Islamic law. She deconstructs the 
Islamic fundamentalist discourse depicted in “Islamic classical tradition, knowledge and 
understandings” (lines 56-57) as having the “possibility and potential for deriving concepts of 
equality and justice” (line 58), thus she promotes “a discourse of equality and justice in Islam”. At 
the same time, ZA promotes “a discourse of Islamic feminism” as the concepts of equality and 
justice adopted by the activists are still “within an Islamic framework” (lines 58-59) and also “rooted 
in the Islamic tradition” (line 109). To challenge “a discourse of Islamic fundamentalism”, ZA points 
out specifically about a “growing international discourse equality and justice in Islam”, which is the 
aspiration of Musawah (lines 60-61). She also promotes “a discourse of “new” Muslim women” and 
positions Muslim women as leaders to lead feminist movements at “national, regional and 
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international” level as wished by Musawah (lines 60-62). 
Next, ZA includes another intertextual notion of the issue of Islamophobia (line 96), which 
refers to prejudice against Muslims which could lead to hatred or fear towards Muslims. ZA relates 
the effects of Islamophobia by non-Muslims from Western countries mostly, which has constructed 
stereotypical image for Muslims all over the world as “fanatical and backward, and Muslim women 
as oppressed and victimised” (lines 96-97). However, she is baffled when she compares the 
stereotypical image constructed by some other Muslims who “speak in the name of Islam”, but at the 
same time portray Islam as “violent, intolerant and misogynistic” (93-95). It is an ironic situation 
whereby there are some Muslims who are trying to argue that the stereotypical image of Muslims as 
backward and oppressed is wrong, yet, there are some Islamists who are proving otherwise. 
Therefore, ZA contests “a discourse of Islamic authoritarianism” as promoted by Islamic 
fundamentalist discourse. She employs a strong modal verb “should” in “Muslims should celebrate 
Musawah as a historic moment” (lines 97-98) to persuade the audience and promote Musawah 
movement as a way to help the struggle against “authoritarianism, oppression and discrimination” 
(lines 98-99). 
In the last part of extract 5-7, ZA employs the inclusive pronoun “our” in “our prayer” to 
refer to Muslim women’s or the in-group’s prayers for equality and justice. She contests how Islamic 
feminists’ demands are positioned as “alien” or “threat to Islam” (line 109). She draws on “a 
discourse of equality and justice” to empower women in the Muslim world to have faith in Musawah 
which she believes seeks equality and justice for women, and seeks for women “to be respected as 
human beings” (line 110). She stresses that “equality and justice are non-negotiable” (line 112) and 
promotes that they should be the central principle in Islam and should not be separable from Islam. 
She reconstructs the definition of “Muslim today” (line 113) as bearing the values of “equality and 
justice”. 
 
5.5 Female solidarity (MM) 
 
MM also celebrates “a discourse of female solidarity” found in Muslim women in Malaysia and 
from other countries. In extract 5-8 below, MM talks about stereotypes and Muslim women. 
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Extract 5-8: “The followers” (#27) 
(MM, The Star, 2006, May 3)  
 
41 I think the only people who can dispel stereotypes about Muslims are women.  
42 While there are certainly some conservative women, even when these speak out  
43 they will naturally change perceptions because in a world where Muslim women are  
44 perceived to be perpetually hidden behind curtains, their sheer presence and  
45 articulateness will be noticed. What more if they are able to argue rationally in a  
46 calm manner.  
 
In this extract, MM goes right into her feminist agenda by employing a personal pronoun “I” 
(line 41) to display her opinion. The classified named social actors here are “Muslims” (line 41) and 
“Muslim women” (line 43). MM uses a passive form in “Muslim women are perceived to be 
perpetually hidden” (lines 43-44) and backgrounds the agent, which suggests the agent to be 
insignificant as the agent is known universally as having the dominant perception of Muslim women 
as “hidden”. 
Here, MM promotes “a discourse of female solidarity” among Muslim women as she 
believes only women can offer help to other women. She draws on “a discourse of women as 
powerful and educated”. She positions women as powerful because MM believes that women 
themselves have the ability to “dispel stereotypes about Muslims” (line 41).  She relates this to the 
stereotypical perception of Muslim women that exists in the world, where they “are perceived to be 
perpetually hidden behind curtains” (lines 43-44). While acknowledging there are still “some 
conservative women” (line 42), she challenges this stereotypical perception about Muslim women by 
constructing new identities for Muslim women who have the ability to “change perceptions” (line 
43). She positions them as educated as she claims people will notice their “sheer presence and 
articulateness” (lines 44-45).  MM deconstructs the need to be loud to get noticed by reconstructing 
Muslim women as able to be think clearly and realistically and also able to control themselves from 
overreacting as they are “able to argue rationally in a calm manner” (lines 45-46). 
Similar to ZA’s extract 5-7, the following extract is also on Musawah. While the analysis of 
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extract 4-10 in Chapter Four revolves around how MM celebrates Musawah’s efforts in challenging 
the discourse of inequality and injustice in Islamic law, in extract 5-9 below MM continues to talk 
about some people’s opinion about the launch of Musawah in Malaysia. 
 
Extract 5-9: “Great to be making history” (#95) 
(MM, The Star, 2009, February 18) 
 
9 As 250 scholars and activists, female and male, gathered in KL from some 47  
10 countries to discuss what can be done to ensure that the equality and justice inherent  
11 in Islam is brought to the fore in all policies related to the family, there were people  
12 who claimed that what we were doing was “insulting Islam”. 
13 The logic that ensuring Islam treats all its adherents, male and female, equally and  
14 justly is viewed as somehow insulting to the religion escapes me completely. 
[…] 
60 All of these countries did it while adhering to Islamic teachings, thus showing that  
61 Islam is no barrier to justice and equality. It is thus puzzling that anyone should be  
62 critical of this effort, as if leaving Muslim women mired in suffering is desirable. 
[…] 
66 I came away energised by this meeting, secure in my belief that my religion will  
67 never abandon my sisters and I whenever we are in need. If they were not before,  
68 our eyes have been opened to the glory of Islam where God loves women equally as  
69 much as He loves men. 
 
From this extract, MM promotes “a discourse of Muslim women solidarity” as she relates 
the event when some scholars and activists got together for Musawah gathering. She challenges the 
Islamic fundamentalist discourse and draws on the discourse of equality and justice seen in the 
discussion on equality and justice, especially regarding the practice of Islam. MM employs generic 
social actors of female and male but specifies them as “250 scholars and activists” from 47 countries 
who got together in a Musawah gathering. She positions these scholars and activists as concern about 
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issues related to Islam and knowledgeable enough to discuss how to apply “equality and justice” in 
Islam in other Islamic family policies (lines 9-11). MM draws on the discourse of Islam as a fair 
religion and she is trying to promote the awareness that “equality and justice is inherent in Islam” 
(lines 10-11).  
On the contrary, despite working in the name of Islam, MM challenges how some people 
have made the claims that the Islamic feminists’ work was “insulting Islam” (line 12), in which she 
employs the pronoun “we” to refer to the inclusive group of Muslim feminists. She challenges the 
dominant discourse of Islamic feminist groups as insulting Islam by stressing that they believe in 
Islam that “treats all its adherents, male and female, equally and justly” (lines 13-14). She questions 
the “logic” that the opponents of the feminist groups see how the feminist groups’ effort to uphold 
equality and justice in Islam can be insulting to Islam. 
In line 60, “these countries” refer to Morocco and Afghanistan. As I have discussed in 
Chapter Four, during the Musawah gathering, representatives from these countries shared how they 
have made Islamic family laws “more just and equitable”. Based on the example, MM promotes that 
while making the laws more just, these countries still adhere to Islamic teachings (line 60). Hence 
she appears puzzled and incomprehensive of how “anyone should be critical” of their efforts (lines 
61-62). MM positions people who criticize feminist groups as do not mind with the unequal 
treatment or suffering that Muslim women receive, which she mocks them seeing the injustice to 
women as “desirable” (line 62). 
However, MM continues her article with a positive note as she felt “energised after the 
meeting and she employs the first person pronoun “I” in this extract which suggests her involvement 
as a social actor. She uses the possessive pronoun “my” in “my belief” and “my religion” to 
construct her Islamic feminist position on her belief and her religion. MM also includes “my sisters” 
to refer to other Muslim women especially members of SIS whom she considers as sisters. She 
positions herself as feeling “secure” in her belief and also she believes that Islam will never abandon 
her sisters and herself (lines 66-67). She draws on the discourse of Muslim women as equal to 
Muslim men and also on the discourse of Islam as fair. She uses an intertextual reference to God as 
she celebrates “the glory of Islam where God loves women equally as much as He loves men” (lines 
68-69).  
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5.6 Progressive Islam (ZA) 
 
Another pursuit of a feminist agenda by ZA and MM is to promote “a discourse of progressive 
Islam” to challenge “Islamic fundamentalist discourse”. In extract 5-10 below, ZA highlights the 
changes in Malaysia, in relation to contemporary and traditional understanding of gender roles and 
Islam.  
 
Extract 5-10: “Changing the Muslim Mindset” (#5) 
(ZA, New Straits Times, 2006, May 19)  
 
22 The statement last week by the Mufti of Johor, Datuk Noh Gadut, that it is forbidden  
23 for Muslim men to be house-husbands is a reflection of the mindset the Prime  
24 Minister was talking about. Changing realities stare us in the face and our religious  
25 leaders and Islamist ideologues are stuck in an understanding of gender roles and  
26 Islamic knowledge constructed within the social context of the mediaeval age. They  
27 do a disservice to Muslims and the country. 
28 Many Muslim scholars, whether from this region or from the Middle East or South  
29 Asia, are puzzled how Malaysia could be so modern and progressive in many ways  
30 when the many Muslims they meet at academic meetings and international  
31 conferences are so conservative theologically and ideologically. 
[…] 
115 An ideological battle is taking place between those who demand an Islamic state  
116 asserting different rights for men and women, for Muslims and non-Muslims and  
117 those who believe in a democratic state with equal rights, fundamental liberties and  
118 justice for all, and who celebrate the blessings of this multi-ethnic and multi- 
119 religious country. 
 
There are a number of social actors here. ZA uses the generic nouns “men” and “women” 
but she employs specific nouns as well such as “Muslim men”, “Muslim scholars”, “Muslims”, 
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“non-Muslims”, “religious leaders” and “Islamist ideologues”. She also includes named social actors, 
whom she foregrounds as the agents: “the Mufti of Johor, Datuk Noh Gadut” who made the 
statement (line 22) and “the Prime Minister” who talked about the mindset (line 23). ZA also 
constructs Malaysia as “modern and progressive” (line 30) and as a “multi-ethnic and multi-religious 
country” (lines 118-119) 
Through this extract, she juxtaposes both discourses of “Islamic fundamentalism” and 
“modern and progressive Islam”. ZA highlights the existence of “changing realities” (line 24) faced 
by “us”, who I assume are those who do not support the Islamic fundamentalism discourse. She 
positions “religious leaders and Islamist ideologues” as “stuck” in between the present day and the 
“mediaeval age” which has resulted in them having difficulties understanding gender roles as stated 
by Islam (lines 24-25).   
ZA challenges “a discourse of inequality and injustice” as she also positions these leaders 
and ideologues as doing “a disservice” in Malaysia since this may cause injustice to Muslims who 
live there (lines 26-27). She cited “many Muslim scholars” words to show an example of the 
extreme situation in Malaysia. These foreign scholars appeared “puzzled” and positioned Muslims 
from Malaysia as “conservative theologically and ideologically” (line 31) and thus wondered how 
Malaysia still manage to be “modern and progressive” (line 29) but still have religious scholars with 
complete opposite views.  
ZA names this extreme situation as an “ideological battle” (line 115) which continues to be a 
constant debate to the present day. She divides the battle between two groups: 1) those who support 
an “Islamic state” (line 115) and 2) another group which supports a “democratic state” (line 117).  
She positions the first group as promoting the dominant discourse of “Islamic fundamentalism” since 
the supporters believe in “different rights for men and women, for Muslims and non-Muslims” (lines 
115-116). On the other hand, she positions the second group which fights for “equal rights, 
fundamental liberties and justice” and supports a country with multi-ethnicities and multi-religions 
(lines 117-119) as promoting the alternative discourse of “modern and progressive Islam”.  
In extract 5-11 below, ZA looks at changes in Malaysia especially the roles of Muslim men 
and women in marriage, and the issue of unmarried men and women in Malaysia. 
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Extract 5-11: “It's men who are the surplus goods” (#6) 
(ZA, New Straits Times, 2006, June 2)  
 
37 The problem in Malaysia is compounded because we are still a traditional patriarchal  
38 society where women are expected to marry up. Thus men with money, education and  
39 skills will get their choice of women. Men with little money, education and skills are  
40 more likely to remain unmarried because society disapproves of women who marry  
41 men "beneath" them, and some of our religious leaders believe it is haram for men to  
42 be househusbands. 
[…] 
87 If our society continues to believe that polygamy is a man's right, that men must  
88 always be leaders and be superior to women, men must always be providers, that  
89 being a househusband is haram, then the statistic for an underclass of unmarriageable  
90 men in this country is likely to grow. 
91 In the past, women needed to marry in order to survive. But today, when women are  
92 educated and financially independent, being a wife is no longer the one ticket to  
93 happiness and well-being. You can actually lead a full and happy life without  
94 marriage. 
[…] 
106 The reality is that increasing numbers of women, while believing in marriage, reject  
107 still the traditional model of the man being leader and provider to whom obedience  
108 is due, while the woman is the subservient and inferior other half who is on 24/7  
109 duty as wife, mother, cook, cleaner, nurse... and for many, a co-provider as well,  
110 without whose income the family cannot survive. 
111 We all believe in family. Let's get real in analysing why families break down, why  
112 women marry late, if at all, why there are many more unmarried men than women,  
113 why men are unmarriageable, instead of offering unwanted solutions to  
114 misconceived problems. 
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Social actors in this extract are the generic “men” and “women”, “religious leaders” and 
“society”. ZA compares the different roles of married men and women perceived in the society, and 
she also compares the positions of unmarried men and women. ZA begins the sentence in lines 37-38 
with passive voice “The problem in Malaysia is compounded”, “women are expected to marry up” 
where she backgrounds the agents who compounded the problem and expected women to marry up. 
However, starting from the second sentence in line 38 until line 42, ZA uses active voice and 
foregrounds the agents as “men”, “society” and “some of our religious leaders”. She holds these 
agents as responsible for the mentioned actions.  
She challenges “a discourse of traditional patriarchal society” as she positions the “traditional 
patriarchal society” (lines 37-38) as the agent that expects and pressures women to marry. She 
divides Malaysian men into two groups: 1) men “with money, education and skills” (lines 38-39) and 
2) men “with little money, education and skills” (lines 39-40).  ZA positions men in the first group 
as easier to get married but positions men in the second group as “more likely to remain unmarried” 
(line 40). She blames the “society” (line 40) and some “religious leaders” (line 41) for some men to 
remain unmarried. She contests the society which “disapproves” of men who are “beneath” women 
to marry each other (lines 40-41) and also some religious leaders who think that men as 
househusbands is haram (forbidden in Islam) (lines 41-42). 
ZA displays her feminist agenda when she challenges “a discourse of men as superior to 
women” which exists in Malaysian society as men receive more rights and higher status than women 
(lines 87-88). She also contests the gender roles that the society assigns to men, such as “leaders” and 
“providers” and not the unfavourable “househusband” (lines 87-89). Based on “the discourse of men 
as superior to women” and more privileges that men receive, ZA argues that pampered men may 
abuse these privileges and may increase the number of “underclass unmarriageable men” (line 89) 
who may turn out to be useless. On the contrary, ZA promotes “a discourse of progressive Islam” 
and celebrates women who do not need to get married to be happy (line 93), challenging the notion 
that every woman should get married to find happiness. She specifically employs the pronoun “you” 
(line 93) to engage with the audience, especially single women readers, as if she is talking directly to 
them. She also celebrates the new position of educated and economically independent women as not 
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just “being a wife” (line 92). ZA deconstructs “happiness and well-being” as not being relevant to 
“being a wife” which suggests her rejection of the idea of the “ticket to happiness is by being a wife”.   
While positioning today’s women as increasingly rejecting the traditional model of women 
as “subservient and inferior” to men (line 108), ZA herself also rejects the traditional model and 
contests the notion that men are leaders and providers, and only women have to be obedient to their 
husbands and not be in a mutual or equal relationship (lines 107-109). She challenges the identities 
of traditional women who are expected to be “on 24/7 duty as wife, mother, cook, cleaner, nurse” 
(lines 108-110) and re-constructs women as “a co-provider” (line 110) which suggests that women 
have an equal responsibility in a family. The new identities of women are drawn from “a discourse of 
progressive Islam”. 
The next extract below is taken from ZA’s column “Valuable voice of progress”, which is her 
tribute to Dr Fathi Osman (henceforth referred to as Dr Fathi), an Egyptian scholar who passed away about a 
month before the article was written. He became a teacher to ZA and other SIS members when he came to 
work Malaysia in the 90s. She also includes in her writing about the death of two other contemporary 
Muslim scholars. All of these scholars support “a discourse of progressive Islam”. 
 
Extract 5-12: “Valuable voice of progress” (#60) 
(ZA, The Star, 2010, October 3) 
 
22 What Dr Fathi taught us most was how to think critically about Islam and how we as  
23 Muslims can live a life according to the teachings of Islam in the modern world. 
24 There were many “aha” moments as he discussed with us concepts, tools,  
25 methodologies, history, and production and construction of knowledge in the Islamic  
26 tradition to help us understand how a text revealed over 1,400 years ago can remain  
27 relevant to our lives today. 
[…] 
56 What we all must imbibe is his indefatigable belief that change is possible and why it  
57 is possible. What Dr Fathi’s teachings gave me was the knowledge and with it came  
58 the courage to believe in, speak out and demand for change in the light of our realities  
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59 today. 
[…] 
67 He saw ijtihad (reinterpretation) as a public responsibility for all to engage in to  
68 enable us to live in a fair, just and kind society. 
69 He believed in a modern country, every citizen being equal, Muslims and non- 
70 Muslims, men and women. 
[…] 
89 He was a great supporter of the work of Sisters in Islam and his voice boomed in our  
90 defence whenever we were attacked, proclaiming we were his students, so how could  
91 our work ever be regarded as against Islam. 
[…] 
99 The death of Dr Fathi, and within a few days, the Algerian scholar Dr Mohammed  
100 Arkoun and earlier in July, the Egyptian scholar Dr Nasr Abu Zayd, three  
101 intellectual giants of contemporary Muslim thought whose contributions have  
102 helped us to rethink how we understand and live Islam in our times, is an  
103 irreplaceable loss. 
104 They gave us ideas and they gave us courage to be able to reject what the extremists  
105 and fundamentalists in the Muslim world claim to be an “authentic” Islam in which  
106 there is no place for feminists, human rights activists and democrats and certainly  
107 no equal rights for citizens of other faiths. 
108 Their ideas opened our minds and gave us hope that it is possible to be modern and  
109 Muslim in the 21st century. 
 
The social actors in this extract are three Muslim scholars, Fathi, Mohammed Arkoun, Nasr Abu 
Zayd, and Sisters in Islam (SIS) members including ZA. She distinctively uses the pronouns “he” to refer to 
Fathi, “they” to refer to the three scholars, and “we” or “us” for SIS members. In deconstructing the discourse 
of Islamic fundamentalism, here ZA celebrates “a discourse of Islam as progressive” through Fathi’s role as 
her teacher. ZA positions Fathi as an exemplary progressive Islamic scholar because he taught her and the 
other SIS members “to think critically about Islam” (line 22) and how Muslims can still follow Islamic 
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teaching and live in the modern world (line 23). She is thankful to Fathi for the defining moments of clarity 
described as ““aha” moments” (line 24) which they experienced when they learned many things about Islam 
from him. ZA constructs him as rejecting the Islamic fundamentalist discourse, and positions him as the 
opposite of Islamist extremists who idolize the past Islamic tradition because he managed to show how the 
old Islamic religious texts can still be “relevant” to today’s life (lines 25-27). ZA honours Fathi as an ideal 
progressive Islamic scholar because of his “indefatigable belief that change is possible” (line 56) as well as 
his belief in “ijtihad” (reinterpretation of the religious texts) (line 67), “a modern country” and everyone as 
equal (line 69).  
Based on the “knowledge” (line 57) and the “courage” (line 58) gained from Fathi’s teachings, ZA 
positions herself, including other ex-students of Fathi, as educated and brave as they are able to “believe in, 
speak out and demand for change” (line 58). ZA promotes “a discourse of equality and justice” as she 
supports Fathi’s vision of “a fair, just and kind society” (line 68) and equality for everyone, “Muslims and 
non-Muslims, men and women” (lines 69-70). 
ZA also criticizes the anti-Islamic discourse used by some people to question women’s movements’ 
credibility. As opposed to other Islamist extremists who always oppose and criticize SIS as un-Islamic, ZA 
positions Fathi not just as a teacher, but also as “a great supporter” (line 89) of SIS and as a protector of SIS 
whenever SIS was attacked because he defended that their work is not against Islam since they were his 
students (lined 89-91). Thus, she promotes SIS as embodying a discourse of “feminist group as Islamic” 
Besides Fathi, there were two other Islamic scholars who passed away: Mohammed Arkoun from 
Algeria and Nasr Abu Zayd from Egypt. ZA positions these three scholars as “intellectual giants of 
contemporary Muslim thought” (line 101) who are “irreplaceable” (line 103) because they 
contributed a lot in understanding Islam in the modern world. Again, through the scholars’ 
contributions, ZA promotes “a discourse of Islam as progressive” as she rejects “a discourse of Islamic 
fundamentalism”. These Islamic scholars are from the Middle East, which are the home of “Islamic 
fundamentalism”. The inclusion of these selected scholars in ZA’s writing depicts the existence of scholars 
from the Middle East who do not support “Islamic fundamentalism”, and represents them as different from 
Islamists as they promote “a discourse of modernity” in Islamic practice.  
ZA expresses her gratitude and celebrates the “ideas” and the “courage” (line 104) that the 
three scholars gave so that they as feminists, know how to “reject” the “authentic” Islam claimed by 
176 
 
the “extremists and fundamentalists” (line 104-106). She rejects “a discourse of authentic Islam” 
which denies the place for “feminists, human rights activists and democrats” and also denies equal 
rights for people from other faiths (lines 106-107). To challenge this, again, ZA draws on “a discourse 
of Islam as progressive” and “a discourse of modernity” by promoting the ideas gained from the three 
scholars to empower to Muslims to be open and hopeful so that they can live as Muslims in the modern 
world (lines 108-109).  
 
5.7 Progressive Islam (MM) 
 
MM also promotes “a discourse of Islam as progressive” in pursuing her feminist agenda. In extract 5-13 
below, MM highlights the criticisms aimed at SIS and looks at the recurring issue of the group’s 
different voice and their credibility especially concerning religion. 
 
Extract 5-13: “Need for solidarity against injustice” (#112) 
(MM, The Star, 2009, October 28)  
 
9 For some people, the rules are that only they be allowed to speak and anyone with a  
10 different opinion should just shut up. If the dissenters dare to say anything, then  
11 they should be hounded and intimidated until they acquiesce. 
12 Today we have a women’s rights organisation that has had 50 police reports lodged  
13 against it by other organisations which do not agree with it. They claim these  
14 women must not only be not allowed to speak, but should be charged under the  
15 Sedition Act, have fatwas made against them and even be banned altogether. 
16 There are even public forums being organised specifically to show that this  
17 women’s organisation is allegedly leading other women down the path to hell. You  
18 have to wonder what is so scary about this women’s organisation that it warrants all  
19 this hostile attention. 
20 As far as most thinking people can tell, this women’s organisation has in the last 20  
21 years been working to ensure that Malaysian women, specifically Muslim women,  
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22 have access to the justice and equality that the Holy Quran says is their due. 
 
MM does not name any social actors here as she only employs the pronoun “they” a few 
times to refer to “some people” (line 9) which I can imply those people as some Islamist scholars and 
Islamic fundamentalism supporters. Here MM also does not name the group but refers to it as “a 
women’s rights organisation” (line 12) in which she claims has received “50 police reports” made by 
“other organisations” (line 13). However, I can imply that she is referring the “women’s rights 
organisation” to SIS because there were many news reports in the Malaysian media about police 
reports made by other organisations against SIS and the “other organisations” here refers to various 
Islamist groups which do not agree with SIS’s ideologies. The separation of the in-group and the 
out-group are evident by the use of inclusive pronouns “they” to refer to the “women’s rights 
organisation”, SIS as the in-group in “they should be hounded and intimidated until they acquiesce” 
(line 11), and to refer to “other organisations”, the out-group of Islamic fundamentalists in “only they 
be allowed to speak” (line 9).   
The issue of having religious credentials resurfaces here. MM challenges the discourse of 
only Islamic scholars (Muslim men) as having the only or last say on religious matters. She 
condemns the construction of “rules” that gives the rights only to Islamist scholars, people with 
religious credentials or the out-group members “to speak” (line 9). Similar to ZA’s stand in extract 
5-7, here, MM also contests “a discourse of Muslim women as silent or must shut up” as she 
challenges the view put forth by “some people”, allegedly some Islamic fundamentalists who said: 
“anyone with a different opinion should just shut up” (lines 9-10). She positions people with 
different opinion as “dissenters” (line 10) whom I believe MM is referring to SIS members or SIS’s 
supporters in Malaysia. The second sentence in line 10 is not MM’s opinion but an intertextuality 
taken from some other people’s opinion on the punishment of hounding and intimidating for the 
“dissenters” to make those with different opinion “acquiesce” (line 11) or agree with the Islamist 
scholars. The agents who should hound or intimidate the dissenters are backgrounded but can be 
implied as those from the out-group members. MM implicitly opposes the out-group’s act of 
shutting people’s voices.  
178 
 
MM contests how the “other organisations”, the out-group, draw on “a discourse of Islamic 
feminism as un-Islamic”. She disagrees with the out-group’s effort to prevent SIS or similar 
women’s groups from voicing out their views. MM challenges the claim that SIS members “must 
not be allowed to speak, should be charged under the Sedition Act (as explained in Chapter One) 
should have fatwas made against them and should also be banned” (lines 13-15). MM also 
challenges the debates in public forums which construct SIS as “leading other women down the path 
to hell” (line 17). MM wonders “what is so scary” (line 18) about SIS and positions the women’s 
organisation as victims here as they receive “hostile attention” (18-19) resulting from the public 
debates. The lexical choice of “hell”, “scary” and “hostile” suggests the out-group’s negative 
positioning of SIS. 
In this extract, MM rejects “a discourse of Islamic feminism as un-Islamic” and promotes the 
alternative discourse of “feminist group as Islamic”, which is drawn on “Islamic feminism 
discourse”. She also promotes “a discourse of Islam as progressive” and “a discourse of equality and 
justice”. She positions SIS as a professional and experienced group as she claims that the 
organisation has worked for the past 20 years to make sure Muslim women “have access to the 
justice and equality” (lines 20-22). Sarcastically she assumes that “most thinking people” know the 
actual facts about SIS (line 20), which she implicitly positions the other Islamist organisations as 
ignorant and oblivious to the actual facts about the women’s group. MM also makes an intertextual 
reference to “the Holy Quran” (line 22), which suggests that SIS still works within the Islamic 
framework and does not deviate from Islamic principles. Her interpretation of combining feminism 
with Islam suggests a modern interpretation of Islamic practice seen as progressive and not going 
backwards. 
In the final extract below, MM relates her experience when she attended a conference with 
human right activists from all over the world which was held in the USA as she draws on “a 
discourse of progressive Islam”.  
 
Extract 5-14: “In defence of women’s rights” (#147) 
(MM, The Star, 2011, April 13)  
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20 The most astonishing aspect of the conference for me was that so many of these  
21 human rights defenders were religious leaders, both Muslims and Christians. 
22 When for so long we have been told that human rights has no place in religion,  
23 especially Islam, it was an incredibly profound experience to listen to imams saying  
24 that it is crucial to defend human rights, especially women’s rights because the  
25 violations are in fact un-Islamic. 
 
Extract 5-14 is a short piece consisting of only two sentences. I chose to analyse this extract 
because I want to look at the representations of opinions of Muslims from outside Malaysia by MM. 
MM includes herself and her in-group as social actors in this extract. Other social actors include 
human right defenders and imams (religious leaders). 
Here, MM celebrates the relevance between human rights and religion as stated by some 
“religious leaders, both Muslims and Christians” (line 21) at the conference. MM positions those 
religious leaders as “human rights defenders” (line 21) which she finds “astonishing” (line 20) since 
in Malaysia, she has had contradictory encounters with “Islamic fundamentalists” and Islamic 
leaders who do not support human rights. MM contests the ideology that “human rights has no place 
in religion, especially Islam” (line 22) but she backgrounds the agents who told them that. It can be 
implied that some Islamist fundamentalist scholars in Malaysia may proclaim the same ideology and 
may assume the role of the agents.  
The issue of un-Islamic also reoccurs here. To deconstruct the Islamist fundamentalists’ 
ideologies, she celebrates the “imams” (line 23) (religious leaders) at the conference who claim that 
human rights violations are “un-Islamic” and who promotes the importance of defending human 
rights, especially women’s rights (lines 23-25). She glorifies the revelation of religious leaders 
accepting human rights as connected to religion as “an incredibly profound experience” (line 23). 
This supports “a discourse of progressive Islam” whereby Muslim leaders scholars do not take 
human rights out of the religion but instead admits the importance. 
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5.8 Summary 
 
This chapter looked my findings about how MM and ZA pursued their feminist agenda in Malaysia 
and negotiated their identities amidst criticisms towards Islamic feminist movement in answering the 
research questions. I showed how they empowered other Muslim women through the construction of 
“new” identities of women today and how they drew on “a discourse of Islamic feminism” through 
the women’s group, Sisters in Islam (SIS). Both of them also drew on “female solidarity” discourse 
and promoted “a discourse of progressive Islam”. 
MM and ZA foregrounded SIS as social actors, and again, employed the inclusive pronoun 
“we” to mark in-group members and the audience who share similar beliefs. Other references to 
Muslim women by MM and ZA were included as social actors to empower other Muslim women. 
Generic and specific men and women as social actors were used but both of them also backgrounded 
the agents in certain extracts whom I inferred as men. They both employed intertextuality seen in 
ZA’s use of the phrase “paradigm shift” which is a popular notion of a radical change, and MM’s 
quoting some other people’s opinions who believe “anyone with different opinion should just shut 
up”. Both of them also made an intertextual reference to the Quran, sometimes written as the “Holy 
Quran” or implicitly referred to as “the original source of the religion” as a way to signify their approach 
of Islamic feminist discourse is still within an Islamic framework, and not as un-Islamic as others have 
claimed. 
I explored how MM’s and ZA’s deconstructed traditional Muslim women’s roles as a thing 
of the past. They celebrated “new” women’s roles today and reconstructed Muslim women as 
educated and independent. ZA wrote about SIS’s interpretation of Islam and contemporary Muslim 
women’s identities. ZA positioned SIS members and herself as believers of Islam but at the same 
time are also feminists and activists who are “educated and economically independent”. She used an 
example of a female minister to position women as capable of becoming leaders. ZA also promoted 
“a discourse of Muslim women as equal to men” to challenge the notion of “Malaysian men as 
superior”. MM wrote about how daughters of previous prime ministers joined forces to talk about 
equality for Muslim women. A dominant discourse of “bad Muslim women” was presented here 
which MM contested by offering alternative discourses of “educated women” and “women as 
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champions or leaders”. She also depicted some female Islamic scholars as knowledgeable and 
experts on Muslim issues.  
MM and ZA drew on “a discourse of female solidarity” as a way of empowering Muslim 
women. ZA acknowledged her affection and pride for Malaysia as she drew on “a proud citizen 
discourse”. As also mentioned in Chapter Four, MM and ZA celebrated the launch of a global group 
working on equality and justice in the Muslim family, Musawah, in which ZA is the Director. Both 
of the writers celebrated “female solidarity” not only with Muslim women in Malaysia, but also with 
Islamic feminists, activists Muslim women from other countries, especially those whom have similar 
struggle towards equality and justice. ZA specifically drew on “female solidarity” with Malaysian 
women from other faiths to broaden her feminist agenda beyond Muslim women and to promote 
Malaysia as a country capable of attaining justice for all people, which does not exclude Muslim 
women.  
I also looked at how MM and ZA promoted “a discourse of progressive Islam” which is in 
line with “a discourse of modernity” in pursuing their feminist agenda in Malaysia. This discourse of 
progressive Islam is exclusively used to challenge “Islamic fundamentalist discourse” which 
occurred throughout my analysis, especially in Chapter Three. ZA contested the idea of adopting a 
traditional Islamic state like in the old Arab states for Malaysia, thus promoting a modern and 
progressive state in Malaysia, not only for Muslims but also for other Malaysians from different 
ethnicities and religions. In refuting the criticisms of SIS as un-Islamic, ZA drew on some prominent 
religious scholars who supported SIS’s work and their progressive ideologies in adopting “a 
discourse of Islamic feminism”. MM also promoted “Islamic feminism” discourse as she pledged 
that SIS has never diverted from Islamic teachings, but she showed that her group has attempted to 
create a more progressive nation within the Islamic context.   
This chapter has shown how MM and ZA are taking the lead to re-construct Malaysian 
Muslim women’s identities in empowering ways that offers women other choices. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Conclusion 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This concluding chapter looks at the overview of the results from the data analysis based on the 
research questions and the methodological framework. In this chapter, I highlight the findings of the 
study through a summary of the study and I also summarize the results for each theme in Chapters 
Three, Four and Five. It included a summary of discourses which I have identified from the data, 
followed by a discussion of significant observations of this study. Finally, I also list some possible 
avenues for future research which can be explored based on this study. 
 
6.2 Summary of the study 
 
This study was conducted with the aim of analyzing columns which appeared in mainstream 
Malaysian English newspaper by two female writers from Malaysia, MM and ZA. The purpose was 
to look at how the two feminist writers utilize newspaper columns to demand gender equality, 
negotiate their identities and promote the discourse of Islamic feminism in Malaysia as well as how 
the writers offer solutions and present any changes concerning the condition of Malaysian Muslim 
society. The analysis was done to answer the three research questions following a methodological 
framework which identified MM’s and ZA’s discursive linguistic actions, positioning, and gender 
and religious discourses seen in the media texts.  
The selection of data was based on issues related to the religion of Islam and gender, 
especially on Islamic fundamentalist or Islamist discourse, 2005 Amendments in Islamic Family 
Law and criticisms against Islamic feminist discourse. Based on the analysis, MM and ZA were 
shown to challenge dominant, traditional discourses on Muslim women and Islam, and they were 
also shown to draw on or create new, alternative discourses. Some discourses were seen repeatedly 
in every chapter and gender and religious discourses are also interrelated with each other. Discourses 
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presented in the next sections are divided into dominant and alternative discourses. Dominant 
discourses refer to what MM and ZA have challenged in Islamic fundamentalist discourse, which 
shows how MM and ZA view the representation of Islamic fundamentalist discourses. Alternative 
discourses are discourses created or promoted by MM and ZA. This study has explored the language 
use and discourses found in Malaysian print media by two feminist writers. MM and ZA were seen 
using the media texts as a tool for communicating with the larger audience. This study has also 
addressed the theme of change which is still taking place in a Muslim society in Malaysia.   
In exploring the answers to research question 1, various linguistic features following 
Fairclough (2003) discourse analysis were found employed by MM and ZA. These features work to 
find out the representational meaning in the clause. MM and ZA were efficient in utilizing the words 
under analysis. I found that social actors employed by MM and ZA were generic and specific in their 
columns depending on the context. They are mostly Muslim women and men, and various 
authorities in the government. There were occasional mention of individuals but in many instances, 
they used passive sentences without foregrounding the agents. Foregrounding or exclusion is used 
either to hide the agent for protection or because the agents are already known. Nominalization 
which is another linguistic feature hides the agency by turning the clause into a noun. The use of 
passivization and hidden agency is also a part of journalism ethics as they also need to be careful in 
disclosing the social actors. 
MM and ZA used pronouns especially to distinguish Us versus Them representations of 
In-group and Out-group. This is significant as they negotiate their identities and relate to the 
audience. For In-group identity, they were seen using the first person plural pronoun “we” 
exclusively to refer to specific group such as SIS, and inclusively to appeal and include everyone in 
the public who may share the same beliefs. The use of “they” was also found to mark the Out-group, 
consisting of Muslim men, Muslim scholars and Islamic fundamentalists, and even the authorities. 
MM and ZA also used another linguistic feature called intertextuality. It is found in 
references to other texts, genres and discourse. In this study, various orders of discourse are found, 
including media, political, legal and religious discourses. Some examples are quotes or references to 
the Quran and examples of Islamic law or systems from other countries. They also employed 
various statements, questions, modality and evaluations which have different functions to how MM 
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and ZA challenge or promote various discourses and identify themselves. The summary of each 
chapter which include discursive actions, positioning, and discourses found in MM’s and ZA’s 
columns to answer the three research questions are given below. 
 
6.2.1 Deconstructing gender and Islamic fundamentalist or Islamist discourses in Malaysia  
 
Based on the theme from the selected extracts, the first theme covered in Chapter Three is on the 
deconstruction of gender and Islamic fundamentalist or Islamist discourses in Malaysia in media 
texts by MM and ZA. In this chapter, I looked at MM’s and ZA’s articles on gender inequality and 
Islamic fundamentalist ideology. Islamic feminists including MM and ZA blamed the struggle of 
gender inequality which Muslim women face in Malaysia on the revival of Islamist discourse in 
Malaysian Muslim society. Through MM’s and ZA’s discursive actions in deconstructing Islamic 
fundamentalist discourse in Malaysia, it is evident how objectionable Islamic fundamentalist 
discourse to them is. Both of them called for gender equality and closing of gender gap, claimed as 
caused by Islamic fundamentalism.  
In Tables 6.1 and 6.2 below, I have identified discourses on Muslim women and discourses 
on Islam appearing in MM’s and ZA’s columns in Chapter Three.  
 
Table 6.1 Discourses on Muslim women 
 
Dominant Discourses Alternative Discourses 
1. Muslim women as unequal/inferior to 
Muslim men 
2. Blame the women 
Boys will be boys 
3. Limitation on women 
4. Muslim women as silent or must shut up 
1. Muslim women as equal to Muslim men 
 
2. Perpetrators should be held accountable 
 
3. Freedom for women 
4. The right of women to speak out  
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Table 6.2 Discourses on Islam 
 
Dominant Discourses Alternative Discourses 
1. Islamic fundamentalism 
 
2. Islamic scholars as having the only/last say 
on religious matters 
3. Feminist groups as un-Islamic/anti-Islam 
1. Moderate Islamic practice 
Modernity and progressive Islam 
2. The right of citizens to speak out about 
injustices in society 
3. Speaking out 
 
From Table 6.1, it shows that in their newspaper columns, MM and ZA promoted an 
alternative discourse on Muslim which is a discourse of “women as equal to men” to challenge a 
patriarchal society based on the Islamic fundamentalist discourse of “women as unequal to men”. 
The discourse of “Muslim men as superior to Muslim women” in Malaysian Muslim society still has 
not changed because I still found the discourse appearing in MM and ZA’s articles in 2011. Despite 
the struggle and effort SIS (and other human rights groups) has put into, minimal changes can be 
seen and based on the Gender Gap Index, gender gap in Malaysia is still there and has widened.   
Other dominant discourses in Table 6.1 used on Muslim women by Islamic fundamentalists 
are “blame the women or victims” and “boys will be boys”. This was only challenged by MM whom 
suggested an alternative discourse of holding perpetrators as accountable for crimes or victims. MM 
and ZA contested “a discourse of limitation on women” and “Muslim women as silent or must shut 
up” which resulted from the views upheld by Islamic fundamentalists. Both of them were found 
promoting discourses of “freedom for women” and “the right to speak out”. This is one solution 
offered through their newspaper columns whereby MM and ZA engaged with the audience and 
empowered Muslim women to speak out.  
Table 6.2 is a list of discourses on Islam where MM and ZA were seen drawing on “a 
discourse of moderate Islam” and “a discourse of modernity and progressive Islam” to challenge 
Islamic practice by Islamic fundamentalists as regressive. In various occasions, their group, SIS has 
been labelled as deviant, un-Islamic and against Islamic teaching. The opposition Islamic party, PAS 
has aspired to create an Islamic state in Malaysia since the Islamic resurgence in the 80s, and has 
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attempted to turn one state under their ruling, Kelantan, into an Islamic state. ZA opposed the 
creation of Islamic state modelled after the Islamic state in the Arab world which is perceived by 
Islamic fundamentalist as practicing the “authentic Islam”. Instead, she supported a “modern Muslim 
state” in Malaysia in line with Mahathir’s Islamization project which started in 1982, which is the 
government’s attempt of modernizing Malaysia using a liberal interpretation of Islam. However, 
even after two decades, the liberal interpretation of Islam still faces criticisms by Islamic 
fundamentalists. In exploring the issue of religious credentials, both writers were found to contest a 
discourse of “Islamic scholars as having the only or last say on religious matters” which are mostly 
following the practice of Islamic fundamentalism. Most Muslim scholars are under the 
understanding that the doors of independent reasoning have long been closed therefore, people who 
are not trained theologically have no rights to challenge the religion. MM and ZA promoted “a 
discourse of speaking out” on Islam especially concerning the right of citizens and injustices in the 
society.  
Through her newspaper columns, MM was seen deconstructing gender inequality discourse 
and “Islamic fundamentalist discourse” through various discursive actions. Among others, she 
condemned sexism, challenged “the blame the female victim discourse” and contested men’s control 
of religious rulings. ZA’s discursive actions in her newspaper columns included promoting the 
closing of the gender gap and criticizing traditional gender roles. Both MM and ZA were found to 
contest limitations of speech and limitations on Muslim women, which they claimed caused by 
Islamic fundamentalist discourse. They also criticized patriarchal attitudes and empowered women 
to achieve equal career opportunities.  
It is somewhat common in Malaysian society for strict Muslim believers to expect Muslim 
women to uphold a “conservative discourse” in their actions based on Islamic practice. Women who 
are against approved behavior by Islamic fundamentalists are often deemed by them as “bad Muslim 
women”. In negotiating identities, MM was seen positioning Malaysian Muslim women as victims 
of injustice, crime and violence. MM was also found to criticize Muslim men who got away even 
though some of them were perpetrators of crime and violence, and she also criticized Malaysian 
male politicians who had “bad behaviour”, unreliable or having the ultimate control. ZA positioned 
Malaysian Muslim women as marginalised at work and men as patriarchs who still control women. 
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Social actors were not foregrounded explicitly even though there were some references to 
individuals, the government or the political party. ZA and MM were careful not to disclose the 
specific social actors because the media has to protect their own interest as the representative of the 
government. Most of the time social actors were disclosed implicitly referring to the opposition 
political party, PAS, and Muslim scholars in the Islamic departments and Islamic courts as the ones 
drawing on Islamic fundamentalist discourse. In defending their group, SIS, both MM and ZA’s 
discursive action involved challenging Islamists who criticised the group as not practising Islam 
according to the proper way, in which they were labelled as “un-Islamic”, modern and liberal. ZA 
was seen positioning their critics, believed to be Islamic fundamentalist followers as authoritarians 
and both the authors were found to position them as Islamist extremists. 
 
6.2.2 Challenging (separate) Islamic Law (syariah law) 
 
In Chapter Four, the theme from MM’s and ZA’s columns is on how they challenged Islamic law in 
Malaysia. Discourses on Muslim women and discourses on Islam appearing in MM’s and ZA’s 
columns in Chapter Four are listed in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 below. 
 
Table 6.3 Discourses on Muslim women 
 
Dominant Discourses Alternative Discourses 
1. Muslim men as superior to Muslim women/ 
girls 
2. Traditional/conservative Muslim women 
1. Muslim women/girls as equal to Muslim 
men 
2. Women as progressive 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.4 Discourses on Islam 
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Dominant Discourses Alternative Discourses 
1. Islam as divine law 
2. Inequality and injustice 
3. Religious segregation 
1. Progressive Islamic law 
2. Equality and justice  
3. Religious parity/religion as fair  
 
From MM’s and ZA’s columns, I found repeated discourses representing Muslim women as 
“regressive”, “bad” and “conservative” which MM and ZA perceived as the outcomes of Islamic 
fundamentalist practice. From Table 6.3, a discourse of “women as traditional or conservative” refers 
to the effect of oppression on women who are unable to modernize as a result of the Islamic law in 
Malaysia, claimed as discriminatory against women. MM and ZA proposed for the Islamic law to be 
amended to be more progressive. They also promoted “a discourse of women as progressive” to 
empower women in a modern Islamic society. In tackling child marriage issue, MM and ZA 
challenged “a discourse of Muslim men as superior to Muslim women or girls”, which is a dominant 
discourse of Islamic fundamentalism. To argue against the dominant discourse, both writers 
promoted an alternative discourse of “Muslim women or girls as equal to men”. 
Seen in Table 6.4 are discourses on Islam which are challenged and promoted by the two 
writers. MM and ZA challenge the inequality and injustice in Islamic law as they claimed Muslim 
women’s rights are different from Muslim men. Both of them also questioned “a discourse of Islam 
as divine law” and drew on an alternative discourse of “progressive Islamic law” which they thought 
is better suited in a contemporary Malaysian society. Another area where Muslim women have been 
disempowered is when they are unfairly treated or discriminated against in Islamic law, unlike 
women in other societies or faiths, and is apparent in the data and named in this study as a discourse 
of “religious segregation”. MM and ZA claimed that “a discourse of religious segregation” existed in 
Malaysia because of the separate laws for Muslims and non-Muslims. To promote a more positive 
setting in challenging a traditional Islamic discourse, MM and ZA drew on the discourses of 
“equality and justice” and “religious parity/religion as fair” in the practice of Islam so that everyone 
in Malaysia receives equal treatment, regardless of one’s religion. 
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In challenging the separate Islamic law in Malaysia, MM and ZA were seen employing 
discursive actions of challenging IFL as discriminatory, unequal and unjust. As explained in Chapter 
One, there are many areas where Muslim women are discriminated against, for example, 
polygamous marriage is viewed as in favour of men after the condition to marry was changed to be 
“just or necessary”. Matrimonial assets division was changed to using gender neutral language 
resulting in men having the right to claim the assets before contracting a polygamous marriage. 
Before this, only women are allowed to apply for dissolution of marriage as they have no rights to 
pronounce divorce. Now, the right to dissolve marriage is now also given to men, however, the right 
to pronounce divorce remains as a men’s right. Similar to Malaysia’s performance in the Gender 
Gap Index report, based on the 2005 Amendments in Islamic Family Law, in their columns, MM 
and ZA claimed that the situation has not improved since Muslim women still face injustice and 
inequality. ZA also claimed that Malaysia used to have a more progressive Islamic law which made 
other Muslim countries look up to Malaysia. However, since amendments were done to the law, she 
alleged that Malaysia has been regressing. 
Both writers also were found to contest today’s interpretations of Islamic religious texts in 
order to apply in everyday lives. MM’s discursive actions extended to challenging Islamic family 
law’s (IFL) credibility and celebrating progressive laws from other countries. Similar discursive 
actions were seen displayed by ZA as she criticized the implementation of “authentic” Islam and 
contested the misuse and manipulation of Islam. In her column, ZA argued that the Islamic law is not 
divine and can be challenged because the interpretation was done by humans. She especially 
opposed to the notion of child marriage which she refused to accept as “divine”. MM also criticized 
child marriage and claimed the legalization of child marriage as “uncivilised”. Other actions by ZA 
included proposing a reform in IFL and the same rights for everyone. SIS is active in advocating for 
Islamic law reform and engaging with the government on various legal issues. However, SIS also 
received criticisms and backlash from Muslim scholars and PAS, the Islamic party whenever they 
question decisions made by Syariah Courts.    
Based on the issue of IFL in the newspaper columns, MM was found to position some 
Muslim men who oppose SIS and their struggle for gender equality as conceited and Muslim women 
as regressing in Malaysia, as a result of separate laws from non-Muslims. ZA was seen positioning 
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Malaysian Muslim women as victims of religious apartheid. Girls were also positioned as victims. 
The act of positioning used by MM and ZA illustrates the powerlessness of Muslim women and girls 
who face injustice from Islamic law. In contrast, MM positioned some men as supporters of women 
MM was seen constructing Malaysian men as intelligent and compassionate, not only in order for the 
male population to listen to their voices, but also to offer a sign of hope that there is a group of men 
out there who actually try to understand the predicament of Muslim women in Malaysia today. 
Powerful positions were made by MM when she positioned non-Muslim women in Malaysia as 
progressive and NGOs as protesters of unjust laws.  
.  
6.2.3 Pursuing a feminist agenda within a Malaysian Islamic context 
 
Chapter Five looks at how MM and ZA pursued their feminist agenda within a Malaysian Islamic 
context. In challenging criticisms aimed at Islamic feminists, both of them negotiated Muslim 
women’s identities and empowered women with new and liberated identities. They also wrote about 
a Malaysian-based global movement called Musawah which was formed to strive for equality in 
Muslim law for women.  
The following Tables 6.5 and 6.6 are discourses on Muslim women and discourses on Islam 
as mentioned in Chapter Five. 
 
Table 6.5 Discourses on Muslim women 
 
Dominant Discourses Alternative Discourses 
1. Traditional/conservative Muslim women 
2. Women as weak and powerless 
3. Muslim women as unequal/inferior to 
Muslim men 
1. “New” (Liberated) Muslim women  
2. Female solidarity 
3. Muslim women as equal to Muslim men 
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Table 6.6 Discourses on Islam 
 
Dominant Discourses Alternative Discourses 
1. Islamic fundamentalism 
2. Feminist groups as un-Islamic/anti-Islam 
 
3. Islamic scholars as having the only/last say 
on religious matters 
Muslim women as silent or must shut up 
1. Progressive Islam and modernity 
2. Feminist groups as Islamic 
Islamic feminism 
3. The rights to speak out 
 
 
In MM’s and ZA’s deconstruction of Islamic fundamentalist discourse, Muslim women’s 
freedom and opportunities in work and education are limited as they are expected to assume the 
traditional gender roles as wives and mothers. As seen in Table 6.5, to contest gender discourses of 
Muslim women as “traditional and conservative”, through their columns, MM and ZA work to 
construct new and liberated Muslim women identities. They offer alternative discourses of Muslim 
women as “progressive”, “educated, independent” and “champions or leaders” to inspire other 
women to be the same. MM and ZA also drew on “a discourse of female solidarity” to challenge a 
gender discourse of “women as weak and powerless”. Both MM and ZA write about women in their 
columns and draw on “female solidarity discourse” in order to connect to other women in similar 
positions, or women who are victims of the injustice under the law. They found solidarity not only in 
Malaysian Muslim women, but also with Muslim women from other countries and Malaysian 
women from other faiths. In Malaysia, SIS is already working with other human rights and women’s 
NGOs since SIS a part of NGOs coalition called the Joint Action Group for Gender Equality (JAG). 
The connection SIS had with an international group, Musawah, gave a significant impact of a 
discourse of “female solidarity” which was extended to Muslim women from all over the world. 
Even though Musawah is a global movement, it is based in Malaysia with ZA as the leader herself. 
MM and ZA were seen pursuing their feminist agenda as they challenged “a discourse of Muslim 
women as unequal/inferior to Muslim men” and offered an alternative discourse of “Muslim women 
as equal to Muslim men”. 
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From Table 6.6, both MM and ZA challenged the “Islamic fundamentalist discourse” but 
through their writing, they have created an alternative discourse of “progressive Islam and 
modernity” based on the discourse of religious reform to contest how Muslim women are 
represented and to offer more favorable Islamic notions and practices. ZA opposed Islamists’ agenda 
of creating an Islamic state, claimed as representing the “authentic” Islam. Instead, she promoted 
Muslims to live according to the teachings of Islam in a democratic, modern and pluralistic state. ZA 
positively reconstructed Islamic society in Malaysia as consisting of both progressive women as well 
as men that has the potential to uphold the practice of equality and justice. What is interesting to note 
is ZA viewed an Islamic state as incapable of being modern. 
Since they are both feminists, they both promote a discourse of “Islamic feminism”. 
However, the interpretation of Islam by MM, ZA and their group, SIS, have been criticized as 
un-Islamic by various Muslim scholars and the Islamic political party, PAS. Nonetheless, in their 
columns, they often defended that their cause is within an Islamic framework. They were seen 
challenging the traditional male interpretation of the religious text and proposed for reinterpretation 
to explore areas that Muslim women are discriminated against. MM defended “a discourse of 
feminist groups as Islamic” to contest the discourse of Islamic feminist group as “un-Islamic”. These 
two competing discourses are on the total opposite as both sides claim their position is right and the 
other side is wrong. MM and ZA also criticized the discourses of “Islamic scholars as having the 
only or last say on religious matters” and “Muslim women as silent or must shut up”. These 
discourses were discussed briefly in Chapter One but in Chapter Three, I presented more data as 
MM and ZA argued against the criticisms towards their beliefs. In doing so, the solution offered in 
their newspaper columns was the promotion of a discourse of “speaking out” as everyone’s equal 
rights to talk about religion. 
The findings of MM discursive actions in their feminist agenda pursuit showed that MM 
contested Islamic extremism but celebrated the relevance between human rights and religion. ZA’s 
discursive actions were found to include promoting a paradigm shift of Islamic understanding as she 
has been supportive of reinterpreting the Quran to eliminate discrimination against women. She was 
also seen rejecting patriarchal construction of “ideal Muslim women” according to Islamic 
fundamentalists’ interpretation which limited women and made women as inferior to men.  
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MM and ZA were seen negotiating their identities from powerless women to powerful 
positions. This is a significant role of their newspaper columns as they presented what they 
(including other Muslim women) have achieved and been able to do. Their powerful identities serve 
as a strategy to relate to the audience, both those who are on their side and those who oppose them. 
MM and ZA positioned themselves as educated feminists but are still believers. MM positioned SIS 
as a group demanding equality and justice for women. This is important to keep the audience 
informed of their own stand as Islamic feminists, especially when they received criticisms as 
incompetent to talk about religion. By positioning themselves as educated, they are claiming the right 
of reinterpreting the religious texts by everyone, which they claimed should not necessarily be 
confined to theologians. MM and ZA drew on “a discourse of modernity” and positioned Malaysian 
Muslim women as capable of being economically and financially independent. This positioning 
strategy places Muslim women in a powerful position and serves as empowering the audience who 
may relate to their ideologies and beliefs. To challenge the power upheld by Islamic fundamentalists, 
MM positioned Muslim scholars as unjust. ZA was found to position people who criticize SIS as 
“extremists” and some “experts in Islam” as authoritarians. ZA positioned SIS as the extremists’ 
“enemies” to illustrate how different their ideologies and Islamic fundamentalists’ ideologies are. On 
the contrary, MM was also seen positioning some religious leaders with positive identities as 
“human rights defenders” and some female religious scholars as knowledgeable in Islam and 
qualified to talk about it.  
 
6.3 Discussion  
 
MM’s and ZA’s newspaper columns were articulated together in a wide range of genres and 
discourses from different orders of discourse consisting of media, political, religious and legal 
discourses. Political discourse intersected strongly with media discourse in Malaysia since the 
government formed based on a Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition of various dominant political parties 
has control over major media agencies. The newspapers under analysis, The Star and the New Straits 
Times are owned by MCA and UMNO respectively, which are a part of BN coalition (Anuar, 2005; 
Hashim, 2006). The ultimate freedom of the media is still debatable because most media companies 
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are owned by BN which controls the content of the media. The opposition parties, including PAS, do 
not have any control of the mainstream media. The freedom of speech remains an active discourse of 
debate between media practitioners in Malaysia. Journalists in Malaysian media need to follow strict 
journalism regulations as they are bound by the Sedition Act which prevents them from scrutinizing 
the government.  
The selected data from MM’s and ZA’s articles were selected from both The Star and the 
New Straits Times making MCA and UMNO as indirectly responsible for their publication. The 
ownership of the media by MCA and UMNO denotes the support of the government which 
embodies a “corporate ideology” (Ong, 1999) on SIS’s voice and how they interpret Islam. I believe 
it is also the government’s underlying support of the state to resist against the Islamist discourse 
supported by many Muslim scholars and PAS, the Islamic political party and various other Islamic 
groups.  
Legal discourse became the central focus in MM’s and ZA’s newspaper columns. The 
subject of Islamic law has been found recurring in their columns. Both of them claimed some areas 
in the Islamic Family Law (IFL) discriminate against Muslim women even after the latest 
amendments were made in 2005, especially when they compared with non-Muslim women who fall 
under the jurisdiction of civil law when it involves family law. From their discourse of “equality and 
justice” in IFL, I found MM and ZA’s constant call for reforms in IFL and reinterpretation of the 
Quran especially in polygamy, divorce and matrimonial assets. Their views on Islamic law and 
Islamic state versus progressive Islamism were reflected in their arguments. 
SIS’s methodology is not accepted by many since most members are not trained theologian 
(Foley, 2004: 61). However, besides other strategies by the group to uphold gender equality for 
Muslim women, MM and ZA still contribute their writing in the newspaper columns using the power 
of language capital through the media texts. There are various ways of “enacting power” 
(Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999) and writing for newspaper columns about religious discourse is 
one of them. MM’s and ZA’s columns are strategically designed to achieve particular outcomes of 
disseminating their ideologies to the audience with a possible intention of: i) educating and changing 
the audience’s views on gender inequality faced by Muslim women in Islamic law, and ii) combating 
criticisms against SIS and themselves made by various Muslim scholars and Islamic fundamentalist 
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groups.  
I see MM and ZA as having the support of the mainstream media as the newspapers they 
write for are owned by the pro-government political parties. However, their voice is still 
marginalized in the Malaysian Muslim society due to their liberal approach of the religion. They 
channeled the power of the newspaper medium to probe into religious discourses. Even though they 
claimed they represent marginalized Muslim women who are discriminated against, they are at the 
advantage because they are able to utilize the media for their own purpose. This, in a way, mitigates 
the rise of Islam which has an alliance with the state of Kelantan, claimed by MM and ZA as 
retrogressive to women. On the other hand, the limitation of the Islamic political party’s freedom in 
the media contradicts MM’s and ZA’s discourse of “speaking out” and the right to talk about the 
religion as everyone’s right.  
Another reason why SIS is not favourable among patriarchal Muslim scholars is because SIS 
is regarded as “a westernized group” (Foley, 2004: 62). SIS’s radical views especially on veiling and 
modesty is the complete opposite of what most Muslims practice since SIS argue that the Quran has 
never forced women to cover their head completely but gives women a choice based on their faith. 
In view of SIS’s Islamic feminist discourse, Ong argued that SIS still has not delved into women’s 
basic rights over their own bodies (Ong, 1999: 365). From the analysis of newspaper columns by 
MM and ZA, I found that although they do oppose to the conservative Islamic control of how 
Muslim women should dress, they still do not address women’s right to sexual autonomy or 
premarital sex since this is a taboo subject in Malaysia especially among Muslims. The question of 
the kind of feminism SIS really is surfaces. Through MM’s and ZA’s writing, I view SIS as still 
struggling to convince the audience about Islamic feminism, although they have tried to negotiate 
their multiple powerful identities in a “new Islamic public sphere”. From time to time they have to 
remind the readers that their work is “within Islamic framework”. This is apparent in MM’s and ZA’s 
columns when they write about matters on Islam and they refer to the religious texts or quote 
Muslim scholars’ work. 
MM and ZA also promoted discourses of “modernities and progressive Islam”, which is the 
aim of Islamic feminist projects. Their interpretation of Islamic tradition in Islamic feminist 
discourse covers the politics of citizenship, rights and public space. MM and ZA also possess an 
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advantage in language capital. Both of them write for English newspapers, which is also the 
preferred language used in SIS’s website. By using English, MM and ZA are able to reach out and 
influence a specific group of educated Malaysian audience who mostly reside in urban areas. SIS 
engages itself with various NGOs in Malaysia which have similar ideological viewpoint of 
upholding women’s rights and equality. English is also considered an international language; 
therefore, MM’s and ZA’s aim is possibly to also influence the international audience. SIS also works 
with various individual Muslims and Islamic feminist movements from other countries. Islamic a 
discourse of “female solidarity” to represent, promote and sustain egalitarian identitiefeminists use s. 
In exploring their identities in a “new Islamic public sphere”, I found that MM and ZA have 
created and enjoyed a constructed social positioning through their discursive activities in their 
columns. They positioned themselves as Islamic feminists who take part in understanding the 
interpretation of religious texts by themselves especially concerning matters involving Muslim 
women. They also took control of “othering” by others and re-negotiated their positioning to 
empowerment. The newspaper columns gave them the medium to control of their own identities to 
challenge powerless, marginalized positions Muslim women are in. In Malaysian context, SIS may 
be viewed as extremists by some but to SIS, they see the Islamic fundamentalists as extremists. I 
view MM’s and ZA’s strategy of positioning themselves as Islamic feminists as their attempt to 
distinguish themselves from the version of Muslim women created by Islamists. SIS represents a 
different version from “ideal Muslim women” according to conservative Islamic society, but MM 
and ZA do not deny they are Muslims. Through their newspaper columns, they constituted identities 
in the use of discursive tools to privilege themselves and created cultural capital. I agree with Moll’s 
description of SIS as a “self-identified Islamic feminist civil society” organization. They attempted to 
represent their own Islamic practice as modern so they utilized this content in the columns for this 
reason. 
 
6.4 Future research 
 
This study has examined two feminist writers’ columns in Malaysian English newspapers which 
focussed on gender inequality issues faced by Muslim women in Malaysia. Some possible future 
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research based on this study can be carried out. 
First, a possible study is to use a similar framework of this study using a combination of 
CDA and FPDA but examine gender inequality issues concerning women from other faiths in 
Malaysian media. As mentioned earlier, Malaysia is a multi-ethnicities country, thus, this study can 
look at how Buddhists or Christians female writers employ their discursive actions, position 
themselves and others, and negotiate their identities in Malaysia.  
Thus study looks at written data; however, it is also possible to explore a similar study of 
discourse analysis to examine language use in electronic media such as television or radio, which is 
spoken data. Similar theme on Muslim women gender issues featured on electronic media can be 
selected for data analysis. This may contribute to a variety in media language analysis concerning 
Muslim women’s struggle in gaining equal rights.  
Another possible research is to do a discourse analysis of male writers’ writings on gender 
and Islam. This study uses data from Muslim female writers so another alternative is to examine 
Muslim male writers’ attitudes towards women. A discourse analysis study of their ideologies, 
positioning of selves and others can reveal the discourses that they draw on or challenge. This is 
important to see whether the male writers support or challenge “a discourse of Islamic 
fundamentalism”. A related study to that is to examine Muslim masculine identities by male writers. 
It is definitely significant to see how Muslim men construct their identities in a Muslim society in 
Malaysia. 
A final possible research can be to triangulate the qualitative data of this study with some 
quantitative data. This study only uses qualitative data that is to analyse rich data from MM’s and 
ZA’s columns instead of looking at numbers and figures. It is still possible to examine the columns 
and turn this into a quantitative study. One possible study is to use a corpus analysis in which the 
newspaper articles have to be from a corpus and one may conduct a study of concordance to analyse 
keywords or word frequencies. Another possible study under corpus linguistic is word collocation, 
which is to look at words or terms that co-occur in the columns. However, a different framework and 
methodology is needed to change into a quantitative research. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, I have examined MM’s and ZA’s discursive actions, positioning and discourses to 
answer the research questions, in which I explored how MM and ZA deconstructed Islamic 
fundamentalism discourse, challenged Islamic law, and pursued their feminist agenda through media 
texts. MM and ZA were seen consistently contesting criticisms and negative identities of themselves 
and other women. On the other hand, they were seen positioning themselves and other Muslim 
women in identities of empowerment through their work to deconstruct negative positions of 
Muslim women. MM and ZA were also seen to contest dominant religious and gendered discourses 
and to promote alternative discourses such as “a discourse of Islamic feminism” and “a discourse of 
equality and justice”.  
Both writers promoted the discourse of Islamic feminism throughout their writings, and 
employed similar discourses in their columns in order to serve as models for women to empower 
themselves and attain human rights. Importantly, this is to be accomplished not outside of Islam, but 
on the contrary, within an Islamic framework and according to the teachings of the Quran, which 
clearly promotes equality. MM and ZA argued that the practice of the Islamic Family Law is 
discriminatory against Muslim women, but that non-Muslim women are not affected, hence the 
existence of the “religious segregation discourse” in Malaysia. Rather than settling for the traditional 
norms, MM and ZA contested the dominant discourses of “patriarchal Islam” and “conservative 
women” by constructing new identities of Muslim women today as educated, independent, and 
progressive. Throughout the selected extracts, both MM and ZA were seen reconstructing 
contemporary Muslim women as reformist and liberal without neglecting Islamic values.  
While I agree with Ong (1999, p. 365) that the rise of Islamic feminist voices in Malaysia is 
due to the country’s presentation of itself as a secular country practicing ‘corporatist Islam’, I argue 
that the voice of SIS through MM and ZA marks a bold and progressive approach. This is an 
important development where Muslim women are becoming able to negotiate their identities in 
Malaysian society and contribute to the development of a progressive Islamic country. Women in 
SIS view Malaysia as not just any Muslim country, but as a progressive Muslim country. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Data conventions 
 
[  ]   Implied meaning 
[…]   Ellipses 
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Appendix 2 
 
Glossary 
 
fasaakh  Dissolution of a marriage 
fatwa   Religious rulings or edict 
hadith  Collected sayings and customs of the prophet Muhammad 
hijab   Veiling for women  
hudud law   Islamic criminal laws 
ijma’   Decision by consensus  
ijtihad  Independent reasoning 
kadi   Religious judges 
kafir    Unbelievers 
mufti   Religious counsels 
murtaad  Apostate  
Quran  Muslim religious text 
sunnah  A collection of the Prophet’s model behavior  
syariah law  Islamic law (Derived from Arabic language, syariah is the preferred spelling in 
Malaysia, otherwise commonly spelled as shari’ah or sharia in other countries) 
talaq Divorce 
ulama Religious scholars 
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Appendix 3 
 
List of MM’s newspaper columns 
 
 
 No. Date Title 
1 #19 December 28, 2005 Ignominious end 
2 #21 January 25, 2006 True equality  
3 #24 March 10, 2006 No cheer for Muslim women 
4 #25 March 22, 2006 A first for women  
5 #27 May 3, 2006 The followers  
6 #34 August 9, 2006 Limitations on speech  
7 #43 December 20, 2006 A matter of tolerance  
8 #55 June 8, 2007 Shouting down the majority voice  
9 #72 February 27, 2008 Still a man’s world, politically 
10 #77 May 7, 2008 A knee-jerk response, again  
11 #88 November 5, 2008 Energised and empowered  
12 #95 February 18, 2009 Great to be making history  
13 #103 June 10, 2009 Veiled view of equal rights  
14 #112 October 28, 2009 Need for solidarity against injustice 
15 #114 November 25, 2009 Beware of ‘terrorists’ within  
16 #129 July 21, 2010 Let women judges do their job 
17 #139 December 8, 2010 Marriage is not about legalising sex 
18 #147 April 13, 2011 In defense of women’s rights 
   
 (from The Star, 2005 - 2011) 
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Appendix 4 
 
List of ZA’s newspaper columns 
 
 
 No. Date Title 
1 #1 March 24, 2006 Let there be public debate on laws 
2 #2 April 7, 2006 Seeking justice for Muslim women 
3 #5 May 19, 2006 Changing the Muslim Mindset 
4 #6 June 2, 2006 It's men who are the surplus goods 
5 #12 August 25, 2006 How much I love thee, Malaysia 
6 #20 December 15, 2006 Women wise up to their rights 
7 #29 May 11, 2007 Move fast to close gender gap 
8 #39 July 6, 2008 Unjust and unnecessary 
9 #43 December 2, 2008 A flock that grows a-weary 
10 #46 February 1, 2009 Neither alien nor a threat 
11 #48 July 5, 2009 Silence not the women 
12 #54 February 7, 2010 Treat us not like kids 
13 #57 June 6, 2010 Nothing divine in child marriage 
14 #60 October 3, 2010 Valuable voice of progress  
15 #62 February 6, 2011 Beware wave for rights  
16 #63 March 13, 2011 Closing the gender gap  
 
(from the New Straits Times, 2006 – 2007; The Star, 2008 - 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
